By 1975 the UF came to be so strongly controlled, organized and equipped by Mogadishu, that it was considered “an arm of the Somali army” (Gilkes 1994b:722). In January 1976, the movement was split for logistical and propaganda reasons into the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and the Abo-Somali Liberation Front (ASLF) (Compagnon 1995:378). Aiming to keep militancy on either side of the Somali-Ethiopian border at bay, Barre not only restricted the WSLF’s activities (Gilkes 1994b:722), but even avoided mentioning their existence to the Somali population (Markakis 1987:227; Lockyer 2006:5). At the time, Barre sent envoys to Addis Ababa to negotiate autonomy for the Ogadeen (Lewis 2002:232). However, the respective regional and international-level negotiations failed, Barre Somali president purposed himself of the Somali guerrillas (Laitin 1979b:112). Throughout 1976, the WSLF developed into “one of the largest and most capable insurgent movements in Africa” (Lockyer 2006:6), starting to move west in early 1977 (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:133;Markakis 1998:31). …show more content…
Only then, on July 13th, 1977, did Barre officially commit his regular troops to the war (Nkaisserry 1997:15), reinforcing some 6,000-15,000 WSLF fighters with 35,000 soldiers (Lockyer 2006:9, referring to Marcus 1994:196f.; Matthies 1987:241f.).Thus, “the Somali dreams of national re- unification with one of the lost territories was about to be realized” (Nkaisserry
Since 1991the Civil War began, and during the 90s the United States and the United Nation made several efforts to bring peace to the region which failed. In 1998 the northern punt land region declares autonomy. In the 2000s in Somalia the unrest would continue; from several attempts to have a stable government and bring peace to the region. Ethiopian troops also made an effort to bring peace to the region, but eventually also gave up and left Somalia as well. The country also has problems with pirates, and the terrorist group Al-Shabab who has control over part of the country. It was not until 2012 when Somalis elected their first president and parliament but even then this new government its still dependent on outsiders to stabilized and offer
Conflicts within the nation of Somalia were sometimes planned as a means to an end. Whereby the United States Government supported a certain regime before they used their power to gain control of the situation and overthrow the tyrant. In other cases the use of national power was used such as the Islamic Courts Union to gain control over Somalia by implementing logical line of operations by providing the people their needs and services to gain their trust. In these situations it would be considered as an irregular warfare environment, because they were violent struggles
Somalis use the word burbur (‘catastrophe’) to describe the period from December 1991 to March 1992, when the country was torn apart by clan-based warfare and factions plundered the remnants of the state and fought for control of rural and urban assets. Four months of fighting in Mogadishu alone in 1991 and 1992 killed an estimated 25,000 people, 1.5 million people fled the country, and at least 2 million were internally displaced.
In August of 1992, President George Bush Sr. sent US soldiers into Somalia to provide humanitarian relief to those Somalis suffering from starvation. The major problems in Somalia started when President Mohammed Siad Barre was overthrown by a coalition of opposing clans. Although there were several opposing groups, the prominent one was led by Mohammed Farah Aidid. Following the overthrow of Barre, a massive power struggle ensued. These small scale civil wars led to the destruction of the agriculture in Somalia, which in turn led to the deprivation of food in large parts of the country. When the international community heard of this, large quantities of food were sent to ease Somali suffering. However, clan leaders like Aidid routinely
By November of 1992, conditions were getting worse instead of better. Food was still being stolen and sold off to clan leaders while aid workers were threatened and attacked. Americans were stunned at the lawlessness and starvation. Thousands of troops were ordered into Somalia to assist in the aid by President George H. Bush. Now food was getting to the people that it was intended for but distrust for the American soldiers was growing after they often violated Somalis privacy by bursting into their homes and confiscating the weapons that was the Somalis only defense against the opposing clans.6 In March of 1993 the U.S. withdrew most of its troops leaving the security of the people to the UN. By this time anger was growing towards the outsiders and the UN took most of the fallout for that by being attacked regularly. Hostility grew even more when the UN announced that the clan led by Aidid was the one responsible for the lawlessness in Somalia.7 When the UN took sides against the most powerful warlord in Somalia, the attacks against the aid workers was stepped up. 24 Pakistani peace keepers were killed
In 1991 when the dictator Mohammed Siad Barre was overthrown after 21 years in power, the UN forces hurriedly left and the country slid into civil war and famine. Full- scale war broke out a year later between the militias of General Mohamad Farah Aidid and his archrival, Ali Mahdi Mohamad and the United Nations watched silently, not even offering humanitarian assistance. The Somalis were angry and felt that the UN had abandoned the country. When some 500 Pakistani Blue Berets finally did come, they were ill-equipped. The Somalis were very suspicious of the UN and two months later they welcomed Operation Rescue because it was an American and no a UN initiative. Two days later, the US Ambassador Robert B. Oakley publicly embraced General Aidid
Upon its withdrawal in 1995, the UN left Somalia in mostly the same state it was in in 1992. The mission created the idea in future involvements not to cross the “Mogadishu line” from peacekeeping to war-fighting (Clarke). UNOSOM 2 also suffered 154 fatalities as well as major problems stemming from the complexity of its mandate and command and control issues, confusion over the appropriate rules of engagement (RoE), lack of effective intelligence gathering capabilities, and the huge challenges involved in a predominantly military mission being tasked with inherently political goals
There are many external actors that have played an immediate role in Somalia conflict which are neighboring countries and first there will be a focus on sub region and four of its constituent states for example Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Djibouti
In Kathy Gilsinan’s With World Focused on Boko Haram, al-Shabaab Steps Up Offensive (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/13841/with-world-focused-on-boko-haram-al-shabaab-steps-up-offensive), the topic of al-Shabaab’s legitimacy and terror is discussed. As Boko Haram (another terrorist organization in Africa) has begin inflicting fear through the abduction of schoolgirls and other acts of terror, al-Shabaab has began to take up arms. Its acts of violence are beginning to spread outside the borders of Somalia.
