The Vietnam War Remained An Existential Crisis

Hess argues that the threat of the USSR and Communism “left the US no choice but to stand up to the challenge posed by Vietnam”. Direct confrontation was impossible as the USSR was a nuclear power, therefore the only choice available was “a policy of containment”; previous success in Korea gives validity to this view. Hess states Vietnam was the centre of the “Domino Theory”, that a communist Vietnam “would inexorably lead to the collapse of other non-communist states”. All communist states were believed to be puppets of the USSR so an increase in Soviet allies would tip the global power balance against the US.

During the Lyndon Baines Johnson presidential administration, both those policy makers who supported America’s involvement in Vietnam and those who opposed the war were part of the “containment generation.” They had reached political maturity during World War II and the early years of the Cold War and had experienced the intense anticommunism of the McCarthy era of the early 1950s. These leaders understood and applied the lessons of American nationalism, which had the primary message that the U.S. was the dominating nation that had to embrace its responsibility to aid and improve nations in America’s image. Therefore, when they saw that there was a threat of the spread of communism to areas of Southeast Asia, a majority of the

The political instability in Vietnam from 1950 to 1975 between the communist North Vietnam and anti-communist South Vietnam during the Cold War era has led to the United States’ inevitable intervention in Vietnam. The main motivators for the United States’ incremental decision to intervene and commitment in Vietnam can be viewed as an accumulation of socio-political, political and economic catalysts. In recognition that there were many other factors that may have contributed to the U.S’s involvement in the conflict in Vietnam, this essay will largely focus on these three factors. As the cold war resonates, the American’s crusade was propelled by the fears of the domino theory and perception of Communist threat and expansion affected the

President Dwight Eisenhower conditionally pledged to support South Vietnam’s new nation in 1955. In the time period between 1955-1961 the United States pumped seven billion dollars in aid so that Vietnam would not “go over quickly” like a “row of dominoes” (McNamara 31). In the next 6 years Vietnam would cost America billions of dollars, thousands of lives, and the disaffection of much of the United States public. Yet in the end, South Vietnam would fall to the North less than 2 years after the United States military involvement ceased.

In 1960s, the US was faced with another crisis of communist expansion in the war between North and South Vietnam. The Kennedy Administration decided to further pursue their containment strategy out of fear being seen by the international community as weak towards communism. During the Johnson Administration, an attack against American vessels that happened in the Gulf of Tonkin led to President Johnson being granted the ability to conduct broad military operations without congressional approval. The American public began to largely oppose American intervention in Vietnam because the optimistic statements made by the government ran contradictory to the reports of the violent fighting by American news outlets. During the Nixon administration, the US switched to a policy, later known as Vietnamization, where the main goal was to strengthen the South Vietnamese forces and provide them with better armaments so they can better defend themselves. Vietnamization proved to be ineffective as the South Vietnamese forces were unable to hold their own against the North without US air support as proven during Operation Lam Son 719 and the Easter Offensive. The signing of the Paris Peace Accords officially ended US involvement in the Vietnam War. The US followed containment policies during beginning of the war due to the underlying fear of the spread of communism and since the policies were inherited from previous

The Vietnam War lasted longer, bloodier, and more hostile than any U.S. President or American citizen imagined. Lyndon Johnson faced many other enemies during the war such as the duration, the immense number of deaths, and for the first time in most American’s history, failure. Through deep evaluation of Lyndon B. Johnson’s foreign policies as President during the Vietnam war, failure was a recurring outcome, as he faced military and political difficulties over having complete authority over political decisions made leading to the misuse of his respective power, receiving split support through torn Americans at home, and his accord to deport so many troops into combat in Vietnam.

The Vietnam War was a major controversy for the United States compared to World War 1 and World War 2. With both of the previous wars that the United States had been a major part of they had brought the people of the country together to fight  and work hard to show their support to the soldiers that were fighting. During these two wars we saw the rise of women in the workforce as they came into the picture of taking the jobs that the men held while they went away to fight in the way. And then there was the avid signing up to fight. Men as young as teenagers signing up to fight in both of these wars. The difference is that with the Vietnam War it was met with disdain from the public and also the soldiers as well. With this war people

The Vietnam war brought many changes to the United States in the 1960’s and the 1970’s. Some of the changes were for the better of the country, take the rediscovered Women’s Rights movements and the ever growing Free Speech movements inspired by New Left, while most of the other changes brought on tensions between government and their people. The Domino Theory pushed our leaders to the edge. In order to stop the Domino Theory in Vietnam, the U.S. invaded. The war was useless for the American government to get involved with. Even Robert Kennedy described our presence in Vietnam as ‘... sending a lion to halt an epidemic of jungle rot.’ (Doc E) From new groups forming to rebel, to inflation and loss of trust in the Government, from 1960’s to

