The Theories Of Consciousness In Greyson And Calvi-P

The study of consciousness in modern day psychology is becoming increasingly difficult to explain. In the early days of consciousness studies it may have been explained as our experience or awareness (Blackmore, 2010). However, over a number of years, there have been many psychologists who have contributed many important theories towards the explanation of how consciousness works, and its initial existence. As Chalmers states: “There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing harder to explain” (Chalmers, 1995 p.200). Being one of the leading philosophers in consciousness, David Chalmers introduced the idea of the Hard Problem in 1994. Chalmers defined the hard problem as: “The questions of how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience” (Chalmers, 1995 p.63). Chalmers suggested that he found it difficult to understand how a small mass of grey matter such as the brain could produce conscious experience. These ideas of a ‘hard problem’ in consciousness were rejected by a number of theorists, which will be discussed later in the essay. Another idea which Chalmers has put forward is the zombie. A zombie, according to Chalmers is a being identical to you and I, speaks like you, acts like you, but is not conscious (Blackmore, 2010). A zombie contains no qualia (a physical conscious experience). The idea of the zombie put forward by Chalmers is extremely important in the explanation of consciousness and has been

“The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is some-thing it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is expe-rience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

Without the quantifiable entity that is the brain, the mind would have no medium for which to exist.

Moreover, how to explain the fact that during the clinical death many people feel like the soul is leaving the body, and they may have a look at themselves from the another side, or see the dead relatives, or see the wonderful and pleasant light. Even though this process cannot be clearly explained by medicine, with Graves’ explanation of the soul whereabouts these visions are impossible.

In his paper “Mind and Body Problem”, Jerome Shaffer examines the much discussed view of the relation between mental and physical events. According to this view consideration is given to whether or not mental events can occur in the same place the corresponding physical events occur. In the course of his examination of this view, Shaffer considers one difficulty which arises in connection with it, and concludes that it is insurmountable. Unfortunately, his treatment of what he takes to be the central difficulty with the view in question is seriously defected and my purpose in this paper is to indicate wherein its defects lie.

“We can all accept that Matthew’s brain is dead,” he will say, “because this is supported empirically by reasoning via experience.” There are medical artifacts, which have been tested over and over again, which can correlate measurement of his brain activity, or lack thereof, to a state of mental incapacitation. However, Melinda’s idea that there is a bond between an immaterial soul and a physical body is founded upon conjecture and belief at best. It is neither a relation of ideas, nor is it a matter of fact. We cannot observe it directly and it is impossible to prove.

As the tool of scientific investigation increase, the relationship between the mind and the brain has never been more intimate. Chemical changes in our brain could lead to heightened euphoria or it can lead to the most profound depression. Damages to the brain can lead to changes that can eliminate the some abilities of the brain, such as smell, vision, or even the ability to recognized faces. Therefore, this is at that vary lease a powerful correlation between the state of the mind and state of the brain. But this is not enough for the Identity theories, so they go above and beyond this to explain this profound view.

The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)

The understanding on the knowledge of other minds has provided a puzzle known as the inverted spectrum. This possibility has emerged as an important challenge to functionalist accounts of qualia. Functionalism is committed to defining mental states in terms of their cause and effects . By identifying sensory events with casual roles, however, functionalism appears to be missing qualitative aspects all together. The topic of spectrum inversion has often been raised as a contradiction to functionalism, as well as other materialist theories about consciousness. These negates to functionalism show that even when all the relevant physical facts are held constant, the facts about qualia can still vary, hence that the phenomenal must be over

Minds are unable to interact directly with each other, the body must interact with another body to convey the intentions of the mind. By accepting substance dualism, our ability to explain consciousness, or self-awareness, is far more advanced than with any form of physicalism. If we consider the mind independently observing

Since the beginning of mankind, which began over 1.3 million years ago humans have been fascinated with life it ‘self and the journeys it has to offer. Unfortunately, mankind also had to come to terms with the idea that along with life follows death, also known as the afterlife. The belief in what one’s mind/body does when they have entered the afterlife has become a controversial subject across many religions. Religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism have provided a multitude of similar and different analysis behind their specific beliefs and practices.

Looking throughout history, the brain has not always been associated with thought; even today we may associate such feelings as pain from the part of our body in which we were hurt, not as a mental state inside our brain. However when scientists observed brain injury patients they realised that thinking could take place in the brain. One famous example is Gage’s Case ; the calm railroad worker after a freak accident, that damaged the frontal lobes of his brain, turned into an aggressive person who became unrecognisable to his friends and family. Neuroscientists have now discovered with more cases similar to Gage’s that damage to specific regions of the brain can severely affect a person’s mental abilities or personality.

Consciousness allows a person to recognize their existence, and subsequently, to form their essence. The

In contemporary philosophy of mind, talk of perception has fallen out of favour. Indeed most writers to deny perception altogether, or claim that they do not matter. Instead they reduce perception to reality, or speak of the “really real.” Perception are said to be “nothing but” particles or waves or structured brain events. “Always already” “Nothing but” matter and motion. One influential philosopher of mind, Paul Churchland in his book The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul replaces the perceiver with functioning biological bodies. The perceiver gets reduced to an organized body, mind becomes the brain, body motions become actions, man becomes the person. Churchland redefines phenomenal qualities as being nothing but properties of the brain. Cognitive events such as understanding, recognising, feeling, and perceiving are replaced with neural analogs. Here psychological events are treated solely as neural events. This is the prevailing view in cognitive science.