Supremacy Of Eu Law Essay

We can tell that the supremacy of EU law above the parliamentary sovereignty in the context with the UK’s statutory recognition of human rights renders parliament obsolete and relic. And the main motive of this essay is to tell that the EU laws supremacy have brought a rapid change as the whole. Some people would like to say that parliament can entangle some few adverse significant which can affect the sovereignty whereas then no one would bother to follow or talk about the irrelevant doctrine. PS is also called to be one of the fundamental head of democratic government where it must contain an elected assembly who will be held responsible for representing people and it is the responsibility of assembly to draft the laws that can be applied for whole population. An act of parliament has the legal power where the courts are unwilling to blame other things that falls shortage of some reason for the preeminent pose. The supreme legal authority also lies with the parliament where it can create or end up with any law. Legislative body is identified to have the absolute sovereignty in all the institutions of government and is also said to be the supreme head.

The legitimacy of the ECJ to uphold EU legislation is a necessary component of effective human rights policy. The history of its increase in power is worth noting. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the ECJ’s location in Luxembourg, far from the political fray in Brussels and Strasburg, prevented it from becoming a strong body of the EU. Yet, throughout that time the court methodically built case-law that would lead to its surge in influence in the 1980s. The two most significant developments of the court during this time period were direct effect and supremacy. These twin pillars clarified the relationship between the national and EU legal orders.

With regards to the claim that the European Parliament is too weak (the second of Weiler's standard version claims), Moravcsik (2002; 2003) emphasises the fact that during the last twenty years, the European Parliament is the institution which have experienced the most reforms, regarding its increase of powers, compare to the Council and the Commission. The latter argument is in fact accurate because ever since the Single European Act (1986), the European Parliament gains more and more power by reforms in every signed Treaty (Moravcsik, 2003, p. 7). Despite that, however, the Parliament is still considered to be weak compared to the other institutions, as it will be analysed later in the essay.

This essay advances the position that the quotation under discussion is, with all due respect to the Author, entirely incorrect. It is the counter-argument of this essay that the Courts of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have ‘abused’ their interpretive jurisdiction, and, in places, have even done violence to the very wording of the Treaty itself.

Historically the EEC treaty contained no provision dealing with the concept of supremacy of Community law over the national law of member states. In fact, treaties were generally silent as to the nature of the relationship between EU law and national law except for a general obligation contained in article 4 (3) TEU which states:-

Established as part of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the primary role of the European Court of Justice (known here after as ECJ) is to ensure the interpretation and application of the Treaties law is observed (Article 19 TEU). The vast majority of cases heard by the ECJ are either brought by member states or by the institutions of the European Communities, or are references on questions of European law sent to it by the national courts of Member States. According to Article 258, “If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to

The crux of the discussion of the essay is to determine whether the principles of direct effect, supremacy and member state liability are capable of protecting individuals’ rights. Direct effect is a directly effective provision that a natural or legal person can rely on in national courts. Supremacy is where a provision on national and EU law are in conflict, the latter will prevail. Member state liability is that the individuals can seek for compensation from the State when there is a failure on the State’s part to implement the EU Law.

Although the EU is only licensed to create laws regarding distinct subject matters, in which such matters are obliged to take precedence above laws constructed by parliament, in this matter, the parliament is no longer the superior body of law in the UK. The earliest exemplar by which the long-established prospect of Parliamentary Sovereignty was questioned, hence embodying the infection point for the ideology of Parliamentary Supremacy relating to EU amalgamation was the instance of Factortame . This case recognized the superiority of EU law on top of parliament’s domestic law seeing that it refuted the Merchant Shipping act 1998 as a result of discrimination of ethnic minority, consequently conflicting the rules of the EEC. By which, national courts had to neglect Parliament’s statuary for it to adhere with EU arrangements as the Court of Justice of the European Union had maintained conclusively opposing with the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty

This hazard came after the government of Poland had reorganized the voting requirements of the Constitutional Court and altered the structure of the nation’s media outlets. The majority ruling party within Poland, the Law and Justice Party, also raised moral questions among other EU member states by establishing new government appointed leaders to the public television and broadcasting agencies. This new change in judicial processes and media control has led many members of the European Union to question both the democracy and corruption within the Polish government and to determine if the new policies have infringed on the EU’s values and morals. Therefore, these recent political fluctuations have lead me to ask what powers does the EU have to influence a member countries media and court institutions, why has the EU become worried about Poland, and in which ways will the EU attempt to sanction Poland for their alterations? This research paper will elaborate on Poland’s recent political changes. It will then analyze how Poland’s changes have raised controversy with the European Union and why the EU was concerned. Lastly, the research will demonstrate which institutions in the EU have jurisdiction over such a conflict, and how the European Union will attempt to nullify Poland’s voting rights within the EU.