Because Johnson believed in the domino theory, that if one county turned Communist, namely Vietnam, then neighboring nations would also turn Communist, his approach to the Vietnam War was to escalate the attacks to the point in which the Communists could no longer fight back. Johnson escalated the war through a variety of attacks, including Operation Rolling Thunder, which was the first of many aerial bombings on North Vietnam. Moreover, it was under Johnson’s administration that tens of thousands of American troops were dispatched to Vietnam which was another factoring intensifying the war. On the contrary, Nixon’s approach to the war in Vietnam was to pull out American troops because he valued American lives over containing Communism in Vietnam. Therefore, because the war had reached a stalemate by the time Nixon was in office and he valued American lives over containing communism, he implemented the process of Vietnamization, the organized transaction of American troops in Vietnam that were replaced by South Vietnamese troops. The reason why Johnson chose to escalate the war while Nixon tried to bring American troops home was because of their differing political views. Since Johnson was a Democrat and held some fairly liberal beliefs, like helping the impoverished at any cost, it was only natural for him to show compassion for the South Vietnamese by fighting Communism in order to create a better quality life for them even if it meant sacrificing American lives. However, because Nixon held more conservative views and believed in preserving order in one’s own nation before reaching out to others, Nixon implemented the process of Vietnamization in order to bring

In the first essay Fear, Ambition, and Politics by Robert Dallek, he talks about the way that the United States started to really conflict with Vietnam and how some of Lyndon Johnson’s issues led the U.S. into it. One thing was clear and it was that Lyndon Johnson did not want communism to spread. Johnson’s advisors would continuously report to him that things were starting to become more serious in Saigon. Johnson did not want to send troops though, saying the he would “not permit the independent nations of the East to be swallowed up by Communist conquest, and it would not mean sending American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing themselves.” Clearly his word did not last though. Dallek seems to have a rather negative view of Johnson because he wasn’t taking the precautionary steps to prevent certain events, and he could not keep his word. Johnson seemed to disagree with his own actions about what we should do in Vietnam because it was so unpredictable. He did not want American involvement, but the pressure ended up getting the best of him. He sent one of his advisors, McGeorge Bundy, to Vietnam to talk about what we should do to help alleviate South Vietnam. Bundy thought that U.S. action was a must or “defeat would be inevitable and there is still time to turn it around.” Johnson then decided to start bombing the North on February 8th, but he was not pleased with having to make this decision. This is known as the Rolling

Here Isserman and Kazin acknowledge that the military’s hands were tied, as they were, not only by popular discontent, but because Johnson did not want to risk making the Cold War hot. Insomuch as success in the conflict was measured by enemy body count in lieu of territorial gains, there would be no direct bombing of Hanoi. As much as the consummate Texan and his inherited Alamo mythology made him believe he was fighting for freedom, there was a line he would not cross, and the North Vietnamese took advantage of this. Americans who opposed the war by 1968 did so because they believed that it could not be won. Once the Pentagon Papers were released in 1971, this purloined collection of documents related to the escalation of American involvement in Southeast Asia, spanning presidencies from Eisenhower to Johnson, further deteriorated the credibility of the American government, and helped to lead the majority of Americans to believe that the war in Vietnam was wrong

US policy during the war was weak and not nearly aggressive enough to beat the North Vietnamese. For example, President Johnson was unwilling to order a full scale invasion of North Vietnam. His reason for this was it passed through the territory of countries not involved in the war This was due to fears that it would also provoke China into entering the war directly. Another example would be Johnson’s refusal to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail. As a result, supplies would continue to flow uninterrupted. The reasons for not cutting off the trail were mainly political. These political reasons include not wanting to breach Laotian neutrality, especially since the North Vietnamese had no qualms about breaching, and that US

The investigation assesses the level of success President Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization policy attained during the Vietnam War to end U.S. involvement in the war. In the strive to evaluate the level of success this policy demonstrated, the investigation evaluates the ability of the policy to equip, expand, and train Southern Vietnamese forces and allocate them to a substantial combat position, all while simultaneously reducing the quantity of U.S. combat troops in a steady manner. The Vietnamization policy is investigated and analyzed by both its causes and effects. The motivation that led to Nixon’s creation of this

Kennedy’s cabinet members were made up of many different thinkers. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State believed that there was a communist plot to take over the world and it must be stopped. Walt Rostow, the presidential advisor believes that we should use military force to cut off supplies to the Vietcong, have large scale bombings of North Vietnam and accelerate modernization in South Vietnam. General Maxwell Taylor criticized Eisenhower’s conventional training efforts. McGeorge Bundy, the NSC advisor wanted to attack the Vietcong and North Vietnam if necessary. George Ball believed that Diem regime was corrupt and to create democracy in Vietnam was impossible.

The United States intervention in Vietnam is seen by the world as America’s greatest loss and longest war. Before the start of the war in Vietnam, the thought of the United States losing this war was unheard of because America was technologically superior, no country in south East Asia could contend with them. Lyndon B. Johnson announced that he would not be the president to allow South East Asia to go Communist . Why the United States lost the war has been a huge debate since the end of the war, because there were so many factors affecting why they lost; the war was a loss politically, after losing support from not only the American public but also the South Vietnamese and losing a political mandate for the war by 1973, when the last