The Roman and U.S. Military

As Rome expanded throughout Europe and acquired a growing number of citizens, the army was able to greatly increase its numbers. This ensured Rome a nearly unlimited supply of new soldiers.

The Romans lost all control and leadership in their army. “They could not organize to protect themselves; they could not serve in the army.” (Doc1) Also, they could not support and keep up with the maintenance of the army, so they had to rely on the citizens more. “The military crisis was the result of proud, old aristocracy’s shortage of children...army composed entirely of Germans.” To simplify: there were less and less children born and raised to go into the Roman army. This led to recruiting foreigners into their army- mostly Germans. According to the map in Document 6, the Western Roman Empire was struck by many, scattered invasions. The military could not unite to protect the empire, leading to the

Romans fought in a manner very similar to the Greeks. In early times they utilized the phalanx and a cavalry back-up, but around the 1st century BCE they began to form a “checkered board” pattern. This allowed them to cover more ground and allow men room to fight. In the first century they also retired using a cavalry (Cartwright). The form of foot soldiers only with no horseback cavalry was uncommon. In

An important contributing factor to an army's success is armor for defense. An army can have skilled soldiers, but cannot be successful without the right armor. Roman and Greek armies wore similar types of armor. The Roman and Greek foot soldiers wore a square breastplate on their torso. While the Romans only wore one greave on their left leg, Greeks wore greaves on both legs. A greave was a sheet of metal worn to protect the legs (Horsepower: Harnessed…). Soldiers wear greaves even in current day. Recently, the greaves have been upgraded to protect the legs from ‘Improvised explosive devices,’ such as those in Iraq (Frost, Quad Guard). Roman soldiers wore a helmet that protected the neck, and came around to protect their face. The Greek’s helmets were more full and protective than the Roman helmets. Greek helmets covered their entire head and only left small

The Roman Tribunes wore different things than the soldiers did. They wore the same basic stuff but they had more things added onto their

The Roman army was the most powerful war machine of its time and arguably many others. It is this vast war machine that facilitated the Roman Empire and its creation. I call the Roman army a war machine because of the meticulous organization the army displayed, organization so thorough it mimics the individual cogs and gears in a machine working in perfect unison to achieve a common goal. The roman army was responsible for developing revolutionary fighting techniques which not only secured Rome’s position as the most powerful force in the world, but would influence the fighting styles of other armies for hundreds of years. But a machine so intricate and complex was not created in a day. It was through much trial and error and the test of time that the Roman army became the world power that we remember it as. I call the legions a world power because without the approval of the legions an emperor would be powerless. History documents show many Generals who already had the approval of their legions ascending to power, most notably Julius Caesar. So the Roman army was a very prominent military and political influence. Although the Roman army did not simply consist of soldiers and future politicians, it also included engineers. These engineers were responsible for the building of the roads that carried soldiers to and from battle, along with numerous military technologies that would influence the future of warfare. The Roman army’s history and the creation of new war

On Roman Military Matters, commonly referred to as De Re Militari, by Flavius Vegetius Renatus is essentially a field manual focusing on Roman military organization and how to field an army in a time of war. Vegetius discusses not only the development of the Roman soldier, from recruitment to final training, but also the organization, weaponry, strategy and tactics employed by the Romans legions. Though Vegetius, through evidence, had no military background or experience, and it is unclear on what evidence he based his argument, he accurately and in great detail described the structure of the Military of the late Roman Empire.

It must be noted that at this particular time, the Roman military was not a professional

The Romans, having had their phalanxes decimated and their most experienced soldiers exhausted and killed first, quickly understood the inefficiency of such a method of organization. Their next system of placement, inherited from the Samnites, the Romans’ peninsular neighbors, during the Samnite Wars, followed a three-line pattern documented by the Roman historian Polybius and referred to as both the ‘Polybian’ and manipular legion, in which the middle class citizens of approximately 20 years of age formed the front line, called hastati. The 20-30 year olds in the legion were grouped in the second line, and were called principes. The key difference in this formation is in the third line, composed of the oldest and most experienced of the Roman infantry, armed with spears and called triarii, described by Polybius as “always the same” in number across legions (Polybius 2.33).

