The Mind Brain Identity Theory

1096 Words Oct 8th, 2015 5 Pages
Many arguments in the philosophy of the mind have been made for and against, whether or not the mind and the brain are the same entity. The mind-brain identity theory is the view that the mind is the brain and that mental states are brain states (Mandik 77). Therefore, we can identify sensations and other mental processes with physical brain processes (Blutner 4). I argue, that the mind is not identical to the brain, and the conceivable idea of zombies, as well as the multiple realizability argument, can disprove this theory. In denying that the mind and mental properties, like qualia, are nonphysical things, mind-brain theory objects to both substance and property dualism. Therefore it is a physicalist approach to the philosophy of mind. Identity theory states that physical systems lacking brains thereby lack minds (79). The concept of identity can be explained as a functionally defined phenomenon with a theoretical phenomenon, for example, consciousness is a particular brain process (Blutner 7). In a philosophical sense, the word zombie refers to a person who is exactly like a normal person, except they do not have qualia. Qualia are the subjective aspects of our experiences as humans; “what it’s like” to have these experiences (Mandik 3). A zombie looks and acts just like other people, while sharing our physical aspects, except they do not have conscious experiences. While the zombie can carry out normal brain functions, such as identifying objects, they have no qualia…
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