The Rte Cereal Industry in 1994

During the second half of our trading period we focussed massively on the private label market and found our niche there. We had realized that the minimum cost of the product wins the market share so we started experimenting with S/Q Ratings and percentage of superior materials to come up with the best product with the least cost price. Adding minimum profit margin to the cost price we were able to seize a massive chunk of the private label market. Attached are a few snapshot highlighting our success in that market.

Thus a sales reduction of 33.33% percent at initial price of $10 is equivalent to losses brought about by a price reduction of 1.5.

7. Overall, the increase in net loss was primarily due to the lower-than-expected sales price and the increase in both marketing and fulfillment expenses.

5) Capital Requirements: in order to enter the industry, there were huge capital expenses to be sustained by firms, such as a minimum of $ 100 million for capital investments, and at least 125 employees to run a plant that could produce both packaging and cereals themselves. In this framework, advertising expenses may be added too, since they’re a great part of the expenditures a RTE Cereal firm has to face, and they also represent a great Barrier To Entry, being an amount close to 1/5 of the sales generated by the company.

Although the company did show an increased gross profit of $8,255,000 with $6,358,000 less Net Sales in 2013 versus 2012, that increase is due to the reduction in product Cost of Goods Sold by $14,613,000. Since increases in product price will negatively affect sales, one of management’s primary goals is to keep prices stable. This objective is achieved through implementation of cost cutting programs, investing in more efficient equipment, and automation of more steps in the production process.

the company’s margins have shrunk by 10% in the past year due to rising costs and growing competition.

Probably increase marketing, promotional and expenses related to discounts in the subsequent year due to “Premier Vision” plan.

While many consum¬ers will still pay for premium products, super¬markets have had to slash prices on many ordinary items. Part of the reason for this is the fierce competition they have been receiv¬ing from such outlets as warehouse clubs. Folgers is a very well-known brand, but not even the stron¬gest brands are safe from the necessity of price-cutting, to which they were formerly immune. In bygone days, owning a strong brand was a sure road to protected high margins. Low-cost generic products have improved in quality and their sales have skyrocketed, making such moves unavoidable.

In these circumstances, the cost structures are not the same as with the competitive industry and so we cannot say that the oligopolistic firm results in higher prices than if a competitive market structure were to be adopted. In fact going along the theory of the downward sloping cost curve we can come to the conclusion that it would be the other way around and consumers would

The second force that I will use to analyze the Trader Joe’s company is the “the rivalry among established competitors”. Factors to consider when looking at the rivalries in the industry are industry demand, cost conditions, and exit barriers. Trader Joe’s competitors include The Kroger Co., Whole Foods Market, and Safewat Inc., and all super markets in general (Llopis, 2011). With that said, there seems to be a high demand for what Trader Joe’s offers, private labels. This means that the intensity in the industry is less compared to an industry with a flat demand. Trader Joe’s does not have to fight hard to sell their products because of the service they have created. Trader Joe’s brand can be considered “diversity on steroids” which has somewhat of a cult following among consumers (Llopis, 2011). Consumers that want unique experiences with their food are able to do exactly that at

These four retailers average private-label dollar share of 22%, well above the industry average of 16%. They have also seen higher levels of overall sales growth versus non-leaders – 5.3% versus 3.4% over the past 3 years. (Future of Food Retailing 2008, 136)

A major issue is since reducing the price 20% reduces the profit margin to 15%, to maintain the same profit while reducing the price, the sales must be $28 million for this year. This is an increase of 233% in one year to justify reducing the price this much. This is a highly unlikely target.

As a manufacture of private label personal care products, Hansson Private Label, Inc. has a considerable amount (28%) of market share in its specific industry. However, private labels as a whole constitute less than 19% in the entire personal care industry. Therefore, growth of HPL depends on the growth of the industry and more importantly the growth of private label component within the industry. In terms of the personal care industry, market growth will not improve significantly in the future. As proven in the past four years, unit volumes in the industry increases less than 1% in each year and the dollar sales growth was only driven by modest price increases. Therefore, the opportunity for private labels

After analyzing the results from the previous quarter, it was determined that the prices set for each segment were not sufficient. Product sales priority were also not properly adjusted. With the R&D investments, sales priorities needed to be changed for the main focus to become the most profitable market segments. Prices were not competitive which in turned decreased revenue, market share, and profitability. To become more competitive we altered the prices in each market segment. The Workhorse product was the first to change, the price was lowered to $2500 in an attempt to increase sales; at this price Team 4 was still making a profit on this product, as well as making the price much more competitive. The Workhorse sales priority was also lowered to 3rd in Americas and 4th in APAC and EMEA. This product was not selling as well as we had hoped, and was no longer as profitable as it once was which led to this decision. Next, the Innovator product’s price was adjusted; this involved a price increase to $4100. This price was adjusted to include the new

Despite its success as market leader RBS still endured challenges. Its major competitors were private labels created by retail stores which were slowly breaking into the markets. Consumers gravitated towards private labels because its prices were generally marked 30% lower than RBS. This advantage caused RBS 5% of its market share in the past decade. Another challenge is that RBS was forced to increase suggested retail prices in 2006-07, by 13%, due to an 11% increase in raw material prices. Raw material cost were expected to decrease back to the normal price in 2008.