However, other theories come into play and reject the psychological approach to explaining personal identity and it’s persistence over time; claims that continuity of the brain and memory are not enough to explain and confirm personal identity are made. These theories include the biological approach, the dualist theory, and the materialist approach from Shoemaker, which involves the memory theory. Through the review of these theories respectively, a clearer understanding of personal identity can be developed and argued for. Following this, we can begin to see how cases of multiples personalities or identities can be argued to exist as well. The biological approach consists of two main claims. The first claim being that human people …show more content…
From this then, it follows that the animal that survived, despite lacking the psychological properties considered necessary in the psychological approach, is the same or has the same identity. Olson (1997) takes this argument one step further claiming that while in the vegetative state the animal cannot be considered to even be a person. The animal does not possess the components necessary to distinguish itself as not a non-human organism; these components included psychological features such as rationality and the capacity for self-consciousness. So, if this is the case then this viewpoint can also argue that identity can exist and persist through time without being a person.
Moreover, the transplant of the cerebrum of an animal is also enacted to illustrate that identity should not be dependent upon the psychological concept of continuity. While this same example, in the case of the psychological approach, would argue that transplanting the cerebrum of a person into the body of another person will allow the identity of the initial individual to now be the identity of the body which the brain, containing memories and other sufficient information for psychological relation and continuity to be conserved, has been transplanted into. In the biological approach, this example shows only what it is at surface value, which is the transplant of the cerebrum that is just like a liver, kidney, or any other organ
In a series of relatively simple though complexly-worded (out of necessity) thought experiments regarding body-swapping and changes to memory and the mind, Bernard Williams attempts to demonstrate that identity should be identified with the body rather than with the mind when identity is extended into the future (and by extension during the present). That is, though it is typical for identity to be associated with the mind at any given moment, Williams argues that the logic that supports this intuitive association does not hold up over longer periods of time, and that anticipation of the future leads to an association of identity with the body rather than with the mind. Whether or not Williams is successful in this attempt is a matter of much debate, with this author finding some fundamental flaws in the very premise of the comparisons and thus the conclusions, however the argument is fairly elegant and persuasive and certainly worth of closer inspection. A careful reading of the argument might lead one to a conclusion opposite to that which was intended, but is no less rewarding for this unusual quirk.
The mind-brain identity theory is an ontological perspective which centers around the idea that the mind can be closely associated with the brain to be considered the same. In other words, a person’s mind processes are coherent with their brain processes. It is a significant topic included in the philosophy of mind. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the identity theory of mind is “to the effect that these experiences just are brain processes, not merely correlated with brain processes”. In this
4.2:7), we should abandon the language of identity. Therefore, for cases in which we are unable to speak of identity (because the psychological continuity relation is not one-one), psychological continuity will be just as important as identity.
What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind.
371). This responds to the objections raised by Thomas Reid in the 18th century (Shoemaker, 2008, p. 340), however, the Memory Theory did require a modification to include the possibility of temporarily forgetting the experiences of an earlier person-stage, “as long as one has the potentiality of remembering it” (Shoemaker, 2008, p. 340). In the conversations held by Gretchen Weirob, Sam Miller and Dave Cohen in Perry’s ‘Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality’ (Perry, 1977), this concept is addressed in depth. Miller relays a chapter written by Locke – “the relation between two person-stages or stretches of consciousness that makes them stages of a single person is just that the later one contains memories of an earlier one...I can remember only my past thoughts and feelings, and you only yours...take this relation as the source of identity” (Perry, 1977, p. 343). These concepts are logical possibilities in my opinion, and are far less unstable than those presented within the Body/Soul Theory, as these concepts do not require the senses of others, but the individual’s first person perception of their personal identity.
As the tool of scientific investigation increase, the relationship between the mind and the brain has never been more intimate. Chemical changes in our brain could lead to heightened euphoria or it can lead to the most profound depression. Damages to the brain can lead to changes that can eliminate the some abilities of the brain, such as smell, vision, or even the ability to recognized faces. Therefore, this is at that vary lease a powerful correlation between the state of the mind and state of the brain. But this is not enough for the Identity theories, so they go above and beyond this to explain this profound view.
