The Yom Kippur War

In this paper, the definition and description of what a case study is, what are some reasons for using a case study, what are some disadvantages and advantages of this approach? Also included in this paper I will talk about what are some of the ways a researcher can acquire information that can is used for a case study. A case study can be defined as a descriptive account of the behavior, history, and other relevant factors concerning a particular individual (Cozby, Bates, 2012).

The Middle East has been a conflict ridden area due to clashing religions, and political and territorial disputes for centuries. Although deep-seated religious and political differences can easily cause violent rivalry, territorial dispute frequently causes long lasting tension and fighting between those involved. Specifically the area occupied by modern day Israel and Palestine and due to the area being a hub for religious pilgrims of Jewish, Catholic, and Islamic faith there has been controversy for centuries. Most importantly though, is the presence of Britain having control of the land beginning in 1917 due to the growth of Zionism. Eventually the United Nations created their partition plan as a way to try to have peace between the Arabs and Jews but as time went on it seemed less and less likely for peace to prevail (Fisher 5). Similarly, this view of the conflict being impossible to solve is present in Yasmina Khadra’s writings. Khadra in his novel, The Attack, suggests that a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is not possible through the extremist behavior of Sihem which correctly reflects that of the actual hatred of Israelis found in current

Between 1947-1973 wars broke out between Israel and its neighbors, resulting in casualties, destruction and no resolution. The 3 wars I’m focusing on are Suez Canal, Six Day War, and Yom Kippur War, and how each of these wars have a common theme and how each party involved in the war believed they were in the right. These wars were fueled by tension and revenge,

Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.

As victory in WWII appeared imminent, the USAAF under General Hap Arnold commissioned studies to assess the impact of strategic bombing in the war. In addition to results about strategic bombing, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) concluded that “the U.S. should have an intelligence organization capable of knowing the strategic vulnerabilities, capabilities and intentions of any potential enemy.” In spite of the aforementioned dearth of intelligence on the USSR, very specific information was needed for military and political leaders to make decisions regarding their strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities. Additionally, the strategic bomber forces needed a list of verified targets in case conflict with the USSR broke out. In order to fill the major voids in information the US civilian leaders employed a bifurcated approach: human intelligence (HUMINT) obtained through agency operatives, and signals (SIGINT) and imagery (IMINT) intelligence acquired

The study concluded with confirmation of abuse, trickery, and coercion methods in the recruitment process. This study did not focus on the morality of espionage.10 However, the study did, in fact noted the moral difference between the intimidating recruitment of a civilian as opposed to an insurgent.11The study concluded with confirmation of abuse, trickery, and coercion methods in the recruitment process. This study did not focus on the morality of espionage.12 However, the study did, in fact noted the moral difference between the intimidating recruitment of a civilian as opposed to an insurgent.13

Eleven years on from the invasion, the Iraq war remains an unforgettable sequence of events for people around the world, especially American’s and one of the greatest intelligence failures in living history. The pre-war intelligence gathered by the CIA suggested that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and connections with al-Qaeda. American officials did everything to prepare the entire world and the entire globe for war against Iraq. The intelligence collected, key to the invasion, was subsequently wishful thinking and wrong. The striking thing about prewar U.S. intelligence is that it played such a small role in one of the most important U.S. policy decisions in recent decades.

The Israeli Defense Force makes effective use of the then modern tanks and fighter bomber aircraft in the 1967 Six Day War. Their perceived superiority or tactic and technology is quickly overran by improved tactics and Soviet provided technology of the Egyptians in 1973. At this time IDF believe the tactics based on their modern technology to be superior allowing their technical advancement and tactical development stagnate. Failing to adjust their strategy and adjust their technology from what had been previously used leads to them paying a heavy price in the opening days of the war. Just as tactics are continuously improving to counter an enemy also priority on new technology development is an imperative to counter the enemy’s technology. During the 1991 Gulf War the M829A1 main gun rounds of the M1A1 Abrams effectively defeats the armor of the Soviet based T72, once thought to be the world’s best battle tank. This demonstrates how modern technology thought to be adequate for the job is defeated by more advanced developments specifically created to counter it. This conclusion also warns against the overreliance on Technology, especially electronic based technology, can be costly. Electronics can easily fail, break, be jammed or otherwise made ineffective by enemy forces. If a military force relies solely on electronic technology to accomplish mundane task such as targeting, navigation, or battle tracking the traditional skill set can be lost. Soldiers must continue to learn and maintain skills in certain areas without reliance on technology to be effective in future battles. Warfighters should continue to utilize newly developed technologies to aid in accomplishing these task but