Historically the EEC treaty contained no provision dealing with the concept of supremacy of Community law over the national law of member states. In fact, treaties were generally silent as to the nature of the relationship between EU law and national law except for a general obligation contained in article 4 (3) TEU which states:-

Enforcing the European Union legal system is diverse and done on multiple platforms; through not only actions taken against member states for breach of their obligations, but also, for example, through the use of direct effect1. Article 267 TFEU; an organism devised to practice private enforcement of EU law before national courts, has been critical to ensure uniform interpretation and application of EU law in member states. References for preliminary rulings occur when the national courts are presented with a question of EU law due to uncertainty of the provision. The national court will therefore ‘make a reference to the Court of Justice (COJ) to obtain a preliminary ruling on any point of EU law relevant to the proceedings’2. In

The CJEU case-law on horizontal direct effect of directives arguably lacks consistency in regards to the application of the general principle. The principle of direct effect was established in Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen. Although there is no set definition of direct effect, a broader definition was provided in Van Gend en Loos that it “can be expressed as the capacity of a provision of EU law to be invoked before a national court.” However, Van Dyun v. Home Office established that directives are capable of direct effect. Furthermore, Marshall v. Southampton established that there could only be vertical direct effect of directives. This stringent principle has arguable ignited the highly contested debate of whether or not horizontal direct effect is applicable to directives or if directives could only have vertical direct effect. However, this essay shall explore the lack of consistency in case-law regarding horizontal direct effect of directives. Firstly, this paper will delve into the case-law of the topic of horizontal direct effect of directives in efforts to try to highlight its consistency in its approach. Secondly, the paper will use case law and the opinion of academics (enter the name of the academics later) to highlight its inconsistencies using the legal mechanisms that have been introduced by the Courts to try to compensate for the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives. Namely, indirect effect, incidental horizontal

However again this higher status can be seen as limited as is only assumed from a written obligation. Therefore to asses if supremacy is not the challenge to member state sovereignty that is appears to be, a close analysis of how the CJEU has dealt with the issue of supremacy of EU law in case law is needed, firstly looking at Van Gend en Loos which stated that the ‘EU was a new legal order permanently limiting the sovereign rights of the Member State’. This customs case helped establish the ‘relationships between the European Union and international law…to grantee that the rules of one system are complied with in another legal order ’ showing in practise that if on a national level EU law is breached CJEU will take supremacy and comply with ‘the integrity of the EU legal order’ . Further evaluation of the limits of the supremacy can be seen in the case of Costa V ENEL where ‘Italy had claimed that the EU treaties…had been transposed into the Italian legal order by national legislation, which could therefore be derogated by subsequent national legislation. The court rejected this presumption of the supremacy of national law by insisting on the supremacy of EU law’ . This case holds significance as it ‘is well-known since Costa V ENEL the court has affirmed the supremacy of Community law over national law’ strongly suggesting the continued existence of EU supremacy is not frequently

It is important to set the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights in context by examining the development of rights within the European Union. The embryo organisation that commenced the EU (The Coal and Steel Community 1951) was introduced in the wake of World War II to rebuild Europe by economically tying previously warring nations together. The consensus amongst the "heavy weights" of the EU was, if member states were economically invested in each other to ensure financial stability within their own state, future conflicts would be avoided. The EU had taken the role of a purely economic organisation which explains why it was not focused on social issues such as human rights, leaving such matters to individual member states to determine. Then came the political advancement of the 1990s, as evidenced by Weiler; ‘[The Maastricht Treaty] appropriates the deepest symbols of statehood: European citizenship, defence and foreign policy’. Naturally, the issue of human rights became prominent within the EU, and after much debate and a Convention the Charter was passed and given legally binding status under the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. The Charter has proved to be a controversial issue within European politics, with doubts being voiced about the functionality of the European Union’s own “Bill of Rights”. To effectively assess the question at hand, this essay will evaluate the extent to which the Charter is a necessary and desirable development, before reaching an overall

The Importance of the Concept of Citizenship in the Development of EC Law After Maastricht