Eliminative materialism (eliminativism) is an ontologically radical approach that claims that a matured cognitive science will show that mental states that common sense takes for granted, such as beliefs, do not exist (or do not have referents). Instead, it claims that these mental entities are theoretical terms for the ‘false’ theory of folk psychology (common sense psychology), which can be defined as the cognitive ability to explain and predict the behaviour and mental state of other people. In essence, the theory aims to discredit folk psychology by claiming that people will discover that there is no neural basis to mental entities and thus, they are non-existent. I shall argue that there are significant fundamental flaws to both the arguments for eliminativism about propositional attitudes and eliminativism about qualia (subjective experience). For the former, I will argue that the eliminative materialist’s theory-theory is flawed and show that propositions alone can discredit the position on philosophy of mind. This will lead to identifying the position as self-refuting. Furthermore, I will show that science itself has proven simulation theory to be true so that I can discredit eliminative materialism. For the latter, I will argue that qualia exist due to introspection. Combined, the deconstruction of eliminative materialism with regards to propositional attitude and qualia will show that the materialist position is flawed and should not be agreed with.
Sellars first
Social psychology and personality psychology both came into fruition around the same time – the 1920’s and 1930’s. Needless
The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.
Phrases such as “seeing the forest from the trees” and “the whole is greater than the sum of the parts” have roots grounded in the same ideals of Gestalt psychology. These phrases best describe the purpose of Gestalt psychology in how they emphasize focusing on the big picture and not just the colors. The Gestalt concept of perception is how the mind understands the world around it by seeing it in whole forms, not simple elements. The human brain and consciousness contains an essence that loses value when broken down into elements of study.
Individual psychology is a theory developed by Alfred Alder to explain human personality and the behaviors that stem from that personality. His personality theory regards people in a positive light especially in their potential to overcome physical disabilities and the feelings of inferiority that stem from them. Individual psychology can also be used to explain underlying causes of mental and physical disorders. Susan E. Belangee in her article “Couples and Eating Disorders: An Individual Psychology Approach” examines the factors that lead to eating disorders and how eating disorders affect adult intimate relationships through Adler’s personality theory. Belangee deems individual psychology as an effective approach to treating eating disorders. Examining eating disorders through individual psychology expands one’s understanding of personality and how its development can lead to issues such as eating disorders. Viewing eating disorders in such a way is also consistent with other research and provides a useful application of the theory through its use in therapy.
In David Armstrong’s thought-provoking work titled, The Nature of Mind, he explains that the most convincing way to make sense of the mind-body problem is to approach it in a materialistic way. Specifically, Armstrong shows that the science of physico-chemical processes of the brain is the best way to explain the nature of our mind. He goes on to explain traditional and dispositional behaviorism, and states his own materialistic take on behaviorism. His arguments throughout his paper are very logical, and though there have been arguments against his explanations, he effectively justifies the materialistic view of the mind.
To quote Karl Popper, “Every solution to a problem, raises another unsolved problem” (Williams, 2003, p. 2). It has been a topic debated for centuries, still, a definitive solution is yet to be found that universally satisfies the problem of mind brain identity. The most logical answer comes in the form of monism. Therefore in this paper I will argue that the mind and the brain are identical, as the mind exists only as a property of the brain. David Lewis and D.M Armstrong give support for the causal relationship between mind and brain states in the form of the identity theory, and deal with the multiple realisability argument provided by Hillary Putman. Gottlob Frege provides his support for materialism by showing that mental states are determined by the function of the brain, while discounting Thomas Nagel’s argument which proposes the idea of Qualia. Both the functionalist theory and identity theory reach agreement on the materialistic view that the mind and brain are of the same substance.
