The Rise and Fall of Ideologies in Fukuyama´s The End of History

When the world famous liberal thinker Francis Fukuyama in his masterpiece declared that we were witnessing the end of the history, he was greeting the new political structure and also the new international environment, which is peaceful[1]. However, developments that occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union showed us that the dissolution of the Soviets was unexpected. The international society was not ready for peace and Fukuyama’s optimistic assumptions were far from becoming real. Moreover, the international society currently started to realise that the tension and the potential of mass destructive war during the Cold War era had provided a

Since the dawn of human civilization, individuals have been constantly immersed in conflict with each other. Whether these conflicts stemmed from socio-economic inequalities, political disputes, property rights, religious disagreements, or any other contentious matter, the creation of human governments has necessarily been to handle, organize, and resolve conflicts between people within communities in the least destructive manner possible. Governments act as a formal instrument through which individuals in a society can agree upon shared rules, solve problems, and engage in cooperative behavior, and it helps avoid the severe repercussions resulting from revolutionary social upheaval. The purpose of government – as spelled out in the Preamble of the Constitution – is to “establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” While countless forms of government have sprung up over the centuries, only one has been resilient enough and has had the pervasive influence necessary to stand the test of time: democracy. While there are many different types of democracies, this paper will focus on liberal democracy specifically. A liberal democracy is a form of representative democracy that operates under the paradigm of classical liberalism. According to the Center for Research on Globalization, liberal democracy is defined as:

Liberalism was previously a projection of how international relations ought to be; now, liberalism is a modern theory towards peace attained with a state’s ambition for dominance. “Self-interest” has two definitions in accordance to liberalism and realism. Liberalism considers the measure of power within states through stable economies, the possibility of peace and cooperation, as well as the concepts of political freedoms (human rights). Realism believes states are driven by competitive self-interest; international organizations hold little to no real influence because states are self-preserved. International relations is governed by states acting in their self-interest through liberalism; states act in their self-interest by cooperating with one another through international organizations, transnational advocacy networks, and non-governmental organizations. International organizations, normative values, and terrorism are all examples of how international relations is progressing into liberalism.

Francis Fukuyama; political scientist, economist, and author, in his article “The End of History?” discusses he rise and fall of major ideologies such as absolutism, fascism and communism, and suggests that human history should be viewed in terms of a battle of ideologies which has reached its end in the universalization of Western liberal democracy. Fukuyama concludes that the idea of Western liberal democracy has triumphed in the world through a variety of different ways and is a thriving piece of world order today. However, there are certain flaws to his argument including a US- centric view on the events of the twentieth century.

Both authors, Samuel P. Huntington and Francis Fukuyama, don’t have any conflicting views but have different perceptions as to how they see the world after the revolution and the cold war. Samuel believes that the west is dominating the world, changing cultures and customs of other countries. However, Francis analyzes the positive aspects of how the liberal democracy in the west is more powerful than all other democratic nations and he portrays how western dominance is effective and healthy for most of the nations.

Zhao Dingxin claims that “The country quickly acquired a level of political freedom and economic affluence that it could not even have dreamed of during Mao’s era” (42). People enjoyed not only a convenient life with color televisions or refrigerators but also the sudden influx of Western culture. However, the rapid growth of Chinese economy also led to inflation, corruption, embezzlement, economic crimes and increased the difference between the rich and the poor. On the other hand, the intensive absorption of Western literature and popular culture trends (such as pop music, movie stars, jeans, brand names or disco dance) created “social fevers” in Chinese society. Having the chance to approach the Democracy ideology, Chinese reexamined the values they had always respected. They questioned the ideality of Socialism and Communism, they wanted to have democracy as other Western countries and they realized the over-domination of the communist state. As it was stated in the March 1989 report of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League, the youth thought “Marxism is outdated, others that China has the worst record of democracy even among socialist countries” (Zhang 18). They hungered for Capitalism and Westernization and they wanted an absolute change in the way the Chinese state ruled the nation.

Fukuyama asserted that the end of history had arrived. He acknowledged that the world has not yet reached the point at which other ideologies are nonexistent or governments and philosophers are unneeded. He explains that the end of history is not defined by this end result, but by the point at which it can be recognized that one ideology had essentially won out. This did not have to be in a very material sense. Liberalism, though there was still opposition, appeared to Fukuyama to have the ‘true’ principles that could not be enhanced. The political and ideological climate appeared to support the idea that more and more people were coming to accept that. The world seemed to be on its way to peace. Fukuyama was sure in his argument and even expressed his condolences for the loss of history, a time at which action truly mattered because it had the ability to change the world and bring new and interesting “art and philosophy” that there would be no use, place, or need for in a post-historical era.

