The Problem Of Self State

Central Argument (3-5): The brainstorm machine is part of the intuition pump that has the possibility to confirm two individuals have different color qualia. The issue here is that one could never know the correct orientation of the brainstorm machine because there is never an intersubjective comparison of qualia, even with the help of technology. Additionally, the intuition pump of the neurosurgical prank and alternative neurosurgery describes an evil neuroscientist did something horribly wrong in one’s mind where his or her color qualia are inverted. What the evil neuroscientist might have done is maybe inverted the optic nerve or the certain memory-anchored dispositions to react to qualia. Concluding that these two procedures do not

As the book state on page 30, “yet, when we begin to think, we risk cutting ourselves off from our sensations”, meaning, that we cannot think and hand feel the sensation at the same time. We would lose track of what we were thinking of to feel the object.

I remembered Johnny—his face all cut up and bruised, and I remembered how he had cried when we found him, half- conscious, in the corner lot.

The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

To quote Karl Popper, “Every solution to a problem, raises another unsolved problem” (Williams, 2003, p. 2). It has been a topic debated for centuries, still, a definitive solution is yet to be found that universally satisfies the problem of mind brain identity. The most logical answer comes in the form of monism. Therefore in this paper I will argue that the mind and the brain are identical, as the mind exists only as a property of the brain. David Lewis and D.M Armstrong give support for the causal relationship between mind and brain states in the form of the identity theory, and deal with the multiple realisability argument provided by Hillary Putman. Gottlob Frege provides his support for materialism by showing that mental states are determined by the function of the brain, while discounting Thomas Nagel’s argument which proposes the idea of Qualia. Both the functionalist theory and identity theory reach agreement on the materialistic view that the mind and brain are of the same substance.

There are two main theories that make up the knowledge argument. The first is Physicalism, (or better known as materialism) which is the thesis that “All facts are dependent upon physical processes.”(Smart) The other main stance taken is property dualism. The thesis of property dualism states that there are “Non-physical properties of physical substances” (Calef) or that there are physical and mental properties. In this article, I will defend the stance of property dualism by acknowledging objections and replying to these objections to show why the argument for property dualism works.

“contents of consciousness that possess sensory qualities as opposed to those that are purely verbal or abstract”

The International Association for the Study of Pain defined pain as “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage” (Unk, 2007). Pain being described such as this allows us to see that pain is a perception, not unlike seeing or hearing. Pain is the most common reason that people seek medical attention but pain is very hard to define because it is subjective. Pain perception is the process by which a painful stimulus is relayed from the site of stimulation to the central nervous system (Freudenrich, 2008). In order to determine if pain is a perception of the mind or if it is biological we must first understand how the process of pain works.

An extensive matrix of neurons in the brain gives us the sense of our own bodies and body parts. Pain results when this matrix produces an abnormal pattern of activity, as a result of memories, emotions, expectations or signals from various brain centres and not just from signals from peripheral nerves. Because of the lack of sensory stimulation or a person’s efforts to move a nonexistent limb, abnormal patterns may arise, resulting in phantom pain.

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

For centuries philosophers have engaged themselves into conversations and arguments trying to figure out the nature of a human person; this has lead to various theories and speculation about the nature of the human mind and body. The question they are tying to answer is whether a human being is made of only the physical, body and brain, or both the physical or the mental, mind. In this paper I will focus on the mind-body Identity Theory to illustrate that it provides a suitable explanation for the mind and body interaction.

the physical body. In addition, Smart's theory is a posteriori claim, which is to say that

Even when it is defined it has no physical meaning involved. I am led to believe consciousness is not physical. For example is it physical when one knows right from wrong? Knowing happens in the mind, the mind is a part of one’s conscious. Therefore inferring knowing right from wrong is a conscious state of mind. When someone goes into the store and steals no matter the reason why, the action attaches itself to one’s conscious. The conscious is connected to memory so when someone remembers a bad action it takes a toll on their conscious.

At the time when Alejandro was surrounded with neglect, domestic violence, and drugs; it was unlikely that he would feel cohesion of self, as described in the theory of the tripartite self. The first pole of Self Psychology, the Grandiose Pole, Kohut explains that persons have a need to feel special and worthwhile (Flanagan, 2011). As gathering resources, finding, and abusing methamphetamine can consume much of one’s resources and time, it is likely that Ms. C. did not spend much time making Alejandro feel loved and special. Furthermore, not receiving this sort of nurturement may have caused Alejandro to act out in order to receive attention. When Alejandro was taken from his mother, it is likely that his foster parents had made him feel special due to the attention that he then received. However, as he spent time in four homes within approximately nine months, it is unknown if he has seen any of his foster parents as selfobjects. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the second pole of Self Psychology.