The Theories Of Clausewitz And Creveld

Clausewitz’s attack of enemy centers of gravity and Sun Tzu’s prioritization of attack of important elements of national power provide contrasting approaches to the development of effective strategy. These contrasts are reflections of each author’s perspective on how war should be waged, the proper use of force, their definitions of the ideal victory and how best to achieve that victory as well as their methodologies,

Wars are often glorified in tone to give praise and respect for those on the battlefields. There is an overall understanding that there are sacrifices needed in order to accomplish a larger goal. Excluded from this understanding is the realization that the effects of war

Much confusion has arisen from misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s discussions on Schwerpunkt or “center of gravity”. Many students of military theory interpret Clausewitz’s ideas through their own historical perspectives. For example, military officers tend to confuse military objectives for centers of gravity, assuming physical objects such as ships or cities are the source of a countries power. While these objects may provide tactical advantages, true power arises from the critical strengths possessed by a country, be they political, diplomatic, military, or informational. The Argentinean military junta made similar mistakes during their invasion of the Falklands. Without fully understanding the source of British power in the region,

In order to answer this question it is first important to determine the fraises “pro-war” and “anti-war”. The term “pro-war” describes an attitude in which war is desired, necessary or justifiable. The term “anti-war” describes the opposite; war is viewed as immoral and is generally opposed and condemned. This paper will argue that there are grounds in the book to support both proposition.

In the year of 1792, a twelve year old boy named Carl von Clausewitz enlisted in the Prussian army for war, and soon after appearing in such battles as Jena-Auerstädt and Waterloo, became dedicated in conflict and its reasons for their results most of his life. By being alive at the same time as Napoleon's rise and fall, Carl von Clausewitz was able to document and relate how war was fought, won, and lost. It's important to comprehend that in his writings, he is relaying why it is pertinent to think about how war is fought, not how to win a war. Clausewitz' theories described in “On War,” are not only effective in wars fought in today's time and past, but will remain current in future endeavors, due to its generic layout of

If the Germans, instead of being resisted by force of arms, had been passively permitted to establish themselves wherever they pleased, the halo of glory and courage surrounding the brutality of military success would have been absent, and public opinion in Germany itself would have rendered any oppression impossible.” He taught non-resistance as proper defense to violence. For such antiwar pacifists, all participation in war is morally wrong.

War is a human endeavor. Humanity continually pursues solutions to counter evolving threats with the end of preserving power while also enabling peace. Civilizations resort to war to maintain their perception of this equilibrium. Defined threats and adversaries have changed throughout history, however, the essence of human nature and the base concept of conflict itself have not. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories on warfare capture the relationship between humanity and its application of war, remaining relevant in today’s era through their pensive explanations of timeless philosophical principles regarding the concept of war. These theories regarding war in politics, the key factors affecting war, and the extent that war is applied are inherently interconnected, providing insight on the relationships between humanity and its application of war.

War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, written by the talented author Chris Hedges, gives us provoking thoughts that are somewhat painful to read but at the same time are quite personal confessions. Chris Hedges, a talented journalist to say the least, brings nearly 15 years of being a foreign correspondent to this book and subjectively concludes how all of his world experiences tie together. Throughout his book, he unifies themes present in all wars he experienced first hand. The most important themes I was able to draw from this book were, war skews reality, dominates culture, seduces society with its heroic attributes, distorts memory, and supports a cause, and allures us by a

To developed the war theory, Clausewitz used the Dialectic approach, which is a method of philosophical argument that involves contradictory process between opposing ideas to establish the truth, propounded by the German philosopher G W F Hegel. His “thesis” on war is an ‘absolute war." According to him total or absolute war carry out with the ‘utmost violence ' for unlimited aims, and there is no ‘logic limit’ to the application of available all power. On total war both warring fraction could not suspend their ‘military operation’ and ‘hostilities’ until one or other side finally defeated, or ‘fully discharge’ His "antithesis" is historical evidence and his own experience of war. By interaction between these thesis and antithesis, Clausewitz develops Synthesis (theory of war).

The influence of various theories and concepts on the conduct World War I has generated a range of studies in an attempt to understand how and why World War I was fought. Specifically, Clausewitz’s theories on warfare have come under a considerable amount of scrutiny with regards to their influence on World War I. This scrutiny has led to the ascertation that the protracted and bloody stalemate of World War I was largely due to a stubborn reliance on Clausewitz’s theories. The question that this paper attempts to address is weather the cause of the bloody and protracted

On War is not just a manuscript on of how to understand war; it also provides insight into what Clausewitz thought about the dynamics of human thinking. Similar to what Claxton outlined in Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind, Clausewitz believed that, “knowledge must be absorbed into the mind that it almost ceases to exist in a separate, objective way.” (Clausewitz, p147). In other words, Clausewitz believed knowledge

War is never seen as something that can only be viewed from one particular point of view. Rather, there are many different points of view and perspectives people can take into thinking about war, as through the scope of mediation. Mediation is looking at certain things in particular ways through aspects like point of view, relation to the event, and translation during the author’s time. One example of looking through something with mediation is Magdeburg mayor Otto Guericke’s view accounting the sack of Magdeburg. Guericke represents a first hand perspective of what happened, because he was actually there and witnessed the destruction personally. Evidence of this is the way he describes destruction, by saying, “The soldiers began to beat and

In this paper, I will argue that Luban’s critique of Walzer conception of legitimacy is misguided. I will first present Walzer’s argument for interventions using the “legalist paradigm,” in particular his conception of self-determination and how the principle of non-intervention may be set aside in exceptional circumstances. I will then present Luban’s critique of Walzer and his argument for developing an account of Just War directly in terms of human rights, before concluding with my own critique of Luban’s argument.

These politics do not have to be just foreign or international politics, but also domestic politics. To achieve these objectives, Clausewitz believed in two levels of war: strategic and tactical (Echevarria, 1995). One must also remember that Clausewitz did not believe war could be down to a science, it is far too diverse and unpredictable. He was a strong believer that a theory is an explanation, not a solution. In “On War” Clausewitz states, "the primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled” (Clausewitz, 1832). His theory harps on this idea that if conflict of politics reaches an emotional high, organized violence can breakout. Clausewitz’s theory today is taught with “policy” and “politics” as interchangeable components. However, Clausewitz created his theory based around a dual meaning. He believed war could lose sight of its policy aims, but war could never escape politics. On this basis, he combined three forces into one, which is referred to as ‘wondrous trinity’ (Echevarría 1995).

Martin van Creveld wrote The Transformation of War book in 1991 when he detailed a predictive hypothesis about the changing character of war into what he called ?Nontrinitarian War. There were conflicts arise as intrastate wars and were not based on the simplified version of Clausewitz?s ?remarkable trinity? of government, people and military forces (Van Creveld, 1991, pg. 49). In his book, Van Creveld offers an account of warfare in the previous millennium and suggests what the future might hold. The drive was that major war was draining and the emergence of forms of war ?that are simultaneously old and new? now threatened to create havoc.