In his article, “The Future of the Liberal World Order”, John Inkenberry discusses what he sees as a global shift in power, from the Western and Northern powers such as the United States and Great Britain to the more Eastern and Southern developing states like China, India and Brazil. This potential shift in power has sparked a fear in many people. This fear, as the global power switches from West to East and North to South, stems from the thinking that these new nations that are coming to power will abolish the liberal world order that we all know. I however believe that instead of challenging the United States for power and changing the world order to more reflect their ideologies, these emerging nations will instead seek a greater position of leadership in the already existing world order. Firstly, I will provide an argument of Inkenberry’s main arguments and why realists’ have started to worry. Second, I will show how China is rising to threaten the United States superpower position in today’s world order, and finally I will illustrate ways which show that China is not challenging the Liberal World Order and why.

The introduction of The German Ideology can be attributed to the intellectual influences Karl Marx received from the philosophy of George Friedrich Hegel (“Karl Marx”, par, 2). Hegel’s philosophical concept was based on the idea of the dialectic, which was initially used to describe the procedure of logical argumentation and refutation. While earlier philosophers had treated this signature concept as a process of generating accurate ideas, Hegel argued that these ideas develop based on a constant procedure of disagreement and resolution. He

From what I have seen, “the world is becoming smaller”(Diana 2001) differences between the U.S. and China are becoming less because of the Internet. From one of my friends who is still studying in China, the environment of education didn’t change a lot from the pass four years. He is still suffering through the high school graduation test, which is the most important test for every student in China. He said to me that comparing to him I’m living in heaven and he is living in hell. The culture and value has changed a lot. For example, “fast food culture, self center, money talks, and lost of the idea of family. However the credit system, independence, and law system in China are not as perfect as the U.S.”(Jian 2006) “China are not only growing very fast in economy but also losing the culture in the same speed.”(Jiyang 2003)

To begin with Francis Fukuyama's, provocative thesis, that after the fall of communism in Europe and the withering of the grand ideological contests, history too has ended. In his "end of history" theory, he maintained that the western liberal democracy had become the `final form of human government'. The fact is that though not all theorists have this kind of a faith in liberal democracy, and believe that it's not the only feasible form of democracy, they are in a minority. The theoretical circles and the popular discourse have been dominated by "liberal democracy."

Snyder claims that realism failed to predict the Cold War. Given this, Mearsheimer states “China cannot rise peacefully.” Since realists describe the world as a self-help system, according to Posen, every country “must look to its own interests relative to those of others” and because “security is the preeminent issue in an anarchic world, the distribution of capabilities to attack and defend should matter.” Thus, because China’s strive for regional hegemony inevitably threatens the power dynamic of the global system, the U.S. will, according to Mearsheimer, take an offensive realist approach that will eventually lead to war. In addition, as seen in post-Cold War, economic stability greatly determines the distribution of power. Friedberg notes, that the projected “speed and magnitude of China’s growth in recent decades appears to be unprecedented” and as early as 2015, “China’s economy could overtake that of the United States.” Although the U.S. faces an unprecedented challenge to economic power, according to Ikenberry, China has signaled cooperation by “redoubling its participation in existing institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit or working with the other great powers in the region to build new ones.” Nevertheless, following the actions of the U.S. post WWII, China strategically makes “itself more predictable and approachable” to reduce “the incentives for other

In conclusion, however, I find that it is not a meaningful argument to examine if ‘the end of history’ has indeed taken place, simply because Francis Fukuyama has set the basis of his theory too wide. People will naturally gravitate towards having more options in their lives, be it socially, economically or in this case, politically. This tendency would thus make Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ irrefutable. The more pertinent question to explore would be how the end goal of liberal democracy can be properly managed, with it being based on the twin principles of liberty and equality. At this end point of history as we know it, trade-offs have to be made between the two- equality cannot be achieved without the actions of a state controlling liberty, while liberty cannot be attained fully without social inequality. The end of history has dawned, where there would be no further meaningful challenge to liberal democracy, but a new battle awaits with the conundrum of balance between liberty and equality in liberal

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Chapter VI. The Third Image." In Man, the State, and War; a Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959; p. 159 3. Ikenberry, G. John. 2008. “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?”. Foreign Affairs 87 (1). Council on Foreign Relations: 23–37.

From the beginnings of my foray into the study of history during my formative years of education in elementary school, to the rigorous minutia of a Tennessee high school’s curriculum, the period from Pre-history to the Enlightenment age was briefly discussed in the younger years and very rarely toughed upon in the later ones. Oftentimes, it seemed as though only a week of classes was devoted to this period at the start of the semester, eschewed in favor of the more “relevant” modern history—the Industrial Revolution, or Reconstruction, or the World Wars. So, coming into this course, I can say I only had the faintest grasp on this time period, particularly the timeline of events and a hint of understanding about each civilization’s unique cultures. It was also at the start of this semester that I believed the most important information I would learn from this class would be the conflicts and downfalls of these long-gone societies. Instead, I have realized that while I understood a great deal about the rise and fall of these civilizations as they related to humanity’s timeline as a whole, I failed to recognize the significant role of philosophy throughout history and how it has shaped our world today, evolving through the ages from the founders of western thought, the Greeks, to the Middle Ages with the integration of religion and philosophy, and finally into Modern thought with the arrival of Machiavelli. I also learned how these schools of thought relate to Christianity and