The Judicial Arms Of The Eu

Legitimacy of courts has long been an important factor in the judicial system. However, a more recent concern has been diversity. It is becoming increasingly important for the court to represent those who it serves. “The ECJ’s composition remains unreflective of the millions of black and migrant European Union citizens whom it serves”. Judgements of both the domestic courts of England and Wales along with the European Court of Justice, affect the everyday lives of all EU citizens – including those of minority and underrepresented groups. “Outcomes should not be influenced by considerations of political or financial consequences”. Independence is important as it is vital that each judge is able to decide cases solely on the evidence presented to them by the parties in court. Personal independence is always necessary to ensure that the judiciary as a whole of both the land or the community remains independent. In order for the courts to be fully independent, they must represent the diversity of the people and make decisions in accordance with the law with no other influences. With the growing influence of the government over the last century it has become increasingly important that the judiciary fulfils its responsibility to protect the public against unlawful acts of the government. What has therefore also become increasingly more important is the need for the judiciary to be completely independent from the government. The evidence suggests that the courts nowadays are not

The legitimacy of the ECJ to uphold EU legislation is a necessary component of effective human rights policy. The history of its increase in power is worth noting. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the ECJ’s location in Luxembourg, far from the political fray in Brussels and Strasburg, prevented it from becoming a strong body of the EU. Yet, throughout that time the court methodically built case-law that would lead to its surge in influence in the 1980s. The two most significant developments of the court during this time period were direct effect and supremacy. These twin pillars clarified the relationship between the national and EU legal orders.

The European Court of Justice is roughly equivalent to our Supreme Court. The European Court of Auditors is roughly equivalent to our GAO (General Accountability Office) and CBO (Congressional Budget Office).

The European Court of Justice – The court has a judge fro each member state that sits for a term of six years. The court adjucates on all legal issues and disputes involving community law and must ensure that community law in uniformly interpreted and effectively applied.

Treaty of Lisbon has provided that Union should uphold the representative democracy and thus, the legislative power is divided between the European Commission (‘the Commission’) which represents the interest of the European Union as a whole, the Council of Ministers (‘the Council’) which represents the Member States’ interests or their citizens and the European Parliament which represents its citizens’ interests. However, only 34% turned out to vote at the last EU election which implied a growing dissent in Europe. The EU is described as “undemocratic from the start”. The gist of the question is whether the EU law-making process is sufficiently democratic. EU’s democratic performance should be judged on the basis of subsidiarity, representativeness, accountability and engagement.

This paper will assess the claim that supremacy of EU law is still an evolving and debatable concept. To do this, I have divided this paper into four sections. The first section will discuss the establishment of supremacy in EU law through ECJ case law. The second section will explore the vibrant debate surrounding constitutional pluralism that has arisen since the early 1990s. The third section will examine the debate and impact of the codification of primacy in the early 2000s. The fourth section will examine the extent to which the principle of sovereignty has been accepted in three EU Member States, namely, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Poland.

The Court of Justice shall consist of one judge (28 judges) from each Member State, which means that represented all the EU's national legal. The Court is assisted by eight Advocates General, whose role is to present reasoned opinions in cases brought before the Court.

Enforcing the European Union legal system is diverse and done on multiple platforms; through not only actions taken against member states for breach of their obligations, but also, for example, through the use of direct effect1. Article 267 TFEU; an organism devised to practice private enforcement of EU law before national courts, has been critical to ensure uniform interpretation and application of EU law in member states. References for preliminary rulings occur when the national courts are presented with a question of EU law due to uncertainty of the provision. The national court will therefore ‘make a reference to the Court of Justice (COJ) to obtain a preliminary ruling on any point of EU law relevant to the proceedings’2. In

