The November 2008 Attack : Failures And Fault Levels

Using the concepts of security, terrorism and risk learnt in this unit, critically evaluate the record of global counter-terrorism measures since the 9/11 attacks.

In accordance with the National Commission which was concerned about inadequate information sharing following 9/11. (Cordner, Scarborough 2010) I believe it's worth noting that across the board the internalized intelligence and lack of transfer of information has led to a lot of pointed fingers from agencies as to whom could have had a better potential of preventing the attacks of 9/11.

Perhaps the most important change in how the federal government was reorganized after September 11th is the creation of both the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2004 with the passage of the same IRTPA that created TSA. This concept had been first suggested in 1955 after a study by Congress then and was recommended time and again but only became a reality after the September 11th attacks drove the need for major intelligence reform home and the 9/11 Commission continued the push for the creation of such a position (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-5). As one can see from the mission and vision of the ODNI, the importance cannot be overstated. The mission includes leading intelligence integration while having the IC produce the most insightful intelligence products possible and the vision is fully integrating the IC thus making the nation more secure (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-2).

The 9/11 attacks opened the avenue for a scrutiny of the performance and ability of the intelligence community to detect any threats to the safety of the United States. The media, politicians, reformists and other interested parties would not comprehend how such an attack would happen without the knowledge of the intelligence community. However, it is important to consider the fact that the attack was one of its kind and could not be approached with the resources and expertise used in other initiative such as the cold war. Therefore, the need to restructure the intelligence community arose from the view that it was still operating in the mindset and spirit of the cold war even in the modern era that had seen a revolutionary change of warfare

Upon analyzing 9/11 it was clear to focus on the limitations that the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency had faced. Security breaches and poor intelligence sharing were just some of the critical failures that were encountered. Moreover, the main focus is pointed towards the miscommunication between these two agencies. Evidently, the execution and tactical strategies went unnoticed despite the apparent red flags that presented themselves, in addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency failure to pursue threats and establish a baseline of security resulted in the disaster of 9/11. In conjunction to these mistakes, the restriction of shared information

Prior to 9/11 attacks on the U.S., inter-agency communication was not very good.  There were many territorial issues on who was in charge and how information would be passed.  There are several agencies that have overlapping missions to help protect. Homeland. Intelligence sharing was identified as a main issue for the failures of the attacks of 9/11as cited by Eric Velez-Villar Assistant Director, Directorate of Intelligence Federal Bureau of Investigation. “The constantly evolving national security threat requires an adaptable information

Assessing our vulnerability to terrorist attack remains difficult in part because the events surrounding the attacks of September 11, 2001, have not been thoroughly explained. In its investigation into them, the 9/11 Commission slid past many important questions, leaving them unanswered, and did not adequately challenge the Bush administration when it refused to cooperate or obfuscated its own actions.

An obstacle that arises in securing ships and ports is that of travelling to foreign ports. Security professionals are are encouraging the United States government to extend U.S. boundaries to foreign ports, which would put much emphasis on security at loading points (70). The fear is that attackers will board a ship at a foreign port and sail to American soil where they could practice terrorism. A way that shipping security has changed is that of the plan of the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which calls for international security criteria to identify high-risk cargo containers for pre-screening at their point of shipment (70). The Coast Guard has also increased patrols in the U.S. ports and waterways, specifically around the nation’s critical petro-chemical facilities (71). By 2004, The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code took effect requiring ship operators to develop security plans, appoint ship and company security officers and maintain a minimum level of on board security, while port officers are required to develop similar plans and hire a port facility security officer (71). This code made it mandatory for all ships to be secure both while still in ports and also while travelling. Not only does this protect passengers aboard the ship, but also citizens of the United States as threats cannot enter the country through shipping

The terrorist attack that occurred on September 11, 2001 (9/11) is arguably the greatest tragedy the United States has ever faced. This attack was widespread, coordinated and devastating in nature. Many people claim that the government failed to protect us from this event and that it should have been prevented. Over the Course of this paper, we will examine that claim. We will examine how the Intelligence community failed to prevent the 9/11 terror attack. This paper will also examine how the Intelligence community could have used its assets more effectively. The two biggest factors in this attack were the lack of information sharing and lack of action taken on received intelligence. After discussing how those two factors facilitated the 9/11

With the emergence of the 21st century the necessity for a broader understanding of security have said present. The world has experienced a variety of new security challenges that have put at stake human safety and have made policymakers all around the world rethink their approach and strategies when it comes to the decision making process. The rise of terrorist organizations in the international arena as well as the development of extremist groups has offered extreme significance to the quest for power and the search for peace, while requiring us to look back and examine our achievements and failures in the analysis of terrorism, extremist groups and our counterterrorism efforts since 9/11. It is essential for all Americans to understand

Subsequent to 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon which compelled the U.S. to imagine the unconceivable. That day things went really wrong, because that was the day that terrorist decided to make their presences know by attacking us. They evolved from using bombs to using airplanes to deliver as there attack weapon because it would cause lethal fatalities on U.S. soil. This was never done before and we were not prepared to handle such a massive attack. This paper will investigate what went wrong before and after 9/11, the effects of post 9/11, surveillance surge on state and local policing, what was the problem why the C.I.A. and the F.B. I. did not communicate with each other, analyze our current and past laws in regards to the dissemination of information between state, local authorities, and federal authorities, and to recommend changes or reforms to policies that are obsolete. We understand that local law enforcement and state agencies will bring specific advantages (there strength) from there organizations, and they will also bring their inherited weaknesses. Thereby, they will bring one important thing to the table which is how they collect local intelligence; as well as them being able to address some of their weaknesses. For example, lack of analytical capacity in order to fully use the data they collect. This paper builds and contributes to how things were before and after 9/11, and the types of changes that were made within law

In 2004, the intelligence community underwent a reorganization through legislation under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This act established the role of the DNI, and allocated funds directed to the support of developing priorities for intelligence sharing and collection. According to the CRS Report of 2013, those “priorities and corresponding budget allocations reflected the priorities in individual agencies. Such was the situation prior to intelligence reform in 2004 and the establishment of a DNI with expanded budgetary authorities over the different components of the intelligence

Homeland Security officials and law enforcement are not constrained from sharing information in a timely and accurate fashion before, during and after a terrorist attack, but instead, fail to share information with other agencies. These failures between intelligence agencies and other federal, state and local law enforcement was the reason why Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his brother were able to commit their heinous crimes.

The attacks of 9/11 in 2001 shed a light on many different weaknesses relevant to the security of the United States regarding communication, and disaster response. On every level of government— federal, state, and local— substandard communication methods contributed to the deaths of nearly 3000 people, as well as the growing number of people dying from illnesses that resulted from participating in the cleanup at Ground Zero. There were many communication challenges faced by agencies tasked with responding to the incident, and particularly in the case of law enforcement, these problems likely resulted in more fatalities than would have occurred had better systems been in place. This paper will discuss the communication problems that

The Testimony of Cofer Black, the Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center from 1999-2002, greatly affected my thinking about the domestic intelligence ‘failures’ which led to the inability to foresee or prevent the 9/11 attacks. His testimony, paired with both concurring and clashing views from the 9/11 Commission Report, gave a persuasive ‘defense’ of the intelligence community’s actions and capabilities before September 11, 2001. Three of Black 's ‘agreements’ were particularly influential towards my understanding. First, Black presented a strong argument that the inefficiency of counterterrorism had much to do with pre-9/11 domestic priorities, which left those involved with fighting terrorism, including those acts