The Importance Of An Efficacious Frame Work

The analysis is then given to consumers and policy makers, once it is checked by the analyst supervisor and peers. The analyst should also be ready to give a briefing on short notice. But both the analyst and the policy maker or consumer have to be aware of at all times, is that the intelligence field does not know everything. “On any given subject, the intelligence community faces what is in effect a field of rocks, and it lacks the resources to turn over every one to see what threats to national security may lurk underneath” (Pillar).

The DNI has modestly more power than the old Directors of Central Intelligence (DCIs), but not enough to give the ODNI/AIS real clout. “Herding cats” remains a decent description of the ODNI’s basic role. The DNI has several duties and responsibilities, but for the subject of improving intelligence information sharing the focus will be directed towards: Improving Analytics, Improving Information Security, Improving Foreign Liaison Relationships, and the end state of Improving Information Sharing.

It contains various organizations and services such as International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), etc. (Peterson, 2005). In terms of intelligence, the IACP serves as a resource for police commanders and it’s website provides intelligence policies, information on training workshops, and publications. The International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Inc. (IALEIA) is a non-profit organization that is comprised of over 50 countries with about 1,800 members (Peterson, 2005). The members are analysts, intelligence officers, and police managers that are dedicated to educating the police community about the benefits of intelligence and analysis (Peterson, 2005). IALEIA have also published documents pertaining to intelligence and

Consolidation of the intelligence community under the DNI increases collaboration by inculcating a culture of “jointness”, similar to collaborative efforts by the military services following the Goldwater-Nichols reform. Second, establishment of the National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) provides DNI with a way to coordinate and focus collection efforts across the intelligence community. Lastly, The Library of National Intelligence provides a means for analysts across the intelligence community to gain access to additional sources.

According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence “post 9/11 investigations proposed sweeping change in the Intelligence Community, resulting in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The IRTPA created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to oversee a 17-organization Intelligence Community (IC) and improve information sharing and ensure integration across the nation's IC.” The efforts of the ODNI and the IC to find and kill Usama bin Laden (UBL) following the events of 9/11 were more than sufficient in achieving their mission. It may have taken the IC 10 years of working together to successfully track down the location where UBL was hiding in Pakistan, but they did it and

The production, analysis, or dissemination of intelligence can be improve to provide actual benefit to homeland security leaders and practitioners in numerous ways. For this to happening, everyone who receives access to intelligence reports must be educated about intelligence itself and willing to understand it. The Washington Post reported in 2004, no more than six senators read beyond the five-page executive summary of the NIE, although 77 senators voted to authorize the use of force in Iraq. (Lowenthal, 2008). Even though it was inevitable of going to war with Iraq. The NIE can foreshadow problems to occur, and could have aid senators in different ways. From understanding the situation better, to helping with foreign policy. Homeland security leaders and practitioners must be direct of what types of reports they are requiring.

Intelligence is both a procedure and an item and has assumed an essential part in discretion and fighting all through history. In the data age, intelligence has undertaken a much more noteworthy vitality. However in the mainstream media, the part, means, and reason for intelligence is regularly distorted, best case scenario. Just a modest division of intelligence officers perform covert intelligence assemble ing. They don't kill individuals, convey weapons or even wear trench layers. The larger part of the intelligence group completes its unremarkable undertakings at a work station and, while intelligence alone can- not stop the following terrorist assault, it is the basic initial phase in distinguishing and conceivably keeping

