The Hornswoggle Problem : The Hard Problem

The study of consciousness in modern day psychology is becoming increasingly difficult to explain. In the early days of consciousness studies it may have been explained as our experience or awareness (Blackmore, 2010). However, over a number of years, there have been many psychologists who have contributed many important theories towards the explanation of how consciousness works, and its initial existence. As Chalmers states: “There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing harder to explain” (Chalmers, 1995 p.200). Being one of the leading philosophers in consciousness, David Chalmers introduced the idea of the Hard Problem in 1994. Chalmers defined the hard problem as: “The questions of how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience” (Chalmers, 1995 p.63). Chalmers suggested that he found it difficult to understand how a small mass of grey matter such as the brain could produce conscious experience. These ideas of a ‘hard problem’ in consciousness were rejected by a number of theorists, which will be discussed later in the essay. Another idea which Chalmers has put forward is the zombie. A zombie, according to Chalmers is a being identical to you and I, speaks like you, acts like you, but is not conscious (Blackmore, 2010). A zombie contains no qualia (a physical conscious experience). The idea of the zombie put forward by Chalmers is extremely important in the explanation of consciousness and has been

To define such a universally experienced phenomena as consciousness may seem on the most superficial level rather unnecessary. Yet a more scientific, and at times philosophical, investigation into the phenomena demands some sort of confirmed interpretation which supercedes any such common understanding. For our purposes the content of consciousness may be deemed those things of which one is aware and thus can report. Thinking, as well, and the higher-level mechanisms associated there in may also be components of this consciousness. While additionally an individuals' conception that the way in which she experiences the world comes from more than just the neuronal activity of her brain can be understood as a contribution

Many arguments in the philosophy of the mind have been made for and against, whether or not the mind and the brain are the same entity. The mind-brain identity theory is the view that the mind is the brain and that mental states are brain states (Mandik 77). Therefore, we can identify sensations and other mental processes with physical brain processes (Blutner 4). I argue, that the mind is not identical to the brain, and the conceivable idea of zombies, as well as the multiple realizability argument, can disprove this theory.

There are four major points outlined by the author. The first one is the central role of consciousness in the traditional mind-body problem. The relationships between mind and body cannot be explained without the proper comprehending of consciousness and its role. The second one is the incorrect approaches utilized by the modern reductionists. Their examples and analogies are inapplicable to the mind-body problem. The third one is that experience of any specie or organism has a highly subjective character. Therefore, people cannot even image what it means to be a bat. The fourth one is the need for determining the optimal balance between comprehending the objective physical processes and beings’

However, as the article, and time frame the article occurs in, progresses, the indirect observation of the conscious mind becomes more deliberate. It becomes the aim of the research rather than a secondary result. For instance, the work of Weiskrantz and Bisiach indicates an intentional and deliberate studying of consciousness, through scientific processes involving “blindsight,” (31-32) and “inattentive,” vision (33), respectively. The correct responses in the studies yielded by individuals who have been rendered incapable of consciously correctly answering the questions provides solid, scientific evidence of unconscious processes that enabled their behavior, and also indicates a shift in the article toward a more objective take on the scientific method. However, the work indicates not only an evolution and advancement of the scientific discoveries highlighted—that is, the discussion of consciousness—but also an evolution of the scientific process itself away from the antiquated practices of pseudoscience that the piece highlights near its start, and toward the scientific method as it is known

Materialism aims to disprove these ‘danglers’, ever facing backlash from immaterialists and dualists, asserting that mental processes exist independently of material reality and that there are no correlational laws between mind and body. The development of Artificial Intelligence has immensely impacted the study of human behaviour and consciousness as a scientific, emergent phenomenon. However, so far, the goal of replicating consciousness is yet to be reached. American theoretical linguist Noam Chomsky argues that the brain is similar to a complex mechanism, however unlike any previously understood one. Despite this, some physicalistic materialists still consider the brain, including consciousness, as a group of ‘reflex mechanisms’ (JCC. Smart,

mind would in response to the same input does not prove the presence of subjective consciousness.

