The Pros And Cons Of Irregular Warfare

1. (15 pts) Review the Operational Approach Student Aid Slide #7 for this question. Operational Design and the Operational Approach is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns.” (JP 5-0, III-1). In the context of the Mediterranean/North Africa Theater of Operations (M/NATO), using the contextual background notes and material provided for this exam in Parts 2 and 3, apply operational design thinking as described in JP 5-0 chapter III to answer the following.

Conventional warfare follows the single battle concept, where two or more well defined forces using weapons that target the opposing force. The contiguous battle-space is well defined with a deep, close and rear area allowing the force commander to array forces that can be visually displayed in a linear graphic. This does not hold true in an unconventional warfare, where the rear area may also be the close and deep fight and forces may target the civilian population either through direct, indirect or propaganda attacks. The will of the people play an important part in unconventional warfare and their support to either force is equally important. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the Marine Corps force in readiness is capable

A small country such as North Vietnam was able to win a war against a superpower like the United States of America, through, namely, tactics – such as Guerrilla Warfare -, the ignorance of their enemy, the attitude of the South Vietnamese, as well as a strong leader such as Ho Chi Minh. The Vietnam War was a major conflict (of the Cold War) which lasted from 1959 to 1975 , with US involvement from 1964 to 1973 . US reasons for their involvement in the war was their fear of “The Domino Effect” - or – the US fear that communism would spread to Vietnam and Southeast Asia, making them a major threat to national security. The Fall of Saigon marked the end of the war in 1975.

Given the context of current strategic guidance, it is important to ask if the U.S. can be prepared to conduct both conventional and irregular warfare successfully. The answer is yes. However, preparation for conventional operations should always be the priority. Preparation for irregular warfare should not come at the expense of conventional warfare preparation. This is necessary because of the reasons discussed below: the strategic limitations of irregular warfare, the enduring nature of conventional war, resource constraints, and prioritization of operations and training.

(1350)The Failure of Guerilla Warfare Methods in the Vietnam War: An Analysis of the Causality of the “Counter Insurgency” Governmental Policies and the Presidential Campaign of 1968

In this essay, I will support the JP 3-24’s current definition of insurgency. It defines an insurgency as “The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.” In CW4 Sicard’s COIN class we discussed that insurgencies mobilizes people and other resources to form an alternative to the state or government. As my historical example to defend this definition of insurgency, I will use the American Revolutionary War. The American Revolutionary War was essentially waged by insurgents, which were present in all the American colonies, which were still controlled by the British at the time. We were legally subjects of the British crown, but we wanted to break free

If people wanted to know anything about the Guerrilla war or the fighters, they should read this book, despite it not having been written recently, and become enamored with the story of common men; who protect their homeland from foreign invaders, from conquering them, and taking away stuff that makes them, Spanish, and call Spain, their home.

A group of US soldiers are behind guerrilla forces about to ambush them when they loses track of his location and their compass malfunctions resulting in them getting lost in dangerous terrain. Their radios also stop working because of the density of the amazon rainforest. They are forced to apply the survival skills taught in training to survive whilst making sure they aren’t detected by enemy forces. They expect to hear gunfire soon to indicate where both of the forces are but no skirmishes ensue. They are forced to make the tough decision of making a signal that could attract the enemy or their forces or trying to hide their presence which could lead to US forces not detecting them but also hide them from enemy guerrilla forces. Then as

As the 20th century saw the nature of warfare move away from line by line battalion formation fighting to trench warfare in the First World War, to the highly aggressive and audacious blitzkrieg methodology implemented by Nazi Germany in the Second World War and the introduction of counterinsurgency operations highlighted by French and then American involvement in Vietnam, so too does the nature of warfare adapt to 21st century technology and the seemingly fragile geopolitical landscape. This new form of fighting rears its ugly head in the form of hybrid warfare. As far as definitions are concerned, the United States Army defines a hybrid threat as a diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects (Department of the Army, 2010). The recent event I chose that demonstrations a hybrid threat would be the Russian annexation of Crimea and its destabilization of eastern Ukraine.

Irregular warfare has become the centre of much military and academic study in recent years, due mostly to the ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan. However irregular warfare is by no means a recent revelation in the evolution of warfare and strategy, numerous examples exist throughout history in which irregular warfare tactics and strategy have been adopted and later analysed by academics and military professionals. This author will focus on the key issues that governments face in creating effective strategies for irregular warfare with a particular emphasis on counter-insurgency (COIN) and terrorism. Resources such as time, space, legitimacy and support present themselves as key issues in dealing with insurgency and terrorism and are

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of

The challenges of fully understanding Unconventional Warfare fall into two categories. First, the socioeconomic factors that drive a society are incredibly complicated, much more so than any military campaign, conventional or otherwise, is prepared to address. Second, self-imposed restrictions within our military, government and society have hampered attempts at sincere UW campaigns. In COL(R) Maxwell’s article, he suggests that there is a lack of understanding due to a dearth of intellectual study of UW. I tend to disagree, I believe that there is an adequate understanding of UW, however there is a lack of political will to engage in it.

Dr Colin Grey, he asserts “that the United States should undertake little irregular warfare. It would be a political and strategic mistake to identify irregular warfare, COIN especially, as America’s dominant strategic future (Grey 1).” I disagree, I would assert that due to the United States’ superior military power and technology, more stable political system (democracy), and globally dominate economy, we can and will, be successful in COIN operations. Examining each of these pillars of power will illustrate the advantage the United States has already demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how these pillars will give us the strategic advantage in irregular

The guerilla warfare thematization gives rise to some interesting mechanics that feature prominently in the tactical skirmishes; a loot system, and a concealment/ambush one. In the loot system, a downed alien combatant occasionally leaves behind desirable equipment you may repurpose, your scopes, magazines and the like. However, in order to obtain the loot, a character needs to end their movement inside the designated area, rendering it an enticing, but a risky prospect. The focus on concealment and ambushes alters the experience in a more immediately noticeable way. In accordance with XCOM 2's narrative framing, the only upper hand your fledgling resistance has is the element of surprise. The ambushes aren't some new gimmick. You should prioritize

An evaluation of OIF planning reveals three strong elements of operational design: arranging operations, lines of operation, and decisive points. Commanders determined the best arrangement of joint forces to conduct their assigned tasks, given the planning constraints. The commanders used the concept of depth to rout the Iraqi military forces, creating opposing and overlapping demands on the enemy in several areas before converging on Baghdad.