The Military Of American Army Downsizing

“For the Common Defense, a military history of the United States from 1607-2012” is a military historic book written by Allan R. Millet, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis. Millet is a historian and a retired colonel of the Marine Corps. Maslowski is a professor at the University of Nebraska. Feis is a professor at Buena Vista University. This book was published in September 2012. It focuses on chronologically describing the changes of the United States military for over 400 years. Even though that is the main purpose, it does include political information. Although this book does not have an exact thesis, its purpose is to inform readers of the creation and enhancements of the US military. At almost 700 pages, this book educates about

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

Retention control points are directly linked to the manning needs of the United States Army. Military members that have served for twenty years or more have witnessed the cycles and fluctuations in strength. There are several issues that build or reduce the manning strength in the military. Building or reducing a large military force should be a slow process, but that is usually not the case. When the decision is made to grow the size of the United States Army, it is usually done quickly by offering large enlistment bonuses and re-enlistment bonuses. During the build-up years the standards for joining the military are loosened to include a larger population of potential applicants. When the decision for a smaller military is made,

Ever since the beginning of time, there has been conflict and conflict will always play a role in the development of history. The world has experienced hundreds of wars with countless casualties, these wars date back to the 10th Century and forward to the present. The United States of America is no stranger to war having participated in over 100 wars either it being a small war or a world war. Michael C. C. Adams “The Best War Ever” gives a rational explanation on the events that led the U.S to become the powerhouse country after sacrificing so much for the war, or did they? In this paper we will support the argument made in Adams “The Best War Ever” Chapter four, appropriately titled “The American War Machine”, other primary sources used will be such as Harry S. Truman first speech to congress in April 1945 and General George S. Patton’s praise speech to the Third Army. The argument being that the U.S did in fact play an impacting role in the outcome of World War 2 but how it also used appearances as an advantage to further develop itself as an international force, just like the tale from the Trojan War, the Trojan horse was all about appearances but with a precise objective.

Consequently, the Obama Administration has silenced defense leader for a long time, so he could keep his Budget Control Act or (BCA). For example “8 years under the Obama Administration, top defense officials were largely silenced and prevented from articulating their concerns about budget cuts and decreased readiness”(Cooper pg1). The Obama Administration neglected top defense officials, which has resulted in “Army has lost more than 205,000 soldiers, or 30 percent of its staff”(Spencer). Nevertheless, this has also resulted in “3 of 58 Army brigade combat teams are considered ready for combat”(Cooper). Conversely, Obama cut down the military so far that America has 150,000-225,000 troops ready in the Army when all of our combat teams should be ready for combat, so that the armed forces can protect America’s interests at home and abroad. Moreover, the Army is not the only who has experienced decreased readiness, for example, there have been budget cuts across the board which have resulted in “The Air Force is the smallest and oldest it has ever been”(Cooper). “80 percent of the United States Marine Corps or (USMC) do not have the minimum number of aircraft they need for training and basic operations”(Cooper). “The Navy’s fleet is the smallest it has been in nearly 100 years”(Cooper). “Maintenance period will increase costs 2.6 times”(Pickup). Accordingly, all parts of the Armed forces have experienced budget cuts

After major conflicts, the government downsizes its military numbers significantly, losing the best-qualified leaders to lead the future’s military. This drastic method of downsizing the military after major conflicts harms our troops and could harm the future of our great nation. If the nation really needs to downsize its military, then it should be done in a very careful manner and to pay extra attention to not losing the best qualified leaders it currently has.

MP1 One of the Carl Von Clausewitz’s central issues that describes war’s dynamic is the concept of “culminating point of victory.” Clausewitz advocated the idea that an offensive should be focused on the defender’s collapse, otherwise there is a “culminating point”, a momentum where the attacker loses his advantage for strategic victory. As he mentioned, “every attack which does not lead to peace must necessarily end up as a defense.” Military history has been enriched by battles of commanders with an overestimating self-confidence and high spirit who failed to identify this momentum. As a result, they lost the tactical advantage and they were defeated. Classical example in the World War II

In the thirty years after the War of 1812, the United States gradually and painstakingly developed its army from a nascent confederation of independent state militiamen, volunteers, and a disproportionately smaller group of regular soldiers into a corporate body of professionals with seemingly common standards of training, doctrine, and, arguably, discipline. Referred to as the “Thirty Year’s Peace,”

