The Naval Aviation Command Logistics Information System (NALCOMIS)

The case study and presentation used for this Joint Operations paper was about Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD). I will describe two operational-level successes and two failures experienced during the operation. I will offer clear proposals, that if implemented could have prevented those failures.

In November 2013 the Department of the Navy (DON) Chief Information Officer (CIO) issued a memorandum of distribution titled, Department of the Navy Information Management/Information Technology/Cyberspace Strategic Objectives for Fiscal Years 2014 – 2018. This brief three page document lays out six objectives for a strategic plan for the Navy’s IM, IT, and Cyberspace interests. My paper will look at two of those objectives, reduce software application spending by 40 percent from FY13 levels and improve transparency, accountability and execution of IM/IT investments on the strategic planning and operation of the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) environment at Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City

Troy, co-authored the JRIMS Joint Mission Needs Statement Homeland Security Enterprise – Information Sharing with the United States Coast Guard, representing CBP. This document was submitted to the Joint Requirements Council (JRC), adjudicated and awaiting validation. Additionally, Troy has been the Action Officer/Representative for CBP on activities to technically and operationally demonstrate Integrated Maritime Domain Enterprise - Operations and Intelligence Data Node system capabilities in Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC)’s Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System (AMOSS).

The history of force reductions after the Cold War era and Operation Desert Storm proves the reliance on contract support to America’s fighting force was important to accomplish the mission. (CGSC, 2015). The Army should maintain its level of contract support relative to the current budget constraints and force reductions. Contract support with oversight from Army Material Command is a force multiplier but will require several mitigation measures in order to be effective in future campaigns.

According to Service Request SR-ht-003, We were to develop a design for a fleet truck maintenance database, located on the Huffman Trucking IT Service Requests site. This paper will talk about how our team completed the Change Request that was on the Huffman Trucking Service Request.

As an LNSC Information Assurance technician, Petty Officer Cavanaugh audited over 575 customer-submitted ONE-Net SAAR-N forms ensuring accuracy in accordance with established policies for user account processing. She generated accurate weekly NIPR and SIPR account dormancy notification reports for distribution to ONE-Net customer commands in the Yokosuka Area of Responsibility (AOR). She served as a designated Information Technology Representative

The purpose of this paper is to outline an information management problem affecting Naval Beach Group and its supporting elements. The current system is not effective due to inefficiency and the distribution of outdated information.

On Nov 2013, the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) awarded the contract to “modernize” its existing custom developed application Cadet Administrative Management Information System (CAMIS) II to the Solers Corporation (Solers Corporation, 2016). CAMIS was developed over several years and began to encompass support for many disparate business processes at the Academy, but primarily served as a Student Information/Management System. This modernization effort or CAMIS III was the third iteration of moving CAMIS from a legacy system to a new platform. Almost 2 years later: Mar 2016, this project ended with the government decision to discontinue the modernization effort. This was done by primarily not exercising option years and stopping funding on the modernization development line item of the contract. (Paulson, 2015) Despite modernization effort ending, the government continued to support the CAMIS III operations and support portion of the contract, as well as the legacy CAMIS II contract. This paper attempts to analyze why this software project failed, based on the personal experiences and perspectives from the overall combined team and attempts to understand why. The major reasons for failure included: gross underestimates (scope, cost, and schedule). However, there were opportunities to achieve a better outcome. These opportunities were failures by the program manager, vendor team, and management stakeholder expectations.

The purpose of the DLIS BIA will be to provide a Business Impact Analysis based on information previously submitted and authorized in the DLIS Risk Analysis (RA) and Risk Mitigation (RM) plan. The BIA will identify CBFs, MAO for each CBF, costs and requirements for each CBF

The Senior Management of the Defense Logistics Information Services (DLIS) has decided to update the previous risk management plan with a developing, new risk management plan. This new risk management plan will not only minimize the amount of risk for future endeavors, but will also be in compliance with regulations such as the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Control Objects for Information and Technology (COBIT), and Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process

Served as the Levant analyst on the Joint Operation Center (JOC) Current Intelligence Team (CIT) during the Iraq crisis. Tasked with standing up a 24 hour intelligence section on the watch floor to provide intelligence support to the JOC watch staff and joint planning group (JPG). My daily duties were to provide the most up to date information for the daily intelligence summary, commanders read book, and preparation of the daily situational awareness brief for directorate and CG. As a trusted analyst I individually managed, addressed, and answered five requests for information directly from the 2-star Commanding General (CG) without requiring follow ups. Additionally, I supported the joint planning efforts by answering 12 additional requests

On the basis of United States Code, Title 10, and joint doctrine, the Marine Corps, in coordination and cooperation with the Navy, has made logistical self-sufficiency an essential element of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) expeditionary warfighting capabilities. This means that the Marine Corps’ logistics mission, at all commands and support levels, is to generate MAGTFs that are rapidly deployable, self-reliant, self-sustaining, and flexible and that can rapidly reconstitute (Logistics Operations, 1999). While the Marine Corps is unmatched in its ability to be the most rapid responding force across the globe, a deficiency exists that should be addressed. Over the past decade, there have been numerous successful innovations in ground and aviation logistics, but they have lacked in standardization or integration within the MAGTF. Emerging operating concepts such as disaggregated MAGTF operations and seabasing, along with current fiscal constraints, are driving the need to further modernize and integrate MAGTF logistics in order to optimize support to the warfighter (Borrelli & Hodge, 2013). Independently, the logistical concepts and systems that exist for the ground elements and the aviation elements are proven to be effective and efficient, however, when the aviation and ground elements work in concert the response of logistical support is hindered. This paper will offer possible solutions to close the logistics gap between the Marines Corps’ aviation and

We also need to invest in the future to ensure continued development and improvement of the war fighter’s mobilization electronic operating systems while continuously conducting relevant high quality training. These mobilization technology systems must support our current complex and evolving operating environment. Additionally, it is imperative that we identify duplicate systems and work towards the migration and/or elimination of unnecessary redundancies.

Configuration Management is a United States Department of Defense (DoD) product of the nuclear arms race of the 1950s. [16] During this time, developments were documented or not documented; therefore, the nuclear arms race did not lead to significant advancements in technology standards. [16] Items and protocols were duplicated which resulted in “high costs and mixed success” for the DoD. [16] In turn, the DoD mandated configuration management for the hardware in the military. [16] They issued “Bulletin Number 390 and 390A to the Army, Navy and Air Force and coined the term “engineering change proposal.” [16] Fast forward to today, configuration management is a common practice across the industry and the new standards are found in the NIST-series

Student Answer: Most every company has a mission and vision statement, but some companies do poor jobs conveying the true intention or depth of these statements. The mission statement should state its purpose and drive its collective efforts. The vision statement should state its desired future and drive its strategic plan (MacLeod, L. (2016). According to these standard of a mission and vision statement most companies would be considered lacking. I am currently employed at GEODIS logistics. Our mission statement states, “We help our clients