The Media and THe Ucranie Crisis Essay

This article goes into detail about the Russian Revolution, occurring in 1917. This event transformed the country of Russia and has been recognized by many, until now. The event started many years ago to remember the revolution, have been cancelled. The reasonings for not recognizing the event are claimed to be because of the consequences of the revolutions outcomes. Although this may be the case, critics claim that Vladimir Putin may be taking away the national commemorations because of his hatred for revolutions and the idea of any overthrow of leadership. The events remembering the revolution were initiated to enhance the national pride of the country, not to try to reenact the historical event. Putin’s

For the past two decades, Ukraine has seen the progress of its neighboring countries, members of the EU, which developed into vital, prosperous democracies. Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine like many other former Soviet Union countries, is struggling with corruption, poverty and an incompetent government. To address these issues, in 2004 Ukrainians rose up and broke out the Orange Revolution (Satell 2014). Things got worse in 2009 when President Viktor Yanukovych was elected. He was known for criminal behavior, corruption and ineptitude. The new government aggravated country’s debt, lawlessness and social uprisings. The Ukraine crisis erupted

To modify Winston Churchill’s quote on Russia Putin “…is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” We can unwrap this mystery by analyzing Putin’s foreign policy through the eyes Morgenthau which will be the basis of this paper. By understanding the mystery we can say that Putin is following a Realist perspective and not the liberalist perspective especially with the Crimean Conflict.

Yet the election was not like the ones that preceded it- there were large scale demonstrations on the streets of Moscow and other metropolitan areas that were against (and some in support) of Putin. These large scale protests as Elkin notes while certainly disruptive and cast a negative light on Russia globally forced Putin to reaffirm his power when he won the election in 2012. Putin was as discussed by Moskowitz and others in class able to use the media to effectively convey his agenda. But Elkin also notes that the resurgence in popularity for Putin was not simply due to a stymied media presence. Putin strategically allowed Medvedev to become the nation’s prime minister, where he was relegated to a position where he could quietly work on making the changes he set during his presidency. Putin set about “restoring” national prestige by being firm on dealings with the west. In particular, during the crisis in Syria, he averted crisis by securing a deal that allowed Syria to dispose of the chemical weapons while also preventing U.S aggression. Elkin notes how Putin would frequently play on populism and patriotism in justifying his action- a formula which combined would ensure that in the crisis to come regarding the annexation of Crimea that he would have the support of the Russian people.

Ukraine, once a totalitarian state in the USSR, is now being ravaged by civil war. This war has been fought between Ukrainian Nationalist and Pro-Russian supporters in the Donbass region. This rising unrest can be traced back to the Russian ties that run deep in its Government. This Russian influence is being used by President Putin to incite Rebellion in the eyes of Ukrainians, and it all starts with Ukrainian politics of party groups Svoboda and The Party of Regions

The central planning and authoritarian control of the past have shaped most of the region’s political, economic, and social conditions of today. Russia is closely associated with post-Soviet states economically, but no longer legally has control over these territories. Russia and the post‐Soviet states are associated today as a region, primarily because of their history from the nineteenth century onward (Pulsipher 2011).

At the beginning after the collapse, the West thought it could be “the end of history”, where the Kremlin would finally reach a post-Cold War settlement, which was based on the so-called “normative ambiguity” and “acquiescence” . However, considered Russia’s deeds in the recent decade, this kind of hope or anticipation is over. In his administration, President Putin has made great effort to preserve things the same within Russia by championing the personalized political system, which has turned Russia into a “revisionist power abroad”. This is in fact the challenge to the prevailing thesis or trend of Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history”. In a word, the Kremlin has demonstrated its resistance to the liberal democratization by keeping its unique domestic political system.

Before beginning my essay, “The Middle East, Conflict in Journalism”, I would like the reader to read a few terms. These are merely food for thought, do whatever with them you wish.

In so called “Crimean” speech in March 2014 Russian President V. Putin used such terms as “divided nation”, “national-traitors”, “Russian world”, justifying and legitimizing Russia taking over Crimean peninsula. President V. Putin applied mostly to the Russian people concerned by “protection of compatriots” abroad from discrimination or even repressions and historical “injustice” needed to be repaired. But does Kremlin really believe in this or it uses this rhetoric just to explain Russian involvement to the neighbor’s inner situation? The right answer on this question will make us to understand true Russian foreign policy motivation in Ukraine and Baltic states. Knowing what is Russian Foreign Policy driven by, the recommendations to those

On November of 2013 the citizens of Ukraine took to Kiev’s streets. Mass protests broke out in dispute of the governments plan to drop agreements with the European Union and instead seek closer economic ties with Russia. Since the protests broke out Ukraine has seen an ongoing conflict in the east of the country. In order to illustrate a clearer understanding of the current situation in Ukrainian I will first discuss a brief history of Ukraine and its relationship with Russian since the fall of the Soviet Union.

For a state to survive, it must pursue power. From Putin’s point of view, NATO’s expansion lessened Russia’s ability to influence its neighbors in terms of economic and foreign policy. For example, Putin offered to buy $15 billion dollars in Ukrainian government bonds in exchange for Ukraine buying gas from Russia instead of the European Union, a move that would keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence. When the protests erupted in Kiev after President Yanukovych accepted the deal and Ukraine became destabilized, Russia appeared to lose its ability to influence Eastern Europe’s largest state which was historically part of the Russia and still has a large Russian speaking population, Russia was perceived as to have lost the image of power

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, takes a Realism approach to policy formulation. Mr. Putin is viewed as man that takes action, with “his swift military interventions” (3). Mr.

The controversial Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2014 depicts lawless arrogant image of Putin. Putin was responsible for invading Ukraine by deploying more than ten thousands armies in eastern Ukraine for more than a year. The civil war broke in Ukraine. The article, “The World May See An Even Darker Side Of Putin” depicted devastated consequences of war:

Following the fall of communism, Russia has undergone a turbulent several decades. What was at one time an economic powerhouse stumbled and, at times, was on the verge of total collapse. For a multitude of reasons, the traditional democratic system seemed to be failing in Russia. Whether this is because of a lack of understanding of the democratic system by the Russian general populace or an unwillingness to adhere to this new type of government and economy is still hotly contested. Regardless, it cannot be disputed that the advent of Vladimir Putin’s rise to power transformed an “imperfect, unruly, and largely unconsolidated democracy” (Stoner-Weiss 316) back into a nation that possessed a larger portion of the power the Soviet Union once held. Thus it can be deduced that Putin’s “strongman” position as both Prime Minister and President of Russia is the primary reason that Russia’s semi-presidential system failed whereas France’s has succeeded.

The conflict between the Ukraine and Russia is the Ukraine's most long-standing and deadly crisis; since its post-Soviet independence began as a protest against the government dropping plans to forge closer trade ties with the European Union. The conflict between Russia and the Ukraine stems from more than twenty years of weak governance, the government’s inability to promote a coherent executive branch policy, an economy dominated by oligarchs and rife with corruption, heavy reliance on Russia, and distinct differences between Ukraine's population from both Eastern and Western regions in terms of linguistics, religion and ethnicity (Lucas 2009).