We deploy globally alongside war fighters and interagency partners to defend America’s national security interests.” [4] The Defense Intelligence Agency is always represented no matter where the military presence is located. They work side by side with military soldiers ensuring assisting with analysis and helping soldiers out in any way they are able to help out. The agency is often confused with law enforcement agencies, but they are not the only agencies this occurs too. Other foreign intelligence organizations have the same issue as well. The Department of Defense (DoD) who is over the Defense Intelligence Agency is in the public eye. Now that the public has much more awareness of their existence, the friction between the organizations is more prominently. “Defense Intelligence Agency is an all-source defense agency designed to prevent strategic surprise and deliver a decision advantage to war fighters, defense planners, and policymakers.” [5] The agency has multiple roles they are responsible for. Some of those roles include collection and analysis of defense-related foreign political, economic, industrial, geographic and medical and health intelligence. [6] Being able to be aggressive during the collection process and being analytically precise, it provides an advantage when making tough decisions for war fighters and the policymakers. This will allow the counter intelligence to be aggressive as well. By counter intelligence being aggressive policymakers along with the war fighters will be confident that the right decisions are being made on time and producing results. This is a critical part for the soldiers on the ground having to conduct these missions the Defense Intelligence Agency come up with and believe

The Director of National Intelligence, appointed by the Senate, works closely with the president. The DNI is to effectively integrate all national and homeland security intelligence in defense of the homeland and in support of the United States National security interests.

For ILP to be successful there has to be a clear understanding of the functions and roles of intelligence and information when applied to the decision-making process (Shaible and Sheffield, 2011), and there also has to be a clear understanding of what intelligence is. One of the issues with the ILP model is not understanding hoe information is turned into intelligence. It’s important to point out that information doesn’t equate to intelligence. Intelligence should be viewed as “information plus analysis”, and can also be defined as “Intelligence is not what is collected; it is what is produced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed. (Peterson 2005, 10). Both definitions emphasize that the collection of information or data does not equate to actionable intelligence, instead that information has to be analyzed in order to influence polices and affect the targeting process in criminal investigations and operations (Ratcliff, 2003).

Additionally, would streamlining the sharing of this information both vertically and horizontally at the federal, state and local levels improve efficiencies, effectiveness, and operability? There are almost 50 agencies from the President down to the local level that have “fingers in the pie” so to speak in the domestic intelligence gathering community. This paper will examine the complexity and inherent barriers within the domestic intelligence community from the federal to the state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) levels, then analyze the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and what appears to be a lack of unity amongst the disparate organizations at both the federal and SLTT levels, and finally assess the levels of training and operational effectiveness to evaluate the overall performance efficiency of the intelligence community at the enterprise level. A way forward is also presented at the end of each section to provide suggested

Throughout Intelligence Community’s history, there has been multiple attempts to input reform measures into various agencies. Often met with pushback, the reform attempts typically fail or are weak in merit. Being unaccepting of reform and showing little adaptation towards newer strategies and technological advancements, the IC was caught unprepared to thwart the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the twin towers and the Pentagon. Some governmental reports, those that have assessed the IC’s actions regarding the devastating attack, have noted that greater cooperative efforts between various agencies may have halted the terrorist attack. The creation of a Homeland Intelligence Organization could be the start of implementation of a reform to bring the IC closer together.

and ensure resilience to disasters. In order to achieve these goals, intelligence is necessary. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, a subsection to the DHS focuses on obtaining and analyzing intelligence and puts them into the Homeland Security Enterprise which primarily

The United States Intelligence community draws on advanced technology and analytical techniques. An intelligence process that sets objectives, collects, analyzes, and report findings, with feedback loops integrated throughout. Explicitly, the intelligence community advantages technology and tradecraft within a proscribed process. However, estimation of threats and decision-making are outcomes of human thinking. Analysts and policymakers create mental models, or short cuts to manage complex, changing environments. In other words, to make sense of ambiguous or uncertain situations, humans form cognitive biases. Informed because of personal experience, education, and specifically applied to intelligence analysis, Davis

intelligence, he briefs the President, has authority to develop the budget for the national intelligence effort and manage appropriations made by Congress, and, to some extent, can transfer personnel and funds from one agency to another.3 I believe that the creation of the DNI position had been on the table for a few years, but the intelligence failures of communication between the agencies and being able to connect the dots to see the events leading up to 9/11 was the last drop in the bucket. I do not think that this organization has worked out all there kinks along with the other organizations in the Intelligence Community completely being open with them, however, I do feel that their roles and placement in the chain is a much needed