The Intelligence Of The United States

Congress built upon the reforms of the 1970s by passing the Intelligence Oversight Act in 1980. This Act was an amendment to the Hughes-Ryan Act and obligated the IC to report covert actions to both the SSCI and the HPSCI prior to their implementation, unlike the ambiguous previous requirement of a timely manner. The Intelligence Oversight Act was noteworthy in that it constrained the intelligence community more than any previous legislation (Riley 2010). The two biggest shortfalls I see to the system is the number of contributors there are to the system on such a large scale. When I think about all of the redundancy built within the system, I think about all of the possible breakdown in communications that could take place. The second shortfall I see is the legislative leverage that is held over the Intelligence community. I personally believe this to be a mistake because this power could be held in a negative manner and to gain a political stance or agenda. The Congress can withhold money and resources, can leak information to the media and which could cause a mission or operation to

Understanding the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) priorities are necessary to recommend any initiatives that will have the most value to the intelligence community (IC). The DNI fully identifies to the IC what his mission, vision, and goals are. The DNI uses the National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) to explain the objectives and the priorities for the IC. There are a few areas, which if made a priority would have a beneficial impact on the IC. These recommendations would not require a lot of resources. They include adapting one overall IC vision, enhancing current agency-to-agency communication, and furthering foreign relations within the IC.

After 9/11, an event so shocking, and humiliating to both the American people, and the U.S. Government, vast reforms were identified to ensure that an attack of this magnitude never happened again. From the ashes of this despicable act came two major pieces of Intelligence reform. These documents were the 9/11 Commission Report and The Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorist Prevent Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Both documents worked to reform the Intelligence Community (IC), and streamline current processes to improve the sharing of intelligence information, and products. With the sweeping changes

The security environment today is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA). The challenges presented by globalization, emerging powers as well as the continuing threat of terrorism indicate the future security environment will continue to gain complexity. Adding to this complexity is the challenge of increasingly constrained fiscal resources. To protect U.S. National Security interests in this complex and constrained environment, Joint Force 2025 (JF-2025) requires four core capabilities, it must be agile, adaptable, survivable and integrated. Supporting these capabilities requires proper balancing of the Joint Force. This essay discusses the impending environment, key strategic direction for JF-2025, the capabilities required by

The attack on 9/11 brought many of the mentioned possible shortcomings of the intelligence community to light. Immediately after the attacks on 9/11, which resulted in radical Islamic terrorists using planes as weapons, many questions aimed at the intelligence community came forward. One of the main questions regarded the lack of communication between intelligence community members. Another question raised was about the community’s main budget and had it been restricted to a dangerous low.

Three of the potential roadblocks associated with the implementation of a National Counter Intelligence (CI) strategy that I believe are the most important rest within resources, information and risk, outlined in Michelle Van Cleave’s article “Strategic Counterintelligence What Is It and What Should We Do about It?” The idea of a national level effort is not a new idea. The National Security Act of 1947 provided basis of our intelligence and CI functions. DoD naturally took the mission of CI activity which fit within the DoD scope. Up and until the 1980s a series of failures within the CI world, such as the failed hostage rescue in 1980 helped to place emphasis on the lack of coordination between DoD services. A new definition of CI was

A great emphasis has been placed on transforming the Intelligence Community (IC) since the catastrophic events of September 2001, as the tragedy highlighted the requirement for the collective organizations to transform in the face of emerging threats and to support new security agencies. A range of instruments such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the 9/11 Commission Report and multiple Executive Orders, directed the IC to become more collaborative. However, any organizational change has issues and the IC is no different in this respect. Two specific factors are key to successful intelligence collaboration. Firstly, the method in which information is shared across the community is of vital importance because each organization relies on discoverable and accessible information to complete their roles in national security. Secondly, relationships between agencies need to be nurtured to foster a cooperative rather than competitive environment because the information flow is promoted within an organization that is not restricted by vertical integration—that is, information can flow across departments at various levels rather than be