The American Civil War is debatably the first modern warfare in American history (Hagerman, 1988, XI). The Civil War was the beginning of a new era, the contemporary operational environment. Field commanders had to deal with conditions, influences, and circumstances that affect the utilizations of military forces. Commanders could no longer rely on past experiences to determine future outcomes. Commanders had to take variables other than military forces into consideration. Field commanders during the American Civil War had to deal with several factors that affect the conditions, influences, and circumstances on the battlefield: national will, nature and stability of the state, military capabilities, economics, sociological demographics, information, physical environment, time, and technology. Commanders had to focus on all aspects of the operational environment to effectively employ military forces.

Force management, or what is really otherwise known as planned comprehensive change, is in reality a complex and interwoven process. Though it was designed within the confines of a systemic approach referred to as the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities), in reality it is meant to enable both dutiful and well-thought out change as well as faster, more urgent adjustments in accordance with the evolving nature of war and information gathering tactics. The Army, as one branch involved in this initiative, focuses most of its attention in this regard on the organizational sector because of the way it facilitates an adequate and democratic step-by-step system of review (Student Reader, F102:2). But the fact is that even this initiative remains multi-faceted and appears to be rather bureaucratic in nature (it has five phases, which seems antithetical to an urgent change process), which might not be surprising since implementing the type of changes that are demanded can have major implications of all sorts. Still, it does appear that this concentration is being well received and that it will eventually serve its goal even if it does not appear that way when detailed on a point by point basis.

The United States went from being the 36th largest military country before WWII to become the 1 military country in the world as well as the most technologically advanced military in the world. The start of WWII the U.S. had 334,473 troops as the years went on the troop numbers quadrupled in size to 12,209,238. When the war ended the U.S. had lost the least number of troops out of the major superpowers at 418,000 deaths compared to 10.7 million Soviet deaths, 5.5 million German deaths and 2.2 million Japanese deaths.(nationalww2museum.org 1) It wasn’t easy start for the newly formed U.S. army as they were sent to fight in Africa before they could fight in Western Europe. It wasn’t long for there to be success in the African campaign as the American and British drive Nazi-Germany out of Africa. The U.S. didn’t show it’s full might until the landing at D-Day where Britain and Canada joined them in the invasion of Nazi-Europe. Once they landed and successfully took the beaches of northern France the U.S. military push never looked back as General Dwight D Eisenhower once stated “I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full victory.” (Margaret J. Goldstein

SUBJECT: Regular Army Precision Retention: The Commander’s Allocation Process 1. Purpose: To provide information on Precision Retention which can be found at: https://www.hrc.army.mil/milper/12-308 2. Facts: a. The Army Retention Program has denied over-strength Soldiers the opportunity to reenlist for continued service in their primary Military Occupational Specialty (PMOS) or forced them to reclassify.

This time I decided to try a search using “downsizing of the military” as a starting point. I immediately came across an article in The Washington Times that gave me some insight about issues with having a smaller military and handling a global/world war. The article pointed out that we as a military would have no problem supporting small strike forces, but, if there were to be more than one major global conflict happening at the same time, we as a military would not have the personnel needed to support both conflicts. I knew I could trust where this information was coming from seeing as it was coming from the Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley. If anyone is to know what the capabilities of the Army is presently and will be in the future, it would be him since he oversees all operations in the Army.

The Navy has come to a crossroad to meet today’s demands while trimming down the fat. In order to meet this increasing demand for U.S. Maritime presence around the world and to satisfactorily support the war, the Navy needs to increase its ships number while decreasing its manpower. This is the dilemma that Navy policy makers have to deal with. Performance-driven organization must maintain its workforce at peak levels and meet retention goals while coping with budget cutbacks and an unyielding "do-more-with-less" mandate. How to properly downsize the force while retaining the right skills in order to afford the increase numbers of ships. But that might prove to be more difficult than originally planned. There much to be consider when it comes to making cuts among the ranks. An analysis of the DOD budget constrictions reveals one challenge facing our troops today: Downsizing the military force and converting jobs designators.

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of