The Representational Theory Of Mind

The important problems of the mind module are: how do we understand the nature of mental events, their relation to the physical world and physical events and fundamentally the problems with other minds. This essay essentially serves to evaluate whether the Zombie argument against Cartesian Dualism is sound by: criticising the Zombie argument through analysing the validity of each premise of the Zombie argument, defending the Zombie argument against one of its objections and responses from the Cartesian Argument by analogy. This essay will offer reasons to believe the Zombie argument by contrasting it with the strengths and weaknesses of the Cartesian

How the world around us is represented mentally is the corner stone of cognitive architectures. It facilitates understanding of information received and perceived from our environment. The storage and retrieval of knowledge would be impossible without mental representations.

In David M. Armstrong’s “The Nature of Mind”, Armstrong praises the field of science and seeks to put the concept of mind into terms that agree with science’s definition of minds. His interest is in the physico-chemical, materialist view of man. Armstrong considers science to be the authority over other disciplines because of its reliability and result in consensus over disputed questions.

In this paper, I will argue that the Mind-Brain Identity Theory provides sufficient grounds to accept Epicurus’ argument for death being annihilation. I will argue my thesis by referring to Peter Carruthers’ The Mind Is the Brain to establish that one’s mental states are in fact brain states and will also refer to Epicurus’ Death is Nothing to Us. Next, I will explain that if one accepts the Identity Theory then one should also accept, as Epicurus argues, that death should not be feared, for it is annihilation. I will conclude by refuting objections to the Identity Theory and the Epicurean argument on death.

Many arguments in the philosophy of the mind have been made for and against, whether or not the mind and the brain are the same entity. The mind-brain identity theory is the view that the mind is the brain and that mental states are brain states (Mandik 77). Therefore, we can identify sensations and other mental processes with physical brain processes (Blutner 4). I argue, that the mind is not identical to the brain, and the conceivable idea of zombies, as well as the multiple realizability argument, can disprove this theory.

The problem of other minds, in philosophy, addresses the issue of finding justification for the existence of minds other than one’s own. The issue is one that logically and chronologically follows the resolution of whether the individual mind truly exists, for if an individual admits to being, or at least having, a mind, then the question of whether consciousness exists in other beings shortly follows. Put simply, the problem states: if one can only observe the behavior of others, and if one cannot prove the actuality of any thoughts other than one’s own, then how can one know that others have minds? That is, the presence of complex behavior does not provide proof of mentality. While the answer seems simple if examined superficially, the proof and reasoning remains difficult to articulate. It is reasonable to assume that because I have a thinking mind—that which reasons, feels, remembers, and is self-aware—then the human beings surrounding me must surely have the same; however, philosophy calls in to question the reality of “ingenious automata,” or mechanical computers made to imitate a human beings (Russell 248). Could the beings surround one’s self be humans with similar human minds, or could they be humanoid robots created to act and react as humans would? This possible, although admittedly improbable, suggestion forces one to contemplate and legitimize the idea of personhood as it applies to beings other than one’s self.

Scientists have discovered that bonobos, chimpanzees, orangutans, and gorillas, do in fact posses many aspects of the theory of mind. The theory of mind was something scientists thought was unique to humans. These great apes can identify the goals and intentions that were behind actions of someone else, and they can also identify features of the environment that others can know about or see. There is one thing apes can’t seem to wrap their fingers around, which is understanding others false belief. One experiment they did was showing the apes a video of humans dressed like apes. In one scene of the video the human actor was trying to search for a stone that he saw King Kong hide within one of two boxes. However, the actor went away, and King

The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound

It has been said that what distinguishes humans from other animals is metacognition-- the ability to think about thinking. Thinking and consciousness are two topics that Descartes emphasizes heavily in his Meditations on First Philosophy. On the topic of thinking, Descartes asks, “But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and that also imagines and senses…Indeed it is no small matter if all of these things belong to me. But why should they not belong to me?” (Descartes, 20). This example of metacognition provides insight into the content of thinking, which can be applied in a variety of ways. By analyzing the way that people think about thinking, it becomes possible to explore an important feature of the human experience. In particular, this aspect of the Cartesian approach to thinking is useful when considering the impact of mental illness on mental processing and thinking.

The mind-body is made up of physical and mental properties. The physical properties “have a certain weight, shape, etc., and are publicly accessible” (Osmundsen, 2016), whereas, with the mental properties “there is a raw qualitative feel to have a mental state” (Osmundsen, 2016). These two properties cause many problems within human life, however there are five major problems arising about the mind and body. The majority of people do not put enough thought into these problems, but they are very important to understand. This paper will include those five different complications with the mind and body, give an argument for dualism, give a response for the argument, and include an opinion for the argument that is stronger and why it is stronger.

Andy Clark and David Chalmers take a unique stance on cognition and cognitive processes. Cognition is the process of thinking, and many believe that it must occur exclusively within the brain. Clark and Chalmers dispute this idea, by proposing the idea of extended cognition and active externalism. In this paper I intend to shed light on the basic views of Andy Clark and David Chalmers. I also intend to inform the audience on different the perspectives of a representational theory of mind, and argue a case for extended cognition and representational consciousness in animals.

The human body itself is a complex organism. The most important organ that makes us function to survive on earth is the brain. On the other hand, our mind is a psychological center which functions based on our cognitive abilities. Our brain consist of cerebrum which is located in the upper portion of the skull. It is here where the bucket of human intelligence lies. Our skills of writing, reading, speaking, perception or any other sensory function processes in this part of the brain; including the voluntary actions. This is why the cerebrum is one of the most essential part for our living. Now, this seems that our brain controls us, therefore are we robots then? Here is when our mind comes to play. Our mind makes an image based on our thoughts which is then displayed in our human nature with the help of the brain.

The mind and body problem is a conundrum that argues the explanation of how mental

The Mind-Body problem arises to Philosophy when we wonder what is the relationship between the mental states, like beliefs and thoughts, and the physical states, like water, human bodies and tables. For the purpose of this paper I will consider physical states as human bodies because we are thinking beings, while the other material things have no mental processes. The question whether mind and body are the same thing, somehow related, or two distinct things not related, has been asked throughout the history of Philosophy, so some philosophers tried to elaborate arrangements and arguments about it, in order to solve the problem and give a satisfactory answer to the question. This paper will argue that the Mind-Body Dualism, a view in

Before us is a question that, no doubt, few governments have had to wrestle with: how do we conduct the task of bringing to justice “grudged informers” who, under the Purple Shirts, we suspect to have acted as whistleblowers on their fellowmen for crimes that we now recognize were not crimes at all, but the exercise of speech we hold should be afforded to all mankind.