The CJEU case-law on horizontal direct effect of directives arguably lacks consistency in regards to the application of the general principle. The principle of direct effect was established in Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen. Although there is no set definition of direct effect, a broader definition was provided in Van Gend en Loos that it “can be expressed as the capacity of a provision of EU law to be invoked before a national court.” However, Van Dyun v. Home Office established that directives are capable of direct effect. Furthermore, Marshall v. Southampton established that there could only be vertical direct effect of directives. This stringent principle has arguable ignited the highly contested debate of whether or not horizontal direct effect is applicable to directives or if directives could only have vertical direct effect. However, this essay shall explore the lack of consistency in case-law regarding horizontal direct effect of directives. Firstly, this paper will delve into the case-law of the topic of horizontal direct effect of directives in efforts to try to highlight its consistency in its approach. Secondly, the paper will use case law and the opinion of academics (enter the name of the academics later) to highlight its inconsistencies using the legal mechanisms that have been introduced by the Courts to try to compensate for the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives. Namely, indirect effect, incidental horizontal

This essay will examine and evaluate the principle of supremacy of European Union (‘EU’) law since its ‘inception in the two fundamental authorities’ of Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie and Costa v ENEL analyzing how these cases established ‘an autonomous legal order which limits national sovereignty’ . Using Professor Weiler’s prism of ‘bi-dimensionalism’ this essay will examine supremacy through two viewpoints, how the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) has looked at the supremacy of EU law and how the national courts have viewed the supremacy. Whilst the EU may have one view, the second part of bi-dimensionalism is how the Member States have reviewed and interpreted the EU decisions reconciling them with

The 'EU ' only has the powers that it 's gifted under the 'EU ' treaties. If you find judicial systems operating under a 'EU ' priority this is done so under our elected parliament 's instruction. A sovereign state has control. We have that control!

An Analysis of the Powers of the European Parliament History of the European Parliament: On the 18th April 1951 the Ministers representing France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg signed in Paris a treaty which established the European Coal and Steel Community, the ECSC was born. The most important feature of the ECSC was its supranational character, it was a supranational organization. It was aptly described as a 'quasi federation in an important economic sector.[1] The Community was endowed with five organs; 1. An executive, called the High Authority 2.

Most European Union law(hereinafter referred as EU law) textbooks showcase that the evolution of direct effect principle gave rise to various debatable issues. It is blatant that directive appears to be a double-edged sword by protecting fundamental rights guaranteed by the Union law, taken jointly, ensuring the uniform application of Union law across the Member States. Nevertheless, David appreciated that this issue became highly contentious due to the inconsistent judicial approach adopted by Court of Justice (hereinafter referred as CJEU) , consequently resulted in belittling Member States’ supremacy.

Thirdly, the cases of Pupino and Commission v Greece discuss the application of the principle of sincere application. The Pupino case determines that the Member States must interpret domestic law so that it is in conformity with the purpose of the framework decision. In the Pupino case, the Court ruled that the third pillar legislation is binding and Member States must ensure that it is implemented correctly. It extended the enforcement obligation of Article 258 TFEU. This case interpreted the framework decision, which is used exclusively for the EU’s competence in police and judicial cooperation in criminal justice matters. Further, framework decisions have no direct effect. The Pupino judgement decided that framework decisions could be entered into force even if a country had refused to implement the framework decision. In relation to the principle of sincere cooperation, the cooperation between Member States and the institutions are seen as difficult as it would be difficult for the EU to carry out the task effectively if the obligations of the Member State were no binding in the area of police and

The European Union (EU) is not a typical international organization. The mix of intergovernmental and supranational institutions makes the EU a unique, distinctive political, and economic system. As Europe has spiraled from one crisis to the next, difficult discussions haves arisen about how much more power should be delegated to Brussels. Even though the EU advocates for “ever closer union”, through increased integration, states are becoming hesitant to relinquish power to the EU. This is due to the fact that state sovereignty has become threatened; it is being compromised by a combination of the lack of effective democratic institutions and the loss of states have lost control of law-making to legislation power to EU institutions. Euroenthuthiasts argue that state sovereignty is enhanced, not threatened, by reallocating power to EU institutions. However, Eurosceptics dispute that too much control has seceded to the EU making is a threat to state sovereignty. My position aligns with Eurosceptics, for the EU has weakened state sovereignty do to increased centralization of power in EU institutions that lack legitimacy. The European Project has obtained a copious amount of jurisdiction from states and eroded a basic fundamental freedom of the modern state- sovereignty. Since the EU has with goals to deepen and widen integration it’s clear that forfeiting state sovereignty will only intensify. My essay will start with a brief history of the European Union and a short