The Impact Of Game Theory On The Domestic Level Of Analysis

The third level of analysis also has the ability to, within the models that can view the state as non-monolithic, presume that the different groups have similar interests and share the same hierarchy of goals by use of the organizational model; or, it can explore the presumption that the different groups have different interests by use of the bureaucratic model. Furthermore, because the focus of level three analysis is on the participants in the decision making process, the psychological aspects that influence the actions of the groups and individuals who influence the actions that the state are considered as well. These psychological aspects can include the perceptions of an individual that are shaped by their past experiences, stereotypes formed through those experiences and their own personal values. The third level of analysis, because of all that it takes into consideration, has a completeness in understanding international relations than cannot be matched by the first and second levels of analysis.

Threat affects the dependent variable of state behavior. Walt states that powers will either balance or bandwagon against another state. “If a weak state is on good terms with a powerful state, the weak state will be unlikely to balance against the stronger state.” Furthermore, the weaker state is likely to benefit from the alliance because of added security. However, “if the weaker state perceives the stronger state as a threat, then the weaker state will balance against the strong state in order to protect itself.” Additionally, if the state is not a good terms with the rival state, it is unable to bandwagon and will therefore engage in balancing. Balancing can be broken up into internal and external parts. A state can either build up their

Strategy is difficult and complex by its very nature, its nature is constant but its character is evolving due to changes in technology, society and political ideas. Strategy can be dynamic or static, depending upon the stability of the means or ends, it may change if new means become available or if different ends appear to be preferable. Strategist understanding of the tangible and intangible factors and instruments of national power in addition to the interplay relation and weighing them collectively is a key to formulate and execute strategy. In this paper, I will explain these factors, how they are interconnected and how strategists should weigh them in formulating and executing strategy along with a practical example the Indochina war in 1946.

John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism follows similar assumptions to that of other realist theories such as Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli’s realism, or Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism. Mearsheimer’s theory operates on five core assumptions. First, as with other realist theories, Mearsheimer assumes that the international system is anarchic, meaning there is no overarching institution that governs nation states. Second, under offensive realism all great powers possess offensive military capabilities. Third, States can never be sure that other states will not use their offensive military capabilities against them. Fourth, drawing from neorealist thought, states seek to maintain their survival above all other goals. Finally, all states within the system are rational actors (Mearsheimer, 2001).

The origins of Game Theory trace back to a letter written by Francis Waldegrave in 1713 which proposed a minimax mixed strategy solution to a two-person card game named le Her. In the following century Charles Darwin acted as one of the pioneers in broadening the realm of this theory into the biology of evolution as he applied the theoretic strategy in his argument of natural selection power to equalize the sex equilibrium ratio in nature. Game Theories initial applications were restricted to two person zero-sum games where the pay-off matrix was symmetric, or in other words that the sum of the payoffs to the two participants maintains a constant value. However, modern adaptations of game theory came into play after John von Neumann

Difficult to analyse to what extent national security is a primary objective of states – theories of IR will help explain states’ motives and how they go about maximising state security, if it is their prime objective at all.

The third and final constant factor originates directly as a result of the anarchic international environment. As stated, a state acts largely in its own best interest. However, given more than one state exists, multiple interests oftentimes intersect. Competition, the final constant, results from this intersection. Rarely, this competition spins out of control into armed conflict. Prior to engaging in war, a state must carefully weigh any potential benefits against likely costs. Mearsheimer defines this as calculated aggression. Most likely, state-level competition remains at a level lower than war. Over time, state power balances develop and eventually solidify. Most importantly, state competition, a state’s prevailing interest to secure an improved chance for its continued survival, remains firmly in place. Seen in this light, both Waltz and Gilpin’s arguments for modifying or upending this balance make better sense. Waltz argues that the international structure limits state behavior. A state can pursue its interest only so far as to not upset the international balance.

