The Workings Behind Government Bond Selling Mechanism

As seen in the cases above with castings and O-rings, even the simplest of parts can pose complications in the auction process. Potential for successful reduction in cost can be recognized with a more concentrated event and management effort. This can be true for engineered parts as well but on a less likely basis. The primary key to success to an auction of this nature would be to not have any surprises or to anticipate suppliers’ behavior. Building on this idea would be to truly know your suppliers, which can get cumbersome in a company with a lot of growth through acquisitions and locations. However, with regional procurement managers, it is not impossible. There should not have been a question “if” an incumbent was going to bid, good vendor management would have assured that a last minute entry by way of an incumbent would not have happened. Applying this thought to the engineered parts, an auction would only be effective if suppliers invited to bid have been fully vetted. An auction can speed up the process of getting time sensitive information to suppliers, but it also may open

There are organizations that decide to issue bonds in most cases go through a series of six steps:

Then, in the 1990s, bonds were created consisting of subprime mortgages, which were higher risk mortgages with high interest rates, made to borrowers with lower credit levels. Essentially, banks were handing out mortgages like candy to consumers who were never going to be able to make the payments, but Wall Street kept buying and packaging the mortgages into bonds. Since these bonds were inherently riskier, one wonders why investors were still willing to buy. Investors, who look at ratings by agencies such as Moodys and Standard & Poors, had no reason to believe these bonds were risky investments. The agencies, whom were being paid by Wall Street, were assigning high ratings to these risky bonds.

The flow of funds within financial markets is stimulated by the money, bond and mortgage markets. A money market is the trading of highly liquid financial instruments with a duration of one year or less and includes the trading of Treasury bills. Furthermore, bonds are long term investments, with a duration greater than 1 year and are issued by corporations and the U.S. government. In addition, the mortgage market creates loans to finance the real estate market. Once mortgages are issued on a property, banking institutions securitize the mortgages and sell them on the secondary market (CSU Global, 2016). Due to the scale of these three markets they have an extensive impact on the monetary supply and economy.

LTCM’s board of directors included many geniuses in from the financial world, who collectively created complex models allowed them to calculate risk of securities much more accurately than others. LTCM’s trading strategy was featured by the divergence in price between long-term U.S. Treasury bonds. It shorted the more expensive “on-the-run” bond and purchased the “off-the-run” security at the same time to exploit the price divergence. In order

ONLINE AUCTIONING SYSTEM _______________ A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of San Diego State University _______________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Science in Computer Science _______________ by Shanthi Potla Summer 2011 iii Copyright © 2011 by Shanthi Potla All Rights Reserved iv DEDICATION To all. v ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS Online Autioning System by Shanthi Potla Master of Science in Computer Science San Diego State University, 2011 The online auctioning system is a flexible solution for supporting lot- based online auctions.

The above links address some of these issues. In other words, the bond market is a market in which the bonds of corporations and governments are traded (i.e., banks, etc.) and transacted in various settings (i.e., banks, private sectors, government agencies) and in various ways (i.e, over the counter, electronically, telephone, etc.) www.econ100.com/eu5e/open/glossary.html.

Milgrom and Weber [13] have shown that the English auction dominates all other auction formats in terms of seller 's expected profit, when the comparison is restricted to symmetric equilibria. Myerson [14] and Riley and Samuelson [15] explain that if the buyers are risk neutral and have independently and identically distributed private values, then, for the majority of probability distributions, the seller 's expected profit is maximized making it the optimal bidding strategy. The item is awarded to the buyers with the highest value, and any buyer whose value is lower than an optimally set threshold receives zero expected surplus. These two conditions, however, are satisfied by a large array of trading mechanisms, including each of the standard auctions all with the same seller 's reserve price.

Many government related institutions issue bonds, some supported by the revenues of a specific institution and some guaranteed by a government sponsor. For example, in Canada they have a bank that issue bonds that are guaranteed by the

Accordingly, we will first "analyze" competitive markets, by discussing demand and supply separately. Then we will try to put them back together (synthesize them) in order to understand the working of competitive markets.

Next I will discuss my favorite topic regarding algorithmic game theory; the price of anarchy. I have to admit that the reasons this topic is my favorite are rather ridiculous; the name sounds really cool, and I like that the concept is also used in economics. Anyhow, the price of anarchy is a concept that measures how the efficiency of a system is ruined by the participants’ self-centered actions. (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999) Essentially, this is the result of an inefficient set of equilibrium outputs. If a system is not designed with the users’ motives in mind, the system is often ruined by participants who are strategically trying to benefit

My analysis of securitization processes will be supported by a number of multimedia and scholarly discourses, ranging from case studies from across the world to econometric analyses using

Nyborg et al (2002) conduct their study by analysing the demand of the bidders and auction results in Swedish Treasury auctions during uncertainty at the time of when the bidding occurs. They find that bidders respond to uncertainty in three separate ways; as uncertainty increases, bidders reduce the price levels at which they want to bid, they reduce quantity demanded and bidders also increase bidding dispersion amongst the same bond. Nyborg et al also deem auction size to be a less important factor than price uncertainty in how it influences the bidders behaviour even though as the auction size increases, bidders increase their individual demands. They also suggest that cautious bidding involves both a reduction in prices and a reduction

Issuance of both the Central and State government dated securities are being done through auctions.

Malaysia and Singapore bonds are unique and idiosyncratic due to factors such as geography, history, politics, culture and ethnicity.1They are substantial trading partner and their bilateral trade amounted to S$113.4 billion in 2012, up from S$77.2 billion in 2003. The island’s investment into Malaysia has climbed about 25 percent annually over the past three years, according to DBS Group Holdings Ltd.2This increase in trade makes quintessential the need to enhance economic linkages between the two countries and the High Speed Rail (HSR) project presented an opportunity to open up and rejuvenate smaller cities in Peninsular Malaysia by connecting them to the two major metropolises. The HSR is an efficient and safe mode of transport which results in dramatic travel time savings.We will firstly analyse the cost and benefits of the HSR and we will try to discuss if the value of the project outweigh the MYR 40 billion construction cost.