Dr. Anil Seth combines cognitive science, neuroscience, psychiatry, brain imaging techniques and mathematics to explain why consciousness exists at all. He talks about the distinction, which is passed from Descartes, between the “easy problem” and the “hard problem”. The easy problem being to understand how the brain and the body give rise to perception, cognition, behaviour and learning. The hard problem being to understand how and why we have phenomenal experiences or qualia and how all of this should be associated with consciousness at all: why aren’t we just machines, without any inner world/experiences? It is intriguing to think that solving the easy problem would get us nowhere in solving the hard problem, which leaves the brain basis

Andy Clark and David Chalmers take a unique stance on cognition and cognitive processes. Cognition is the process of thinking, and many believe that it must occur exclusively within the brain. Clark and Chalmers dispute this idea, by proposing the idea of extended cognition and active externalism. In this paper I intend to shed light on the basic views of Andy Clark and David Chalmers. I also intend to inform the audience on different the perspectives of a representational theory of mind, and argue a case for extended cognition and representational consciousness in animals.

Peter Hacker, a 20th century philosopher, argues that the current notions, held by neuroscientists and philosophers, regarding the brain and consciousness are illogical. Subsequently, he discusses, in his opinion, the current misconceptions we have today.

Whether a scientific theory of consciousness could be provided requires the theory to account for properties of sensations. Place thinks some philosophers struggle to accept a scientific theory by falling for the phenomenological fallacy. Some have posited descriptions of experience lye within the mental cinema (pg. 49). Place characterized the fallacy of thinking that when we perceive something green we are perceiving something green in the mind as ‘the phenomenological fallacy’. He writes, if we assume, for example, that when a subject reports a green after-image he is asserting the occurrence inside himself of an object which is literally green, it is clear that we have on our hands an entity for which there is no place in the world of physics. He proposes the descriptions of green after-images are descriptions of a sort of normal response in contexts involving green light.

Consciousness is a broad topic that spans many different schools of thought. Its role in

Taken advantages of identity claims, Place (1956) suggest the thesis that “’consciousness is a process in the brain’” (Place, 1956/1970, p. 42). Let us do some remarks about this statement, interestingly, Place use the word ‘process’, and this may be expectable from his theory, and this word was not chose by chance, similarly, the use of “is” shall be fundamental in Place’s view. To defends his identity theory, the first line of argument according to Place is to setup the semantic use of ‘is’, he identify ‘is’ as definition and composition; the use of ‘is’ in an identity statement according to Place should be a composition, therefore the expression “consciousness is a brain process” needs to be understood in terms of composition rather than

This statement sets an informative tone, “Hassin’s key experiment results suggests that the unconscious mind has more sophisticated capacities than many have thought. Unlike other tests of non-conscious processing, this wasn’t an automatic response to a stimulus – it required a precise answer following the rules of arithmetic, which you might have assumed would only come with deliberation.”, while also demonstrating the accuracy of this new distinguished nearly irrefutable data (Stafford par. 6). Furthermore, uncertainties about the author’s introduction of the research scientist, Hassin, and the colleges not mentioned in the writing “Your subconscious is smarter than you might think.” Indeed, Safford appears to lead the audience blindly, without raw data or statistics, on Hassin’s key experiment, but seems to acknowledge that although this experiment pushes us leaps and bounds further than where we started there is delightfully more information about “the power and reach of our unconscious minds”(par.

By using the idea of the philosophical zombie, David Chalmers successfully argues that physics is not able to explain consciousness. First, I will explain how Chalmers uses the idea of philosophical zombie to overthrow the basis of physicalism, and then I will present an argument against Chalmers’ solution. Ultimately I will offer a counter-argument that Chalmers might respond with, concluding that Chalmers’ argument against physicalism succeeds.