The Melian Dialogue Analysis

Amidst an interlude in the fierce struggle for power between the two dominant Greek poleis, Athens and Sparta, the Peloponnesian war, there was unrest. Despite the Peace of Nicias, belligerence between the two states did not cease, but rather took on a new face. While careful to remain within the parameters set several years before in the peace treaty, Athens moved cautiously, but aggressively in establishing alliances, albeit coerced, and strengthening its empire. It was at this juncture that it made its move toward securing the small, weak island-state of Melos, which in its neutral independence suggested danger to the Athenian empire. In a move not of fairness, but of survival, Athens offered the Melians an ultimatum: to be subjugated

Action from necessity is a constantly recurring theme in Thucydides’ The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. A sentiment used to explain the growth of the Athenian Empire which some Athenians espoused to an assembly at Sparta best quantifies necessity, “. . . we were necessarily compelled at first to advance the hegemony to where it is—especially by fear, and then by honor, and later by benefit.” (Selected Passages 1.75.3). This claim, referred to as the Athenian Thesis, is used to advance the two following implications: all states act with the motivations of fear, honor and interest and no one can condemn a state for doing so. The Athenian Thesis influences the way many of the Athenian elite structure their patterns of reasoning in both noticeable and subtle ways.

The foreign, military and economic policies of states, the intersections of these policies in areas of change or dispute, and the general structure of relations which they create, are all analysed in terms of aspirations to achieve national and/or international security. Security is most commonly associated with the alleviation of threats to cherished values (Williams; 2008). However this is a definition that is undesirably vague and a reflection of the inherent nature of security as an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie; 1962). Security in the modern day context has many key concepts associated with it: uncertainty, war, terrorism, genocide and mass killing, ethnic conflict, coercion,

A reading of Thucydides’, Pericles’ Funeral Oration and The Melian Dialogue uncovers both contrasting and comparable viewpoints on Athenian politics, power, aims of war, and empire. Thucydides presents two differing characteristics of Athens, one as the civilizer in Pericles’ funeral oration and the other as an tyrant in the Melian dialogue. In the funeral oration delivered by Pericles during the first year of the war, the Athenian leader emphasizes the idealized personal image of the Athenians in regard to their constitution and good character. Pericles goes on to praise the Athenian democratic institution of Athens that contributes to their cities greatness; in Pericles’s own words, “The Athenian administration favors the many instead of few… they afford equal justice to all of their differences” (112, 2.37). This quote emphasizes the good character of the Athens’ to coax and encourage the Athenians to preserve and better their great empire into the future. On the other hand, in the Melian dialogue, this notion of justice and equality is irrelevant; one, because Athens compared to Melos, is the stronger of the two and thus, is more powerful. Further, Athens, will continue to acquire absolute power and build its empire by conquering Melos and whomever else stands in its way. Through Pericles’ funeral oration and the Melian dialogue, the following conclusions/themes will demonstrate both the changing and somewhat stable nature of Athenian policy with regards to empire,

In the ancient societies of Greece, war means many things; power, glory, honor. The idea of fighting is not just a daily task for the Greeks but a necessity. In

History tends to repeat itself throughout the years, and Looking back on at past events can help us understand why some things occur and how we can resolve certain issues. The Peloponnesian War was a significant event that occurred in history, and a lot of the events that occurred throughout the war have helped us to understand politics better. Thucydides’ documentation and interpretation of some of the events of the war have helped us to understand why states make the decisions they do, and some of the implications of those decisions. It is useful to know why states make the decisions that they do because their decisions can impact the actions of other

The book written by Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, contains two controversial debates between distinguished speakers of Athens. The two corresponding sides produce convincing arguments which can be taken as if produced as an honest opinion or out of self-interest. The two debates must be analyzed separately in order to conclude which one and which side was speaking out of honest opinion or self-interest, as well as which speakers are similar to each other in their approach to the situation.

The Peloponnesian War was the turning point in Athenian hegemony in Ancient Greece. It was fought in 431 B.C. between the Delian League, led by Athens, and the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta. According to Thucydides, Athens’ imposing hegemonic status and its overwhelming quest for more power made the Peloponnesian War and Athens’s eventual fall from power inevitable. Despite the Athenians having a far more superior navy and being considerably wealthier, they were defeated and made subjects of Sparta. In this paper, I will discuss Thucydides’ and Socrates’ reasons for why

So the theory suggests that because democracies externalise their interstate norms, they resolve disputes with other states like them in a peaceful way. Hence domestic inner-state policies influence their foreign policies. However, this proclamation is disputed by C. Layne who argues that the ‘crux’ of this theory is that if the assumption that democracies promote their peaceful inner-state norms and beliefs, then they shouldn’t ever threaten other democracies, especially not in a crisis. I will use the case study of the ‘Trent affair’ to provide evidence of how war was avoided. I will argue that in this case, war was avoided not because of the domestic pacific influence on foreign policy but because of other strategic reasons.

The Athenians believed they had been wronged and that “the strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must” (CCW 57). The Melian Dialogue is a commentary on the impact of power hungry nations and how a haughty approach is often unnecessary and leads to conflicts that could otherwise be avoided. The independent variable is the domination sought after by acquisitive unions such as the Athenians. The dependent variable is the war and tyranny that can result from hostility between such prideful nations. Furthermore, the theory that amity equals weakness is presented in The Melian Dialogue by the Athenians. The Athenians respond to the Melians request for neutrality by stating that “your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness” (CCW 57). According to the Athenians, equality represented impotence and vulnerability. The independent variable is the superiority necessary to prove strength and power. The dependent variable is the way in which other nations perceived the Athenians regarding their capability and vehemence.

This essay examines the evolution of the Athens strategy from the beginning to the end of The Peloponnesian War (431 to 404 BCE). The Strategy will be evaluated in the context of the relationship of ends, means, and ways by testing the suitability, acceptability, feasibility, and risk.

The Melian Dialogue is a debate between Melian and Athenian representatives concerning the sovereignty of Melos. The debate did not really occur-the arguments given by each side were of Thucydides own creation. Thus it is reasonable to assume that we can tease out Thucydides' own beliefs. In this paper, I will first extract Thucydides views from the Melian Dialogue and then analyze whether or not these views are well founded.

Contemporary international relations is a complex field. Understanding events and attempting to make sense of them can be a daunting task. There are, however, tools available, which can assist in providing clarity to these complex issues. The first of these tools is historic knowledge. Without historic background of an issue, it is nearly impossible to understand the events driving that issue in modern times. A second tool, the one which will be the focus of this paper, is international relations theory. Theory can be defined as “a belief, policy, or procedure proposed or followed as the basis of action,” (Merriam-Webster) and can be used “in many cases as a basis of prediction.” (Mingst 56) There are three major theories which we

“But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians” (Thucydides 270). The Melians should have acted sensibly instead of being naïve and submit to the imperial power seeing that the odds were against them. The Athenians give them a choice, but they decided to act irrational and respond emotively. “They underestimated Athens’ military power, judging the issue by the clouded eye of volition rather than calculations based on security and followed the human tendency to back their desires with uncritical hope and use of sovereign reason only to reject what they find unpalatable” (Bosworth 36).

The international system is a self-help system; states are obliged to look after themselves, because there is no one else to look after them. Waltz does not assume that states are pursuing the increase in their power and the importance of them between others states, necessarily aggressive body, but he does believe that they desire to preserve themselves. This means that they are obliged to be considered with their security, national defence and obliged to regard other states as potential threats (Brown, 2001).