Rome’s most famous asset was of course its military. They had the best tactics, and the best weaponry for that matter, of its time. As far as any successful strategies used against them, the legions could dissect it, smash it, improve and adopt it into their own military. Take for instance the Greek phalanx. The Romans saw the flaws and perfected it. Rome’s legions typically utilized a full on assault, and their arsenal consisted of weapons such as the gladius, a short Hispanic sword used for stabbing in conjunction with the scutum. The scutum was an oblong shield shaped like a half circle. It was used to deflect

Roman military tactics played an important role in these victories, especially the flexibility of the Roman legions compared the inflexible Phalanx used by the Macedonian armies. The Phalanx was the central tactic of Greek warfare, prior to and after the time of Alexander the Great. In a Phalanx. Greek hoplite infantry soldiers formed a tight rectangle to attack and pulse enemy advances. The Roman legions, however, organized along cohorts. The legion was arranged into 10 cohorts. The first cohort contained 150 men per century. A century was a section of the cohort. The other cohorts contained 80 men. The centurions stood at the bottom left corner of the century. There were 59 centurions in total. Roman legions could use several different tactics including forming a wall with their shields. Roman legions could also form sub groups called “maniples” which could act as strike forces against enemies. For example, in the Battle of Cynoscephalae in the Second

This historical study will define the lack of organized physicians services in the Roman military before the First Century A.D. The Roman military often relied on soldier-to-soldier medical training, which involved basic medical services in the field of combat. These services would often include treating wounds, disease, and other aspects of minor surgery in order to help the patient. These physician services would typically be done by soldiers that had been trained in the medical arts, which were passed down to them by the Greek medical knowledge. More so, physician services in the Roman military were only utilized for higher-ranking officers before the First Century A.D. Non-military physicians were brought in after 1 A.D., which defined a new era of organized physicians services in the field of combat.

Thankfully, due to the Romans writing a lot down, there are many sources (unlike in the "Dark Ages" for example) available to study how the Roman army worked. In this project, the aim is to find out how the training and organization of the

The populace was as averse to defeat as was the army. Society emboldened all that contributed to military strength and spurned all that proceeded from cowardice. It was believed that all free men should be soldiers. Propagation was encouraged; It was noble of a woman to bear a son who would become a valiant soldier and more noble of that son to fulfill that role. Initially, Rome’s legions were derived from a levy on its citizenry, who were made to conform to rigid dogmatic discipline and believe that their submission was the requisite of their power. In combat, a phalanx of warriors would use their shields form an impassable barrier and the frontmost rows of the battalion would extend their spears inflexibly. This formation was highly dependant upon group cohesion and was susceptible to ambuscades from the sides or rear. After having this weakness exploited by the Samnites, Rome discarded this tactic. With increasing Roman suzerainty came more massive and professionalized force of homogeneous military units that were salaried and heavily regulated. Roman generals were abnormally attentive of their enemies’ logistics and willing to cultivate new arts of war which allowed the infantry to adapt to new threats rapidly. Following the second samnite war, Rome adopted a maniple system based on social class and age. Maniples of one-hundred-twenty men, extracted from legions of five-thousand, were arrayed in the fashion of a checkerboard with younger soldiers, eager to demonstrate their prowess, in front. To minimize casualties of Romans, yet ensure that their contenders are crippled, the frontmost warriors would absorb the first onslaught of enemies until weary and marred, then retreat into the maniples behind them, exposing their enemy to two rows of experienced and vigorous warriors who were expected to deplete the remaining enemies. Generals Titus, Caesar, and Augustus increased the effectiveness of this tactic by

The provincial troops were composed of legions and the auxilia. Legions numbered around five thousand men, but this figure is often debated. Within each legion there were ten squads to a century, six centuries a cohort and ten cohorts a legion. Legions were commanded by a legatus augusti pro preator, who was appointed directly by the Emperor, therefore reinforcing the relationship between the Emperor and his troops. The legionaries are generally viewed as the more dominant of the two forces, since the auxiliary units are often regarded as supplementary. Despite the clear segmentation of units within its organisation, the structure of the Army was highly flexible. The Army was designed to work as a system that could respond and adapt to situations, without the fundamental size and structure altering from that established by Augustus. The changes implemented to the military by each