Al-Shabaab as a terrorist group poses a significant threat in Somalia and in the global community. This paper will start by discussing the background. In this part the paper will show how the group has evolved from Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI) to the Islamic Court Union (ICU) and lastly to Al-Shabaab. Before discussing the group’s threat of national security, homeland and international, this paper will provide the conceptual meaning of key terminology, such as national security, homeland security, international security and globalization. It is important to understand these concepts before moving toward the main argument of the paper. After providing the framework for key concepts, the paper will discuss the group’s threat to Somalia in two areas, national security and homeland security. The paper will go further and identify the threats posed by the group on other nations’ homeland security and international security. We will use East African countries and the United States examples. The paper will provide evidence to support how globalization has shaped and fueled the threats from Al-Shabaab. It will then discuss the primary response from the United States and from African countries through AMISOM. The paper will provide the way forward and suggestions for the response of the international community to Al-Shabaab. In conclusion, we will try to alert the international community that although the group has been experience hard times in Somalia, it is unwise to
It is worth noting that Somalis are a mostly homogenous population. Specifically, they share a common language, religion (mostly Sunni Muslim, minority Shi'i) and a common historical identity. The main source of internal contention has always been disputes between the four main clan-families; the Dir, Darod, Isaaq, and Hawiye clans.(Jennifer De MaioTITLE:Managing Civil Wars: An Evaluation of Conflict-prevention Strategies in Africa ) However at this point in history, the Somali people, longing to break out from imperial rule, unified briefly under the Salihiyah tariqa, an orthodox muslim brotherhood led by Mahammad Abdille Hasan. The so-called, Dervish rebellion targeted the British and Egyptian
In neighboring Chad, Muammar Gaddafi helped found a group known as the “Islamic Legion” which attempted to gain control of the Chadian government. This attempt failed, but sparked similar conflicts in Libya, and surrounding regions. During these conflicts, Darfur became a second front, serving as a relay point for military forces and weapon suppliers (Sikainga). Soon after these conflicts, a reformed “Arab Alliance” began to generate propaganda in Sudan claiming that the Arab population was being marginalized and calling for reform in the Sudanese government. The movement gained popularity and using the arms left in the country by past conflicts and hired mercenaries (Janjaweed), supporters soon overwhelmed the government
By the time Britain granted Kenya independence, the government realized that secession of the NFD would benefit both Kenyans and Somalis. A Pan-Somali movement had been fermenting in the Horn of Africa as early as 1946, when British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin suggested the creation of a “Greater Somalia” (“Pursuing Pastoralists”). Kenyan Somalis assumed that independence was tantamount to secession, but their aspirations were crushed by President Jomo Kenyatta’s declaration that “Kenya will never surrender any inch of her territory to anyone” (“The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware”). This statement was made despite the results of a 1962 commission of inquiry, reporting that over 87% of the NFD population favored secession (“Being Oromo in Kenya”). The Human Rights Watch reports that the locals were routinely “rounded up and interrogated. Thousands of Kenyan-Somalis were beaten by the security forces and accused by the acting District Commissioner of harboring anti-government elements” (“Kenya”). Kenyatta’s intransigent policies and the political separation of Kenyans and Somalis during the colonial era constituted the largest causal factor of the Shifta War.
Activism against FGC/M rose during the 1960s and 70s, with the former Somali regime taking an open
One of the most memorable achievement of Islamic Court Union is the Mogadishu Security. The was almost five months with security and stability felt by the Mogadishu residents. No militia brandishing AK 47 in Mogadishu, other than Islamic Courts Union’s militia. In those five months, you could you could go out to Money Transfer Companies, picked up your money sent to you by your families in abroad, and come back with your money without fear of robbers, while you could also use your cellphone. A lot of families, who fled the country,