The Legal Interests Of The United States

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been using drone strikes, against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups. The U.S. Constitution requires that the government must go through a due process before making the decision of attacking and killing a number of people. Drone strikes are usually based on doubtful information, which takes the lives of innocent civilians. In the Middle East, civilians are being killed because of mistaken identity, and for just being at the wrong place at the wrong time. Drone strikes are unlawful because they kill innocent civilians, violate due process, and result in blowback.

In 2002, the CIA used a predator drone to conduct the first targeted killing. The strike was meant for Osama bin Laden; instead, it wound up; killing numerous civilians that were gathering scrap metal at the time. At the time, the government skirted the issue, claiming that the other individuals killed would prove to be ‘interesting’ once their identities were revealed. They weren’t. However, drone strikes occur today with civilian casualties, and there’s little to no public outcry. The public has grown numb and complacent due to prolonged exposure to a type of warfare that most academics agree is illegal at best.

The military’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are able to fly in the airspace for up to 17 hours providing Soldiers, Marines, and Sailors on the ground real-time images of the enemy for 24-hours 7 days a week. They were engineered for precision and power in order to eliminate the enemy without the need of endangering friendly forces. The technological advancement of the drone has furthered America’s military agenda in multiple ways for the better, however, hundreds of civilian lives have been caught in the blast zone of these military drones. Today’s society and engineers have deemed the use of drones as morally good, but what makes killing the enemy from a remote, safe location any different than chemical warfare, especially if civilian lives

Changes in technology have created new opportunities for clandestine and covert operations and what most people think of when the topic of lethal targeting comes up. Before the War on Terror when one would talk about lethal targeting through clandestine operations actions that the CIA took to attempt to assassinate key world leaders like Cuba’s Fidel Castro or other covert actions taken before the Pike and Church Committees. Since the onset of the War on Terror, the thought would go to the military videos posted to social media showing unmanned Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance assets conducting lethal kinetic strikes on those conducting terrorist activities. Covert action in this manner has been one of the most effective methods to engage an enemy that makes every effort to blend in with the rest of society. (Bobich 2007, 1112-1121)

After 9/11, the U.S started to implement policies intended to combat terrorism in hopes of preventing further attacks and bring those who were involved to justice. One such policy that the U.S started was to implement the heavy use of drones- unmanned aircraft capable of bombing specific targets. These drones would be controlled by a pilot remotely from the U.S, thousands of miles from where the strikes were taking place. The U.S used these drones to assassinate suspects who were believed to have been linked to terrorism as well as various targets that were deemed to be associated with terrorism, such as weapons factories. Currently, however, there is a debate on the legality, morality, and effectiveness of drones. One side sees the drones as effective at destroying targets while at the same time, minimizing civilian casualties. On the other hand, the other side believes that drones are reliable for

Jack Serle is a data journalist on The Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s Covert Drone War team who joined the Bureau in 2012 and was part of the team that won the Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism in 2013 for their work on drones and the US covert war on terror. Serle reports that the first known CIA drone strike took place September 19, 2002 in Yemen that turned out to be only the first in a long, rapid fire line of strikes to come in Middle Eastern countries with suspected al-Qaeda activity. Since 2004 in Pakistan alone, there have been 419 drone strikes in which approximately 2,463-3,977 people have been killed and of these thousands only 725 have been positively identified (“Naming the Dead”). Additionally, Serle finds that since 2002 in Yemen there have been as many as 121 confirmed strikes which killed approximately 467-695 people, since 2007 in Somalia there have been as many as 19 strikes which killed approximately 25-108 people, and in Afghanistan there have been 32 strikes which killed approximately 332-486 people (“Drone wars”). No matter how you look at it, these numbers are an astounding markup in these short years and it’s quite a wonder that these strikes and deaths don’t get more news time. It seems that when it comes to something as shady and gray area as CIA drone strikes the phrase “if it bleeds,

Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, a sixteen-years-old boy, was a third American killed by CIA drone strikes in Yemen while searching for his father, Anwar al-Awlaki, also an American citizen, who had been killed in a U.S. drone strike (Finn and Browning). Although drones kill not only terrorists but also innocent civilians including children like Abdulrahman, many drone strikes have been made to Pakistan between the year of 2004 and 2012. This is because the United States military successfully kills targeted enemies without losing a soldier by using drones. However, civilians living near the targeted area are killed by the drones as killer drones can’t accurately focus on the enemies. Therefore, the military’s

As discussed in the next section, some critics of these types of responses to transnational terrorism argue that a law enforcement operations model should be applied rather than the law of armed conflict because of the nature of the operations that are involved. For instance, Kels notes that human rights advocates “insist upon a legal geography of war, whereby states must apply a law enforcement (rather than armed conflict) model to any hostilities conducted outside of universally recognized hot battlefields like Afghanistan” (B3). This approach, however, ignores the realities of military operations on the ground and consequences of using a law enforcement operations model rather than the law of armed conflict to control these efforts (Kels B3). As Kels points out, “Holding a drone operator, fighter pilot or sailor directing ordnance at an overseas terrorist hideout to the same detain-first, shoot-last standards as a Metro police officer would negate the very purpose of the weapons system, which is precisely the goal of some activists” (B3). Indeed, rather than improving America’s opportunities to apply FSW to eliminate threats emanating from other countries that are unable or unwilling to stop them, these arguments only add further fuel to the anti-drone rhetoric in ways that may even encourage additional terrorist incursions from abroad.