Dr. Pillar argues bad leadership led to the Iraq war not bad intelligence, asserting that the intelligence community (IC) advised against the use of force. The 2001 IC statement on world threats did not mention the possibility of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Thus, former Secretary of State Powell misguided the international community when he affirmed before the United Nations in February 2003 that his argument was “based on solid intelligence.” The administration’s officials, including the president and his national security advisor, also barely read the 2002 intelligence estimates on Iraqi WMD programs. The IC concluded that the Iraqi regime was unlikely to use WMDs against the U.S or hand them to terrorists, did not believe

The United States intelligence community (IC) has changed tremendously over the years primarily due to the various intelligence failures throughout history. Since the IC was officially created following the National Security Act of 1947, which was enacted as a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor, it is fitting to explore the massive intelligence failure that led up to the attack that was carried out on December 7, 1941. First, we will explore the many events that led up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor by providing a brief background and deep look at why intelligence failed during this point in history. Then we will dive into what intelligence practitioners could have been done differently from a critical thinking stand point to mitigate the Japanese attack. Followed by an

The Yom Kippur War of 1973, was a very controversial event that took many countries by surprise. Beginning on the day of Yom Kippur, a day of fasting for the Muslims, the Israelis were taken by surprise as the Egyptians and Syrians backed by the Russians started attacking them from both the west and the northeast (Loyola). This caused a dilemma for the United States, because they were afraid that if they tried to help the Israelis they would end up in a war with Russia. Though it only lasted for twenty-four days, it was a very eye opening situation for the Israelis.

I read furiously through the rest of the day and that night. Learning everything from Israeli conscription, officer corps structure, past and current technologies, and the Israeli learning model from high school through adulthood. Israel, after the Six-Day War changed their strategic path to ensure success in the future, i.e. the survival of Israel depended on it. The city of Jerusalem and the religious significants went hand-in-hand with security and protection of all Jewish people. By the end of the night, I had produced four slides on ten key Israeli areas of importance. My confidence level had risen to an acceptable level to brief the next morning.

Within the modern military era, Arabic-speaking armies have traditionally shown themselves to generally ineffective. From the 1960s, where Egyptian regular forces performed poorly against Yemeni irregulars, to the ‘70s, where the Syrians only managed to impose their will upon Lebanon through the utilisation of their overwhelming weight of weaponry and numbers. The Iraqis army demonstrated their own ineptitude in the 1980s, firstly with their wars with Iran, where their opponents were in possession of an army ripped apart by internal revolutionary turmoil showed ineptness against an Iranian military ripped apart by revolutionary turmoil in the 1980s, and secondly in their failure to win a three-decades-long war against the Kurds. Even with the intervention of Western powers, Arab military performance has remained poor, especially on both sides of the 1990 Kuwait war, where they performance was at best mediocre.4 Despite all these examples however, the primary military area in which Arabic armies have performed poorly is in their wars with Israel, where despite three Arabic attempts to conquer Israel with conventional warfare in 1948, 1967 and 1973, Israel has always emerged victorious. And the Arabs have done poorly in nearly all the military confrontations with Israel. In an article for the Middle East Quarterly in 1999 titled “Why Arabs Lose Wars”, Norvell De Atkine, a U.S. Army retired colonel with eight years residence in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, and a graduate

aggression as an opportunity to eradicate the Pan-Arabist movement and the potential existential threat it could pose in the future.8 The tense political and military environment was bolstered by Cold War hostilities between the U.S. and the USSR.9 Why did Israel go to war with Egypt in June 1967? To answer this question, this essay considers Egypt’s provocative maneuvers yet argues that Israel did not truly perceive an existential threat. The 1967 war was a result of culminating hostilities within the Middle East, proliferated by Cold War intervention and Nasser’s desire to be seen as a decisive leader of the Pan-Arabist movement. However, Israel launched what the weight of evidence best concludes was a preventative attack that galvanised

the conflict in the middle east between 1948-1973 was not purely fuelled by the interest and concerns of the superpowers but rather of a series of conflictual incidents, aswell as the main wars that took place from the years from 1948-1967 such as the: 1948 War, The Six Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur war of 1973. But although the conflict was not fuelled by the superpowers, the influence of the superpowers and the reach of the superpowers into the Middle East was evident in the years both prior and following 1978. But even despite the influence and interests of the superpowers between and including 1948-1967 being undeniably evident, the extent of this influence cannot be said to have “fuelled the conflict”.