The United States Has Engaged In Numerous International

The role of the Middle East has been very crucial to the United States, especially after WWII. The U.S. had three strategic goals in the Middle East and consistently followed them throughout various events that unfolded in the region. First, with the emergence of the cold war between the Soviet Union and the U.S., policymakers began to recognize the importance of the Middle East as a strategic area in containing Soviet influence. This also coincides with the U.S. becoming increasingly wary of Arab nationalism and the threat it posed to U.S. influence. Secondly, the emergence of the new Israeli state in 1948 further deepened U.S. policy and involvement in the region while also creating friction between the U.S. and Arab states which were

Since his presidency did not begin with Israel becoming a state, his focus was greatly adjusted and at first there was a noticeable decline in aid and care for Israel’s wellbeing. Israel was also rather vulnerable during this time, due to the fact that there more Jewish refugees entering Israel from surrounding Arab states. President Eisenhower convincingly proved that America had the ability to influence Israel in a good way, although his presidency ended with the Middle East still in a state of war. During Eisenhower’s administration, there were two successful incidents of U.S. management of Israel and in both circumstances, Eisenhower avoided the political compulsions of America’s attachment to Israel and instead forced the Israelis to act upon principle. Unfortunately, his presidency was the last to give Israel undivided focus, for the ones to follow were absorbed in other affairs and did not provide the same constructive support.

There are people who suggest that President Eisenhower was “cautious in . . . international affairs.” Assess the validity of this statement in regard to policies toward Korea, Vietnam, the Suez Crisis, Iran, Israel, and the Soviet Union.

The Suez Crisis was an incident that first commenced on the 29th of October, 1956, in which Israeli military forces entered the Sinai Peninsular and attacked Egyptian positions, driving them back. By the next day, Israeli forces had reached the Suez Canal, after taking a majority of the Sinai Peninsular. (Best, Hanhimaki, Maiolo & Schulze, 2008, p.432). Britain and France then both issued an ultimatum, for both Israeli and Egyptian forces to withdraw from the Suez Canal, citing its safety from the violence of war as extremely important. After Gamal Abder Nasser, Egypt’s President at the time, rejected the ultimatum, on the 30th

The administrations hoped by resolving the issues between the two that the rest of the Arab states would resolve their conflicts and support the United States. Nasser was sent to support the needs of Egypt and the Arab states and return the land taken by Israel and get them to stop creating settlements in return for peace. Before the peace treaty could be discussed further, Britain and France aided Israel in an attack on Egypt taking the Sinai

Israel found an ally in the United States, yet when the Nixon administration had information that indicated the possibility of an attack, there was no action taken by neither . The U.S. had intelligence that Arab states were making efforts to build an offensive military. With continual bluff from Egypt’s President, Sadat, Israeli forces were readily mobilized creating accruing costs by having an army readily available. There was evidence that Arab states were beginning to transfer and move around military equipment and any combative tool that could be utilized in war. All the effort that was allotted to the movement and distribution was not something to have been taken lightly or oblivious to. The U.S. had intelligence of the movements being made and yet both Israel and the U.S. underestimated the Arab states. Leading up to October 6, 1973, the buildup of troops still did not alarm Israel enough to

Ronald Reagan is now one of the most controversial presidents of the past fifty years. Although all have their defenders and detractors, Reagan, though not necessarily a polarizing figure, was engaged in some behavior that has caused questions as people examine his decisions. He is probably best known for his ability to communicate his conservative ideals to the public, and had an innate ability to get people to follow him. Some would say though that his strong arm tactics began the alienation of the United States from the rest of the world, and has led to this moment in time in which the US is reviled by many countries. His chief objective seemed to be to stop the Cold War and end communism as it had stood for the better seven decades, and he did accomplish his task. However, he lacked the delicate diplomatic touch that many wished he would have used. But, he was strong in his convictions ad was not afraid to voice them to any country or individual leader he believed needed to be told how to act properly. This paper looks at the situation with Libya in 1986, examines Reagan's diplomatic doctrine as it applies to this situation, and then determines the immediate and eventual impact of Reagan-led US actions.