From long ago, many people have dreamed of the concept of machines fighting for and against man in battles of awesomeness and gore in the macabre cycle of war. Honor and brilliance would be awarded for the excellence of these things, or disdain, rage, and fear could shine a light over them. The use of drones of the United States for the military is controversial, as some say that it makes circumstances safer for civilians and soldiers alike, while ridding countries in agreeance of networks of terrorists and threatening militants such al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban. Others will state that drones are detrimental to the well-being of the general public and causes more terrorists to rise from the dust (Drones). Albeit there are conflicting

Scott Shane quotes Micah Zenko in his article when he says “… a total of eight Americans have been killed in drone strikes. Of those, only one, the American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who joined Al Qaeda in Yemen and was killed in 2011, was identified and deliberately targeted” (Shane, Zenko 3). Shane is correct when he says that drones should not target Americans, but he fails to mention why they were targeted. These eight Americans were killed because, they were engaged in hostile activity towards the United States. Awlaki was a part of Al Qaeda and was actively plotting to take down the United States. The other seven Americans were not innocent, these people were killed in the blast of drone strikes that were targeting enemy combatants. They were not hostages, but they were still in the immediate vicinity of they hostiles. The other seven were just like Awlaki, they were there to join one of the terrorist groups we are at war with. That is the only way that those citizens were that close to those enemies. The second argument against the use of drones is that drone pilots are at risk of developing psychological disorders. Lindsay Warrior, the author of “Drones and Targeted Killing”, says that “[m]uch of the discussion surrounding drones emphasizes the fact that their use reduces the risk of U.S.

The US increasingly relies on drones for its counterterrorism efforts, and the world has been watching the manner in which the US employs this new instrument of Airpower. The use of drones has raised concerns over state sovereignty, human rights, and extrajudicial or extraterritorial killings. While US drone strikes are undoubtedly projecting US power and eliminated terrorists, the question has arisen as to whether or not these killings are doing more harm than good. This question is rooted in the concept of US prestige. Whether or not these strikes are “worth it” saves for another debate, but for purposes of this discussion, these drone strikes have contributed to a loss of US prestige in the international community. Pakistan and Yemen, although secretly authorizing US drone operations, publically condemn the US for violating their sovereignty. A survey in 2012 found that 74% of the Pakistani population views the US as their enemy. The execution of US Citizen Anwar al-Awlaki by a drone strike in Yemen received considerable criticism from the US population. Despite the fact that Awlaki had been radicalized and had recruited western individuals for terrorist acts, there was debate as to whether or not he should have been granted a fair trial. A study conducted by The International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School found that “The significant global opposition to drone strikes also erodes US credibility in the international community. In 17 of the 20 countries polled by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, the majority of those surveyed disapproved of US drone attacks in countries like Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.” As with Kosovo, the astounding potential of Airpower for achieving effects is attractive, but the long-term consequences of its misuse should not be

The effectiveness of drones to kill terrorists is well documented. Over the last four years, the Obama administration has signed off on over 400 drone strikes. (Why Drones Work, 1) Many senior terrorist leaders have been killed and many terrorist groups have been denied access to their sanctuaries. These drone strikes have been relatively inexpensive in cost of materials, caused low numbers of civilian casualties, and were risk-free for United States forces. (Why Drones Work, 1) However, even though the use of drone strikes has these proven advantages, several disadvantages are

Strikes conducted by remotely piloted aircraft may undermine counterterrorism efforts or enhance them depending on the nature of the violence, the precision with which it is applied, or the intentionality attributed to it. (Kalyvas, 2006; Downes, 2007; Kocher et al., 2011) . Existing research has studied the effects of coercive airpower, (Pape, 1996; Horowitz and Reiter, 2001) , targeted killings (Jaeger, 2009; Jordan, 2009; Johnston, 2012; Price, 2012) and civilian victimization (Kalyvas, 2006; Lyall, 2009; Condra and Shapiro, 2012), but social scientists have conducted little empirical analysis of the effects of drone strikes.

Opponents argue that by removing one of the key restraints to warfare – the risk to one’s own forces – unmanned systems make undertaking armed attacks too easy and will make war more likely. Evidence is beginning to emerge that it is the persistent presence of UAVs sitting over remote villages and towns simply looking for ‘targets of opportunity’ that may be leading to civilian casualties. The CIA oversees drone strikes as part of counterterrorism operations, but US officials refuse to discuss the program publicly. According to a tally by the nonpartisan New America Foundation, since 2004 there have been more than 260 US drone strikes in Pakistan, which the foundation estimates killed between 1,600 and 2,500 people. Not everyone feels comfortable with all this. Critics say that the legal and

Thus, this leads the targets to be identified solely on information gathered from outside sources or from surveillance from the drone. This in itself possesses a great risk as there is a lot possibility for error in identifying the wrong person. But, even assuming correct identification of the target, these strikes often target the residences of high ranking militant leaders. By targeting households the “every reasonable effort” to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets criteria is not being met. This is because there was no warning to the possible family members who most likely reside in the home as well. Estimates from three different reporting agencies averaged to 3,852 people being killed by strikes and 476 of them being civilians in Pakistan since 2004 (NY Times). Although the numbers vary widely, in principle, by not giving a reasonable effort to distinguish between the civilians and militants in these cases violates the rule of discrimination and non-combatant