The United States of America irrefutably remains a superpower in the current era. The country is capable of influencing, to some degree, every part of the world. It is also afforded a myriad of political avenues in which to shape this influence. Those avenues can be broken down into 4 categories; Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) means. Effectively using these means, either separately or in combination, is a calculated effort driven by the highest levels of American government in pursuit of goals laid out in the National Security Strategy (NSS). The incorrect use of DIME elements to achieve those goals can render the overall effort ineffective, or in some cases, counterproductive. The May 2010 NSS includes

According to Lowenthal (2003), the events of September 11, 2001 represented the beginning of a new era in the U.S. intelligence community (IC). The terrorist act highlighted weaknesses in the IC including inefficient information-sharing mechanisms and gaps in domestic terrorism (Burch, 2008). As a result, the pattern of security in the U.S. shifted from focusing on hostile nations to adversary groups resulting in a change of approach to counterterrorism efforts (Lowenthal, 2003). 9/11 had, in short, prompted the largest reorganization of the intelligence community since 1947 (Burch, 2008). Since then, numerous improvements and changes have been made such as the creation of the intelligence process and how information is shared. Probably

As we know there are many factors that attribute failure in our IC community. Like Kennedy said, lack of communication between collectors is one of them. Kennedy used example of how our nation failed to evaluate the Saddam’s WMD capabilities and it is prime example of failing to share the intelligence between agencies. Kennedy argues that collectors have considerable discretion of what information will get passed to analysts and sometimes vital but seemingly irrelevant information could be the key information that completes the mosaic.

The history of intelligence in the United States resulted from the Cold War period and also provided intelligence support to the United States military which helped develop policies and procedures of the United States toward other countries. The development of intelligence in the United States has ultimately provided higher security for our citizens.

The National Security Agency does whatever it takes to protect the American citizens from terrorism, even if it means spying on them. The National Security Agency, commonly known as the NSA, is a bureaucracy that’s often shrouded in mystery. From the time they were founded up until now, the National Security Agency has been an agency of the government that almost seemed to act completely separate from the government they protect. From codebreaking in World War II to domestic spying on the American people in the name of national security in the twenty-first century, they have been involved in a lot of secretive and questionable dealings. In this essay we will be learning about subjects like the laws dealing with the NSA to exactly what it takes

We have to learn lessons from the past how vulnerable our counter intelligence operation is and build the system to safeguard our classified information to protect American citizens harm from our adversaries. We can’t afford to have another penetration on our counter intelligence operation. Hanssen, Ames, Montes cases must be the last example of penetration to our CI operation flaw. Harber argues that government agencies are responsible more thorough background investigations and periodic reviews; regular personal finance disclosure for national security officials and their families; and more frequent polygraphs. (Harber 2009, 228) This will help to mitigate the treat from our enemies. Former National Counterintelligence Executive Michelle Van Cleave has argued that ‘‘By working the foreign intelligence service as a strategic target globally, U.S. counterintelligence should be able to leverage insights into adversary activities and vulnerabilities to direct CI operations to maximum effect.’’ (Harber 2009,

The Indian nuclear test in 1998 came as a surprise for American intelligence agencies despite the intelligence assets and human resources dedicated to tracking their nuclear program. This essay will dwell upon the American Intelligence failure which took place when American secret services were not able to inform the government about nuclear tests in India. Also this essay will examine the facts that led to this intelligence failure, how the different types of intelligences disciplines perform against this failure and will attempt to identify how the intelligence community and other types of intelligence disciplines can help prevent this type of defeat in the future.

Many critics of the United States’ method of foreign surveillance, such as the ACLU believe that the NSA is practicing “unconstitutional surveillance of Americans' communications.” Since, the NSA through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is only permitted to gather data on foreign intelligence not on United States citizens, this is a major violation of the assurances Americans thought they had against unwarranted searches. Apparently, the purported indemnity protecting Americans’ communications and data are ineffective. Evident to this are the many communications and data captured by the U.S. government while they were supposedly only targeting foreign citizens or organizations the NSA might have believed posed a significant threat to United