The Military Revolution

Thomas More’s book, Utopia, was constructed to criticize aspects of European life during the 1500s. One issue that More evaluates is the subject of politics and war. War during this time was used to gain territory or increase the ruler’s power. The Utopians are a peaceful group of citizens that rarely have any altercations occurring upon their island. They have a strict daily schedule that provides a minute amount of time for leisure, resulting in a low rate of problems. So why does More bring up the issue of war, if the people of Utopia infrequently misbehave? More analyzes this issue to exemplify how war was implemented in Europe under the reign of King Henry VIII. In addition, more describes the Utopians’ preparations when they engage in war. More wrote Utopia to provide the citizens of Europe with a source of hope for a new outlook on life.

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

In American history everyone believes that the American Revolution would begin in 1775. But many would argue that the American Revolution had started even earlier than that. As the American Revolution would not spring up overnight, but throughout a series of events that would build tension caused by different views on government, and conflicting interests between the British and their colonies on the western hemisphere.

Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century written by Peter Warren Singer. In his book, Mr. Singer explores and supports his theory of how technology is quickly and decisively changing the way the U.S. fights wars. This book was written in 2009 and the author provides historical data up to 2009 on how the military relies on technology in the battlefield. Mr. Singer’s credentials include a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard and a BA from the Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton2. He has worked with numerous U.S. government agencies as advisor and continues to provide his services in that capacity. He has published books which relate to the military such as Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the

To be sure, a surprise strategic Chinese attack is a valuable worst-case scenario to study, but protracted multi-dimensional U.S.-China competition for Pacific influence—akin to the contemporary era—is arguably more likely and, thus, a more sensible scenario against which to wargame. Also, despite its plausible portrayal of a localized insurgency, the novel stops short of depicting mass civil unrest elsewhere and social stability considerations that would almost certainly accompany a future world war. Nonetheless, Ghost Fleet’s technical narrative provides ample realistic content for today’s security and defense officials to balance and refine tomorrow’s warfare strategies. Singer and Cole’s near-future depiction of U.S. technological vulnerability in warfare should spur those officials to enable American innovation and adaptation in warfighting solutions well before the onset of strategic

The American Revolution was undeniably the most pivotal time period in respect to United States History, but who was really to blame for initiating the conflict? While both the British politicians and American colonists shared the blame for the kindling of the revolution, one party was certainly more at fault than the other: the British. Through short-term causes of taxation and incommodious trade acts, and long-term causes of salutary neglect and involvement in the burdensome French & Indian War, the British politicians proved to ultimately be the most responsible for igniting the Revolutionary War.

There are many different views on how the American Revolution came to be and how it actually was. One way is that the colonists that had money and were known as the elite were trying to preserve their power from the British and this is what caused the revolutionary war. Then on the other hand before the revolutionary war occurred when the colonists were being over controlled by the British, then in result of the American Revolution the colonists were able to win against the British and become stronger, more united, and have the type government they wanted. As described in Gordon S. Wood’s essay Radical Possibilities of the American Revolution, the colonists only wanted to be free from the control of the British and the only way they could accomplish that was to have a war with Britain to show that they could hold their own.

During the time period of 1789 to 1914, several changes began to occur within the European military. Leaders began changing their techniques on how they would approach battles, placement of their men, what kind of equipment they would utilize, along with their means of transportation, how would they communicate with others, along with several other changes. During this time period, the use of technology began to increase which had allowed for the battles to become easier for those using the new technology. There were three important changes that had occurred in the European military which included: transportation with the service of trains and railways, the newest weapons such as the breech-loading rifles, and communication by using telegraphs. With these three inventions, this had changed the outcome on wars and battles for the days to come.

In a 2015 article, “Is U.S. military becoming outdated?” written by Stuart Bradin, Keenan Yoho, and Meaghan Keeler-Pettigrew, the authors argued that despite the U.S. military maintaining a position of global dominance “without peer” during conventional operations, it is not the ideal force against current and future threats. The authors claim that there are several negative factors arising due to the past sixteen years of war against several state and non-state elements, inferior cultural differences of government bureaucracy compared to commercial firms, and a misallocation of defense spending that leaves the US military waging war inefficiently while simultaneously losing technological dominance against current and future threats.

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

There are no universal theories to explain the true nature and character of war, and any war theories are not a fact or absolute truth. All strategic principles are dynamic and contextual, so “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The battlefield environment of the 21st century will be the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, and nature of war will be completely different because of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Highly advance communication and information technologies, a dramatic increase in computing capabilities, developed of precision munitions, dominant air and space power ‘war could be waged by the projection of

American army officer Omar Bradley once said,“If we continue to develop our technology without wisdom or prudence, our servant may prove to be our executioner.” The meaning of this quote lies in the destruction and devastation of humanity and geography during war. If we do not stop advancing in ways of killing and causing suffering, we will soon face the consequences of these technologies. Throughout World War I and World War II, there was a ginormous technological boom in which countries were competing to invent new weapons or vehicles used in warfare. Specifically, World War I could be blamed for the start of the creating of new technologies used in warfare even today. These technologies were often invented or created during World War I,

The military revolution was a direct outcome of changes in the virtuosity of war between 1560 and 1660. The changes crucially influenced campaigning and combat in Europe during the late 17th and early 18th centuries. The most influential alterations included transformation in weapons, growth in the army size, change in tactics and organization, and centralization of the states’ bureaucracies. There were many battles in the late 17th and early 18th centuries that were highly influenced by the implications of the military revolution, for example, the Battles of Hogue, Danube, and Blenheim. These altercations started a development for military superiority and increased proficiency that enabled Europe to dominate the world long after the Wars of the Spanish Succession. However, I would like to emphasize that those victories mentioned above were heavily influenced by the skills of the commanding individuals and their roles in the military organizational system rather than a full internalization of the revolution’s implications overall. The Duke of Marlborough is a great example of an individual overweighting the flaws of the late 17th century logistical systems to his advantage. By comparison, France’s failure to understand and implement the alterations eventually enabled the rise of Britain’s at the French expense.

Giulio Douhet, in his seminal treatise on air power titled The Command of the Air, argued, “A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.” The United States (US) military establishment has been asking itself this exact question for hundreds of years, in an attempt to be better postured for the future. From the Civil War, through the American Indian Wars, and up until World War II (WWII) the American military’s way of war consisted of fighting traditional, or conventional, wars focused on total annihilation of an enemy. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift from the traditional framework towards one that can properly address non-traditional, or irregular wars. While the US maintains a capability to conduct conventional warfare, the preponderance of operations where the US military has been engaged since WWII have been irregular wars. Therefore, this question articulated by Douhet, as to understanding the character of the next war in order to properly plan, train, and equip, is certainly germane to the current discussion of regular war versus irregular war. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the questions remains, which will dominate the future and therefore, garner further funding and priority. Based on the current threats and the US role as a superpower, the US

The notion of an early modern military revolution is one which is a much debated subject among historians. Two historians who are very dominant in this field are Geoffrey Parker and Michael Roberts. Although they both agree that a military revolution occurred, they disagree on the timing of a revolution in war. Roberts argues that a military revolution started in 1560 and "by 1660, the modern art of war had come to birth." Parker, on the other hand, sees the military revolution as a "firmly sixteenth century phenomenon with antecedents in the fifteenth."