The Us Army 's Doctrine

Mission Command is the framework used by the U.S. Army to ensure key leaders receive clear direction from commanders. Clear commander’s guidance allows subordinates to make disciplined and informed decisions to best accomplish assigned tasks. Ideally, application of mission command principles ensures all elements integrate and sync actions, thus creating a shared understanding and purpose. Analysis of Major General (MG) William Garrison’s decision making during the Battle of Mogadishu demonstrates how mission command principles must be applied to gain and maintain a position of advantage during military ground operations. As commander of Task Force Ranger (TFR), MG Garrison demonstrated both successful and failed application of mission command principles. Four principles will be discussed in the

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

General Franks and joint planners identified various strengths in the Iraq pre-invasion planning efforts of the Joint Staff. For instance, throughout development of the Iraqi operational approach, planners recognized Saddam Hussain and the City of Bagdad as strategic Centers of Gravity (COG) as a major sources of Iraqi power and strength to the Hussain regime.5 (JP5-0, p. III-22) By comparison, Karl Von Clausewitz referred to the COG as the “the hub of all power and movement, which everything depends or the point at which all our energies should be directed.”6 (JP5-0, p. III-22) In addition, General Frank’s and planners’ operational approach acknowledged the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard as key operational COGs targeted in pre-invasion

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

In his memoirs, "American Soldier," former U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Tommy Franks, USA, (Ret.) portrayed Operation Anaconda as an "absolute and unqualified success," but one in which the original U.S. military battle plan "didn't survive first contact with the enemy." General Franks' apt portrayal provides the framework for this case study of Operation Anaconda, which took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan during early March 2002. The goal of Operation Anaconda was to root out enemy Taliban and al Qaeda forces that had gathered in the valley following their earlier defeats in the first 3 months of the war. To achieve this goal, U.S. commanders crafted a complex and sophisticated battle plan involving

In evaluating the campaign planning efforts for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), using an operational design (OD) as a framework for the analysis, the overall strategic and operational planning process was deeply flawed and inadequate in addressing the complex security challenges posed by the Iraq situation. This essay will assess how well Commanders and planners understood the operational environment (OE) and refined their operational approach (OA) over time. In conjunction with articulating these assessments, it will also consider the process of reframing, as an important part of the OD methodology within the joint planning process, while comparing that to what strategically and operationally occurred in Iraq leading up to the “Surge” but particularly during 2006 - 2007.

Operational Design (OD) provides a useful framework to analyze the United States (US) military’s Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) campaign plan. Using the OD framework, the US OIF campaign plan from 2002 to 2007 was poor at planning and execution. First, this essay evaluates how OIF planners and commanders understood the Operational Environment (OE) and defined the overall problem. Second, this dissertation assesses strengths and weaknesses of the initial operational approach using end state, supported objectives, Lines of Operation (LOO), center of gravity, anticipation, and effects. Next, this paper gauges how planners and commanders assessed the initial OIF campaign plan and refined their operational approach over time. Lastly, this essay evaluates the degree to which current joint planning policy and doctrine (APEX and JP 5-0) incorporate lessons from OIF.

In response to the September 11th attacks, the United States launched the Global War on Terrorism, invading both Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite these wars and the necessity for post-conflict stability operations, military leadership, including the Secretary of Defense, had neither desired nor trained its personnel to effectively conduct stability operations, which require effective interagency collaboration. Failing to effectively leverage interagency capabilities during the early phases of the 2003 Iraq War at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels prolonged the achievement of the U.S. military’s objective—transferring power to the Iraqis.

In 2002 during OIF initial planning President George W Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld severely limited Franks’ opportunity to conduct effective operation design by failing to synchronize and clarifying the strategic objectives for the Iraq Invasion. In mid August, 2002, Bush issued a top secret guidance titled “Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy” this document provided clear National Strategic Ends, and one of his objective describe

The failure to understand the operational environment and define the problem confronting the joint force at the onset of the joint planning process hampered the U.S. campaign plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from 2002 to 2007. In support of this thesis, I will detail how planners and commanders initially misunderstood the operational environment and inaccurately defined the problem facing the joint force at the expense of missed opportunities and the misapplication of ways and means. I will also argue the strengths and weaknesses of the initial operational approach. I will explain how planners and commanders assessed the campaign as events unfolded, reassessed the operational environment, redefined the problem, and eventually adjusted their operational approach to stem the tide of a losing campaign. I will reinforce my points with an eye to how current joint force planning doctrine incorporates lessons learned from OIF.

The 'Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) case study is regarding the U.S-Philippines partnership in counter-terrorism (CT) operations that took place from 2002-2011. The CT operation was titled as 'Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) and was conducted by the partnership of Philippine security forces and US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). The CT cooperation took place at three levels, tactical, operational, and strategic. The role of JSOTF was that of 'advise and assist' whereby ground operations were conducted by the Philippine forces. The US cooperation for CT in Philippines was guided by the Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and a policy and action framework to act as a binding framework for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational CT operations using full range of military operational capacity. The OEF-P was also conducted by incorporating JP 5-0 principles and guidelines of engagement. The OEF-P took place in Southern Philippines. Following is an assessment how the US forces used termination, military end state, and objectives of operational design (Joint Pub 5-0, page III-18) to develop and refine their operational approach.

Operational art implies that war is the use of military force to achieve a strategic political goal, and that warfare is the methodology in which the government employs its military force to achieve that goal. The concept of operational art as a cognitive process to align actions in space and time is critical to understanding its relationship to war and warfare. As a cognitive process, its strengths and weaknesses derive from the human element. Historical examples demonstrate that those who have the requisite education, training, judgement and foresight employ operational art successfully. Those failing to conceptualize strategy as a continuous process, or who fail to acknowledge changes in conditions, may fail in this process. Therefore, one must understand the relationship between operational art, war, and warfare to successfully plan and execute military action in pursuit of political aims.

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution

“One of the most important tasks confronting the JFC’s [joint force commander’s] staff in the operational design process is the identification of friendly and adversary COGs” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). Identifying the centers of gravity of our terrorist adversaries will aid policy makers and strategic planners is two ways. First, a thorough center of gravity analysis will deftly identify strengths and weaknesses, our and theirs. Second, when aligned with enemy COGs, strategic level objectives become focused and attainable. More than a target of opportunity, centers of gravity represent that which a terrorist organization cannot do without it. Therefore, understanding that no two groups are alike and where to focus our efforts

Collectively, the strategic documents serve to align purpose and effort to ensure optimized use of people and resources in pursuit of national objectives. Echoes of these documents are evident in the operational level of military planning. Therefore, to best frame the context in which CA will operate in the future through execution of its core tasks, it is necessary to highlight specific elements within a selection of USG strategic documents that are relevant to CA. Analysis