Eisenhower’s view that the way to prevent the spread of communism to the Middle East was by promoting stability in the region between both the Western powers and the Arab powers went on to guide his policy towards the Middle East. Eisenhower’s goals for US involvement in the Middle East “reflected the president’s own cold war ideology and included promoting regional stability, guaranteeing the free flow of Middle Eastern oil to Western Europe, supporting Arab nationalism and Israeli independence, improving relationships with the Arab states, hastening the decline of European empires, maintaining the solidarity of the Western alliance, and avoiding an arms race between Israel and its Arab neighbors, with the United States and Russia the principal arms suppliers” (Ambrose 328-329). The President’s commitment to these goals of maintaining relationships and containing communism accounts for many of the trends that would characterize Eisenhower’s conduct in the Middle East. Among these trends were: Eisenhower’s reliance on frequent-but-informal consultations with a small number of appointees; his tendency to try and delay the inevitable for as long as possible as to allow for planning; his hesitation towards nearly any action, whether it be to take action or to cease taking action; his encouragement for vagueness and secrecy pertaining to the Crisis; and finally, his ability to firmly and effectively communicate his full executive power. Eisenhower’s

During the Suez Crisis of 1956, Eisenhower condemned the Israeli, British and French invasion of Egypt, and forced them to withdraw. He also condemned the Soviet invasion during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 but took no action. In 1958, Eisenhower sent 15,000 U.S. troops to Lebanon to prevent the pro-Western government from falling to a Nasser-inspired revolution. Near the end of his term, his efforts to set up a summit meeting with the Soviets collapsed because of the U-2 incident. In his January 17, 1961 farewell address to the nation, Eisenhower expressed his concerns about the dangers of massive military spending, particularly deficit spending and government contracts to private military manufacturers, and coined the term "military–industrial

Background: In the midst of the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict, conflict arose over Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. This was of particular concern due to Nasser’s increased connection with the Soviet Union, through the Czech Arms agreement and the Aswan Dam. Following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, Great Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt. In facing this crisis, the U.S. had to consider Cold War politics with the Soviet Union, relations with Arab and Israeli nations, and relations with the invading powers

The United States (U.S.) have always considered the Soviet Union as a strategic national security interest. At the end of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall fell, communism power lost its grip, and U.S. and Soviet Union relations were no longer strained. During the mid to late 1980s, the U.S. faced a new challenge of an emerging Middle East power, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. General Colin Powell was Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) when the U.S. was under the intense pressure of leading coalition forces into the Gulf War. Realizing this was an opportunity for the U.S. to turn away from old polices, he tackled strategic decisions under the Goldwater-Nichols Act that shaped the post-Cold War. This paper will focus on how Powell through his career

On October 10th, United States Deputy Secretary noted, “The Arabs are fighting better now than they did in 1967. The conflict dealt a blow to two myths, that of Israel’s inevitable military superiority and that of the Arab’s perennial Inferiority. The U.S. is trying to keep the Soviets out of the situation while maintaining our own position in the Arab world.” United States officials knew that the Egyptians, Syrians, and Israelis would be looking for ways in which to resupply their dwindling military resources in an effort to continue their war efforts. With Soviet influence in the Middle East, while not at its peak, a fear of potential communist-puppet states spread throughout the State department. With McCarthyism creating a deep-seated fear of communism, potential action by the United States was seen by various Arabic states and the Israelis.

These Reprisal attacks eventually took a back seat in 1956 when Israel attempted to remove Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser from power in the Suez War. While the other Arab States had limited their involvement in the reprisal operations, Egypt, which bordered Israel directly to the south, had directly sponsored Fedayeen terrorists in Palestine; a group infamous for targeting civilians. Egyptian authorities had also repeatedly seized and detained Israeli ships passing through the Suez Canal, a strategically important waterway controlled by the French and British but located in Egypt, and the Straits of Tiran, Israel’s most important waterway. Finally, Egypt had been purchasing large quantities of military grade equipment and heavy weapons from the Soviet Union; including jet fighters, bombers, tanks and artillery; after refusing a similar deal with the United States due to a clause stating that the weapons would not be used against Israel. Needless to say, tensions between Israel and Egypt were high. In 1954 the British agreed to withdraw their soldiers that were stationed in the Suez Canal and return it to Egypt, with the understanding that French and British ships would be still be guaranteed safe passage through the canal. However, in 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser was elected president of Egypt. Nasser was a staunch opponent of British and French involvement in the Middle-East and Africa. He was also very anti-Israel, no doubt due to his status as a national hero following

This span of time allows for the analysis of how a president changed throughout his presidency in terms of their decision making. Such an understanding is relevant because it can determine the strengths and weaknesses of a person in power that can either be exploited by political opponents or improved upon by future commander-in-chiefs to determine the overall effectiveness of the president. This topic was of interest because an analysis of the both of the events can present the way in which John F. Kennedy changed in relation to his foreign policy between 1961 to 1962.

the conflict in the middle east between 1948-1973 was not purely fuelled by the interest and concerns of the superpowers but rather of a series of conflictual incidents, aswell as the main wars that took place from the years from 1948-1967 such as the: 1948 War, The Six Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur war of 1973. But although the conflict was not fuelled by the superpowers, the influence of the superpowers and the reach of the superpowers into the Middle East was evident in the years both prior and following 1978. But even despite the influence and interests of the superpowers between and including 1948-1967 being undeniably evident, the extent of this influence cannot be said to have “fuelled the conflict”.