In philosophy, the issue of personal identity concerns the conditions under which a person at one time is the same person at another time. An analysis of personal identity
To quote Karl Popper, “Every solution to a problem, raises another unsolved problem” (Williams, 2003, p. 2). It has been a topic debated for centuries, still, a definitive solution is yet to be found that universally satisfies the problem of mind brain identity. The most logical answer comes in the form of monism. Therefore in this paper I will argue that the mind and the brain are identical, as the mind exists only as a property of the brain. David Lewis and D.M Armstrong give support for the causal relationship between mind and brain states in the form of the identity theory, and deal with the multiple realisability argument provided by Hillary Putman. Gottlob Frege provides his support for materialism by showing that mental states are determined by the function of the brain, while discounting Thomas Nagel’s argument which proposes the idea of Qualia. Both the functionalist theory and identity theory reach agreement on the materialistic view that the mind and brain are of the same substance.
In, “A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality,” the author, John Perry, proposes three totally different ways of thinking about personal identity. The first theory is presented by a character named Gretchen Weirob, she believes that a person is their body. By this she means that a person’s identity is intertwined with the DNA and molecules of their body. Their personality as well as their personal identity can’t be separated from their body, and they cannot exist without it. The second theory was presented by a character named Sam Miller, he believes that a person is their immaterial soul. So in general, Sam thinks that the soul is this invisible, immaterial substance that is able to exist from the body. The third and final theory was presented by a character named Dave Cohen. Cohen believes that a person has continuity of memory, and/or psychology. So in general Cohen’s theory is that personal identity is a set of correlating experiences and/or memories enclosed in the brain. All three of the personal identity theories state some very valid points, but they also have some inconsistencies, some more than others. But there is one theory that seems to be the most credible, and creates a very compelling argument while also having a little science to back up some of its points.
Personal identity is essential in the human experience. Identity is complex and can be broken down into two main groups: introspective identity, and bodily identity. Introspective identity is based off of the groups, mentalities, or beliefs that you align yourself with, and bodily identity is based off of the physical side of yourself. Whether physical or introspective, your identity impacts every action you take. Whether choices ranging from what colors you prefer to which college you want to attend are primarily based off of your introspective identity, which is a combination of both memory and consciousness, physical identity impacts how others perceive you. Consciousness is mainly the awareness of bodily identity as well as continuous introspective identify, while memory is awareness of introspective identity. These two different facets of identity are imperative in the distinction between bodily identity and introspective identity. In means of personal identity introspective identity (which is evident in memory), is essential, while bodily identity (based partially in consciousness) has less credit.
In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.
If on Tuesday, I suffer an accident and lose all of my memory, it is probable that my family and friends will still love and care for me, creating an impression that I am indeed the same person I once was. These conditions imply the theses of animalism and bodily continuity when it comes to personal identity. However, is this human habit enough to discard the idea that it is psychological continuity that sustains identity? Whilst many may argue that it would be against our intuition to say that I am no longer the same person, I do not believe that this is caused by our intuition, but instead a societal construct that’s sole purpose is to make the trauma of the accident and loss easier to deal with. By using this premise and upholding the psychological
There are many questions surrounding personal identity: whether it consists in consciousness, whether we are just a soul or a mind and are we only who we can remember being? Locke claims that our personal identity is found in our identity of consciousness, yet can this be true if a person can change bodies, or one mind can be inhabited by various persons? In this essay, I will first be looking at Locke’s account of personal identity and how he comes to the conclusion that personal identity consists over time. From this, I will then counter-argue Locke’s ideas with Thomas Reid’s discussion on the transitivity of identity, and how Locke’s argument of how consciousness makes the same person over time is inconsistent. In response to Reid’s
Taken advantages of identity claims, Place (1956) suggest the thesis that “’consciousness is a process in the brain’” (Place, 1956/1970, p. 42). Let us do some remarks about this statement, interestingly, Place use the word ‘process’, and this may be expectable from his theory, and this word was not chose by chance, similarly, the use of “is” shall be fundamental in Place’s view. To defends his identity theory, the first line of argument according to Place is to setup the semantic use of ‘is’, he identify ‘is’ as definition and composition; the use of ‘is’ in an identity statement according to Place should be a composition, therefore the expression “consciousness is a brain process” needs to be understood in terms of composition rather than
Philosophers over time have tried to explain their understanding on the view of personal identity some of the like Rene Descartes adding the views of the existence of the material souls or egos. His views on the existence of egos suggest that people have bodies which can die but still they continue to exist. In as such other philosophers proposed diverging views from him suggesting that such a simple