The Problem Of Self State

The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)

To define consciousness we must make an assumption, that an equilateral state of being is common throughout all who can express it. Be it a normal waking consciousness, or an altered state of behaviour. To develop a testable parameter we rely on physiological responses, which are relative and subjected, if a persons conscious awareness overrides their physical response objective measures become unreliable and thus invalid. Because of this we have struggled to define consciousness, philosophers such as David Chalmers equate the mind and the body to be distinctive seperate forms of sensory transference. Like a passenger in the vehicle of the body, this dualist method of thinking suggest that the mental state can’t be condensed into physical systems.

The relationship between the physical and the mental is an issue that philosophers have pondered for centuries, and this issue still remains relevant today. In the attempt to determine the relationship between physical properties and mental properties two schools of thoughts emerged: Monism and Dualism. People who subscribe to monism believe physical properties, such as color and location, as well as mental properties, such as emotions and beliefs, are all one entity. Materialisms, the most popular form of monism, claims that everything mental is also physical. On the other end of the spectrum, Dualists believe that physical and mental properties are two separate entities. This paper will address the merits of interactionist substance dualism (interactionism) and epiphenomenalist property dualism (epiphenomenalism) as well as functionalism which is a type of materialism.

To quote Karl Popper, “Every solution to a problem, raises another unsolved problem” (Williams, 2003, p. 2). It has been a topic debated for centuries, still, a definitive solution is yet to be found that universally satisfies the problem of mind brain identity. The most logical answer comes in the form of monism. Therefore in this paper I will argue that the mind and the brain are identical, as the mind exists only as a property of the brain. David Lewis and D.M Armstrong give support for the causal relationship between mind and brain states in the form of the identity theory, and deal with the multiple realisability argument provided by Hillary Putman. Gottlob Frege provides his support for materialism by showing that mental states are determined by the function of the brain, while discounting Thomas Nagel’s argument which proposes the idea of Qualia. Both the functionalist theory and identity theory reach agreement on the materialistic view that the mind and brain are of the same substance.

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

“contents of consciousness that possess sensory qualities as opposed to those that are purely verbal or abstract”

Identity theory attempts to explain the relationship between the body and the mind. It states that some mental states are the same as some brain states. This implies that one could group mental events – like pain, pleasure or hunger – into events that correlate with physical states of the brain; for example, when one feels pain, C-fibers are firing(mason, “identity theory”). However, there are many objections to this theory. Overall, these objections are compelling and show that identity theory is weak and untrue. In this essay, I will argue that mental states are not identical to brain states by breaking down the Identity Theory.

David Eagleman explained in detail how the cognitive brain works and what factors play a part in the thought process. He did so by picking apart different segments of the brain and describing what developmental processes it goes through when obtaining thought and language. I would definitely recommend this book to other people if they want to better understand how people think, act, and behave. When certain things are skewed in the brain, it reacts in many different ways. Whether that be poorly or very highly. It depends on what factors are brought upon the brain and what that specific part of the brain takes in. Eagleman does a fantastic job explaining with good humor how the thought process comes about. Without our cognitive ability to think and act, there would be no personality or knowledge on this earth.

The first objection Smart presented was the question of how someone could describe sensations without any knowledge of neurophysiology. The seventh objection Smart presented stated, "I can imagine myself turned to stone and yet having sensations" . Smarts responds with the same rebuttal to both of these objections; that even if A is identical with B, one can know about A without having knowledge of B. Smart uses the example of lightning being one and the same as electric discharge. People having knowledge of lightning but not electricity does not imply that lightning is not electric discharge. This response also defeats objection 7, since this conceivability argument only ensues when the person conceiving has an incomplete understanding of

the physical body. In addition, Smart's theory is a posteriori claim, which is to say that

Thus if psychology cannot be reduced to physics, it is not because psychology is not physical in an ontological sense; it is because the appropriate bridge laws will not allow a full explanation in physical terms. This suggests the idea of physicalism that may entail Fodor’s view, via the generality of physics; Fodor(1974/2002) suggests “that any event which falls within the universe of discourse of a special science will also fall within the universe of a discourse of physics” (p. 128), he also maintains that “it is not further required that the taxonomies which the special sciences employ must themselves reduce to the taxonomy of physics” (Fodor, 1974/2002, p. 134). Moreover, Fodor (1974/2002) argues that “the attempt to pair neurological structures with psychological functions is foredoomed” (p.130). Thus Fodor allows for the independence of the special sciences – a non-reductive physicalism – and in doing so, implies criticism of the identity theory proposed by Place and Smart, and an alternative he defend a functionalist

The International Association for the Study of Pain defined pain as “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage” (Unk, 2007). Pain being described such as this allows us to see that pain is a perception, not unlike seeing or hearing. Pain is the most common reason that people seek medical attention but pain is very hard to define because it is subjective. Pain perception is the process by which a painful stimulus is relayed from the site of stimulation to the central nervous system (Freudenrich, 2008). In order to determine if pain is a perception of the mind or if it is biological we must first understand how the process of pain works.

For centuries philosophers have engaged themselves into conversations and arguments trying to figure out the nature of a human person; this has lead to various theories and speculation about the nature of the human mind and body. The question they are tying to answer is whether a human being is made of only the physical, body and brain, or both the physical or the mental, mind. In this paper I will focus on the mind-body Identity Theory to illustrate that it provides a suitable explanation for the mind and body interaction.

Even when it is defined it has no physical meaning involved. I am led to believe consciousness is not physical. For example is it physical when one knows right from wrong? Knowing happens in the mind, the mind is a part of one’s conscious. Therefore inferring knowing right from wrong is a conscious state of mind. When someone goes into the store and steals no matter the reason why, the action attaches itself to one’s conscious. The conscious is connected to memory so when someone remembers a bad action it takes a toll on their conscious.