Kenneth Waltz in his book Man, the State, and War, distinguished three images of international relations, or levels of analysis, in terms of which we usually try to analyze the causes of war. According to the first image, war is traceable to human nature and behavior. It is embedded within the human psychology. However, Dougherty argued that international war cannot be adequately explained only by reference to psychological and biological explanations of individual aggressiveness. The first image does not provide a rational explanation for the causes that led to the Cold War, as it is limited to the human psychology. This individual level of analysis points towards the way individual leaders and their inner circles decide to go to war. George W. Bush’s decision to go to Iraq in the second Gulf War can serve as an example for a decision that was made through this first image. President Bush and

Professor Eric Maskin was born in New York City on 12 December, 1950. He spent his child and high school years in Alpine, New Jersey. Alpine was a very small town, so he has study his high school in the town of Tenafly. When he was at Tenafly high school he found Mathematics very interesting due to a great Calculus teacher named Francis Piersa. So he continued with Maths major at Harvard. Maskin happen to take some economics courses along with his degree in Mathematics. During his undergraduate studies he happened to attend Kenneth Arrow’s class on information economics, he said “Kenneth Arrow’s class was so inspiring that I decided to change direction. It seemed to me that economics combined the best of both worlds: the rigor of mathematics with the immediate relevance of a social science” (Maskin, 2013a). He continued at Harvard on his master’s and PhD in applied mathematics, but focused on economics. Maskin wrote his dissertation on mechanism design and social welfare on Arrow‟s direction (Maskin, 2008). In 2007, Eric Maskin was awarded Nobel Prize in economics along with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson for laying the fundamentals of mechanism design theory.

Generally interstate politics is a permanent bargaining game over the distribution of power, thus it describes world politics as a state of war and a struggle of power, and is pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflicts and war. Therefore, the best description for world politics is the constant possibility of war, because the nature of humanity or structure of international order allows wars to occur. Realists recognize that states go to war for significant reasons, which makes it difficult to understand the exact causes of wars. Hence, there is no question that states often begin wars to acquire power over a rival stateand to enhance their security (Dunny, Kurki, & Smith 2016), such as during the Cold War. Mogenthau (1945) argues that human nature is the main cause of war. He maintains that everyone was born with power that drives them to dominate each other. Thus power is the currency of international politics, which is therefore important to have a substantial amount of power and ensure a balance of power (Dunny, Kurki, & Smith 2016). Waltz (1979) is practical in stating that the primary goal of states is not to maximinze power, but to achieve or minimize the security needed (p126). This means that improving a nation’s power is indeed only a means to another end, that end being less of a reliance on maintaining high security, since that nation will be holding the power. The case in point here is that when the U.S formed an alliance with Western Europe, this

Realism’s strength remains grounded in its consistency with all states being naturally suspicious of each other’s intentions, the equilibrium is more stable than that of cooperation The theory’s weaknesses in predicting outcomes are primarily due to its disregard for politics at the domestic level. It is the domestic level that determines how a state interacts on the global platform, Realism weakness is the inability to explain the rise of powerful non-state organizations and how the most powerful country in the world declared war on an independent terrorist group (Synder, 2004: 55). For example, the post 9/11era has challenged many of the fundamentals of Realism because a group like AL-Qaeda are not contained within state borders but their influence affects many different

Game theory is the study of strategic decision making, cooperation and conflicts. The concepts appear when the actions of several agents are independent. The agents are like groups, individuals, firms or any combination of these. These ideology of provides a language to formulate, structure, analyze, and strategic scenarios. Specifically, it is the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision makers. This is mainly used in economics, psychology, logic and biology.

Whenever Game theory is taught at colleges, politics is one area that is never touched upon as an application of game theory. Though game theory in international relations and national politics has been a studied in detail in the past, there has been a recent increase in the popularity of this study. An increasing number of game models are extensively being used in informed studies of arms control, preservation of international peace, disarmament policies, environmental treaties, national politics, international trade negotiations and bargaining process etc., with all the studies sharing the assumption that all the players in the international arena are rational with respect to the goals they seek to advance.

In the Statecraft world, one is able to understand actions, decisions, and their implications on a state or even multiple states. The two main theories on how an actor can function are realism and idealism. In the game, those two theories have been put to action, each being used with different goals in mind. Since it is difficult to know what is happening in every state, my judgement is based on how certain states interact to identify which theory is in action. Between the states that use differing theories, there seems to be equal success, but the meaning of success differs between realists and idealists. While the idealist states have domestic issues and international cooperation as a high priority, realist states a more concerned with maintaining power. While there is not one state that seems the most successful overall, the state that will come out most successful in the end will most likely be one following the idealist approach.

This idea of self-preservation is essential to any sovereign state, and all take a similar stance on national security as the United States. One of protection. In order to accomplish this it is necessary for states to be able to implement goals on an international stage, thus requiring a certain amount of power. When it comes to the issue of obtaining power, two major methods become apparent. The control over space and the control over physical place. Both of these options available to states focus on power as “Condign (based on force), Compensatory (the use of various resources) or Conditioned (result of persuasion), and their sources as Personality (individuals) and Property (their material resources)” (Galbraith, 1983).