The Mind Body Problem, By Thomas Nagel

This paper will accomplish two tasks. First, it will briefly outline the main points of Thomas Nagel’s argument in “Personal Rights and Public Space”. Secondly, it will examine and discuss the portion of his argument that I find to be the most problematic.

“What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” is American philosopher, Thomas Nagel’s, opinion on the widely debated mind-body problem. Nagel introduces the paper by explaining what it means for something to be conscious. He defines consciousness as an organism’s ability for there to be something it is like to be that organism. Using his definition of consciousness Nagel suggests that physicalism cannot be successfully defended using the popular reductionism theory. This is because in order to be defended a physical account must be given to phenomenological features themselves. This leads Nagel to his argument, “Every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will

Within the realm of philosophy, new ideas are formed, applauded, often questioned, and most carefully analyzed. These new ideas are what provoke thought, and help move progressive thinkers forward. This can be said to be true in Frank Jackson’s case, with his essay “What Mary Didn’t Know”. Jackson presents an argument that challenges the thoughts of physicalism, physicalism being, “…the challenging thesis that [the actual world] is entirely physical” (Jackson 291). Jackson creates what he calls the ‘knowledge argument’. In his essay Jackson presents the example of Mary, a woman who lives in an entirely black and white world. She is confined to her room, and everything is controlled so that all that Mary views is black and white. It is

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

When contemplating the relationship between the mind and body, most philosophers advocate either dualism, the view that the mind and body belong to the mental and physical categories respectively, or physicalism, the stance that there is only the physical. (Gertler 108) Brie Gertler upholds the former perspective, and her essay In Defense of Mind-Body Dualism aims to disprove physicalism by establishing the possibility of experiencing pain without the firing of C-fibers, which physicalists believe is identical to pain. (110) She claims that thought experiments are best for determining matters of possibility, but only if such experiments utilize “sufficiently comprehensive” concepts. After first clarifying why Gertler emphasizes the need for

The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He

This thought- experiment only posits the possibility of different qualia, but does not argue 3 anything significant or empirical. The problem of consciousness is mysterious to humans only given our current, limited understanding. Churchland claims that adding “I cannot imagine” is merely an epistemological fact about the speaker and is not significant or interesting. Such an argument merely states a fact about human limitations: There is no

Armstrong begins his paper with a question for the reader of what it means to have a mind. It is well understood that man has the ability to perceive, to think, to feel, and so on, but what does it mean to perceive, to think, and to feel? The answer, he believes, lies in science. Seeing that science is constantly and rapidly gaining ground, he asserts that “...we can give a complete account of man in purely physico-chemical terms” (295?) Pointing out the fact that this view has been accepted by various scientists throughout time, he explains it is the most reliable way to approach the mind-body problem.

Lastly, I’lol be discussing Churchland 's interpretation of Frank Jackson’s Argument: Knowing our sensations. Churchland explains Jacksons argument as “showing the differences between knowing our states via introspection and knowing via non-introspective means are of such nature as to constitute grounds for denying the reducibility of psychology to neuroscience” (Churchland, 4). I 'll be summarizing Churchland 's summary of Jacksons constructed argument. A neuroscientist (Mary) who lives her entire life seeing no colors but

Different ways of abstracting the absurd will unsurprisingly induce altered proposals about how we might go about challenging it. Nagel states that the absurd arises exclusively within the cognizant mind of a person, and he all but associates it with epistemological skepticism. However, as previously contended, Nagel apparently fails to distinguish the metaphysical requirements that

Thesis: The mind-body problem arises because of the lack of evidence when looking for a specific explanation of the interaction of mental and physical states, and the origin and even existence of them.

The following is a thought experiment by Jackson to undermine Physicalism. “Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina...What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false” (Jackson 130). At this point of time, Mary supposedly

The first half of this course has focused on many different philosophical theories that deal with the mind-body problem. One of the most interesting of these theories is physicalism, which is the belief that everything in this world is physical or that all facts are physical facts. There are many arguments against physicalism, but one of the most well-known and most successful arguments is the knowledge argument. The knowledge argument illustrates that physicalism is false.

Jackson contends that if physicalism were true, Mary would know what a color looks like before she would ever

Here Nagel sees a direct impact on the mind-body problem: Accessing these facts about what it is to