This essay aims to explore and describe some of the key studies within Social Psychology and show why social psychology is still important within the science of psychology today. Social psychology was once described by Allport (as cited in Lindzey & Aronson, 1985, p.5) as, “the scientific study of how people’s thoughts, feelings and behaviours are influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of others”. One of the first psychologists to study social psychology was Kurt Lewin. Lewin is considered the “father of social psychology” by many as he took a stand against the dominant behaviourist approach during the 1920’s through his belief that interaction between the individual and their environment is key to affecting behaviour, rather than environment alone. His revolutionary ideas matured into the study of group dynamics, which is widely used by many organisations today (Collin, 2012).
The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)
Frank Jackson’s “knowledge argument” has been heavily critiqued since being published in the 1982 “Epiphenomenal Qualia” article. The argument seeks to refute physicalism using Jackson’s widely known “Mary’s Room” experiment. Many issues arise from the experiment, such as problems with the terms used, as well as questions about whether the premises and conclusion can be held and deductively follow one another. Examining objections to the “knowledge argument” shows how the problems the argument experiences undermines Jackson’s attempt to refute physicalism.
In denying that the mind and mental properties, like qualia, are nonphysical things, mind-brain theory objects to both substance and property dualism. Therefore it is a physicalist approach to the philosophy of
There are two main theories that make up the knowledge argument. The first is Physicalism, (or better known as materialism) which is the thesis that “All facts are dependent upon physical processes.”(Smart) The other main stance taken is property dualism. The thesis of property dualism states that there are “Non-physical properties of physical substances” (Calef) or that there are physical and mental properties. In this article, I will defend the stance of property dualism by acknowledging objections and replying to these objections to show why the argument for property dualism works.
The topic I have the most interest in from the textbook is Chapter 14: Social Psychology. I have chosen this topic because I believe that psychology cannot be thoroughly researched without knowing the social trends and influence it has on people. Without knowing what to expect from people, it becomes more difficult to know what to hypothesize or what you want to happen. I hope to learn more about social norms and the ability it has to influence our instinctive thoughts and actions before we realize and analyze what it is we should do. For example, the most common and relevant discovery of social psychology is the Bystander effect. This is when an audience does not feel the need or feel as guilty when someone is in dire need of help or assistance. Our first reaction is to help them, as it is instinct for most people to help. However if there is a crowd of people that just stand around waiting for something to happen, you are more likely not to help and just allow more time to pass before someone actually does help that person. This effect throws out our instinctive reaction to help and not do anything.
Churchland defines “folk psychology” as our “tacit command of an integrated body of lore concerning the law-like relations holding among external circumstances, internal states, and overt behavior” (Churchland). He starts off with the variety of roadblocks that materialism has overcome over the years while opposing folk psychology such as qualia and “raw feels”, leading to the current day barrier of intentionality and propositional attitudes which will be the focus of his arguments. In order to reveal how folk psychology and its claims of intentionality are unnecessary and needs to be eliminated, Churchland first stressed the point that folk psychology is actually a theory, therefore it is open to theoretical failures. In order to do this, he looks at the explanatory power of folk psychology. In order to explain the behavior of
Traditional behaviorism focused exclusively on the direct observation of objectively measurable events (Wolf, 1978). Due to declining popularity, behaviorists had to rethink their position to remain relevant (Wolf, 1978). They discovered that society typically wanted to learn about concepts and ideas that are more subjective in nature (Wolf, 1978). Behaviorists began to acknowledge the social validity, or the relevance to society, of their research (Wolf, 1978). The population now had a voice in the research of behaviorists which stimulated research into new areas, such as teaching people how best to “relate” to young people (Wolf, 1978, p. 207). Behaviorists emphasize the importance of incorporating the subjective into what had once been an objective sub-division of psychology.
Both Trait theory and Social Cognitive Theories are currently and have been very influential in describing personalities in people over the years. They have both similar and opposite qualities as well and seem to work off of each other at times in my opinion. Although many theories are still helpful in some ways, I feel like these two are more beneficial due to them bringing a more positive approach to describing personalities and giving the person more control over their own behavioral change rather than giving them an excuse as to why they can’t change their behaviors.