Theories And Theories Of The Calms Made By Alan Chalmers

The development of the scientific method in the late 1500’s to the early 1600’s was a crucial stepping-stone in the science community. The scientific method is based upon observations, hypotheses and experimentation. The concept is rather simple, and can be applied to many areas of study. Once an observation is made, the observer can make a hypothesis as to why that phenomenon occurs and can then design an experiment to prove whether or not that hypotheses is valid. Although the scientific method has been extremely useful in the discovery of various things from usages of medications to studying animal behavior, there are still those who question the usage of this tool. These critics claim that since

Despite Karl Popper’s extensive and credible work in the field of scientific philosophy, I think his falsification theory should be thought of solely as a philosophical theory and nothing more because it is most useful as a guideline that is not taken at face value and applied to every scientific theory.

Induction is a form of reasoning where the premises support the conclusion, but do not confirm that the conclusion is true. To justify induction, we are required to justify that we can infer that experiences we have never experienced will resemble those that we have experienced. Making inductive inferences is necessary for everyday life as well as in science. It is rational to rely on inductive arguments in everyday life for claims such as “the sun will rise tomorrow.” But inductive arguments require that nature is uniform. For example, tomorrow the laws of physics will continue to work the same as how they have in the past, so the world will continue spinning and the sun will rise. This perceived uniformity (the principle of uniformity of nature) allows claims like the one previously outlined to be easily understood. Although inductive arguments are useful, whether or not they can be justified is a topic of debate. In James Van Cleve’s “Reliability, Justification and the Problem of Induction,” he uses an inductive argument to attempt to justify induction. In his justification he claims that his method of argument is not circular. I argue that his reasoning is problematic because an inductive argument is not able to justify induction, mainly because inductive arguments presuppose the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature.

The reason induction originated as a concept of reasoning did not come from its ability to result in proofs, but the usefulness in predicting future occurrences which it allows. As an example of this principle, we can bring into the light the supposed laws of nature which provide constants to our physical world. For any number of the infinite reasons at any instantaneous point of time exceptions to the laws of nature can emerge. Due to this fact, and the fact that the laws of nature are based on a finite number of circumstances of which permanence is assumed, laws of nature cannot be fully proven. However, without the human assumption of the existence of laws of nature, the progress of science would be halted. The laws of nature serve as an exceptional example of how even without a definite proof, inductive reasoning enables leaps in knowledge and

What is Science? When it comes to the word ‘science’ most of the people have some kind of knowledge about science or when they think of it there is some kind of image related to it, a theory, scientific words or scientific research (Beyond Conservation, n.d.). Many different sorts of ideas float into an individual’s mind. Every individual has a different perception about science and how he/she perceives it. It illustrates that each person can identify science in some form. It indicates that the ‘science’ plays a vital role in our everyday lives (Lederman & Tobin, 2002). It seems that everyone can identify science but cannot differentiate it correctly from pseudo-science and non-science (Park, 1986). This essay will address the difference between science, non-science and pseudo-science. Then it will discuss possible responses to the question that what should we do when there is a clash between scientific explanation and non-scientific explanation. Then it will present a brief examination about the correct non-scientific explanation.

The following essay aims to discuss the inconsistencies between the inductivist and Popper’s points of view of science rationality of science in light of claims that the scientific method is inductive yet an inductive method is no. I think is rational to say that inductivist view of science has significant contradiction that Popper’s view solves. To support Popper’s view my argument will introduce the inductivist and falsificationsist views and I will focus in showing the issues of considered science as objective, scientific knowledge as proven and nature as uniform as well as the differences between inductivism and falsificationism to the creation of hypothesis.

The inductivist account of science recognizes five steps which are essential to scientific progress. First, scientists compile a large body of facts from observation and experiment. Using the principle of induction, these facts can be generalized to form the basis for a theory or law. Then, once a theory has been developed, scientists can use the theory as part of a valid logical argument to make new predictions or explanations of phenomena. According to Chalmers, the inductivist account has “a certain appeal” to it, namely, that all of scientific progress can be seen as the result of five fundamental leaps of thought (54). “Its attraction lies in the fact that it does seem to capture in a formal way

In this essay I attempt to answer the following two questions: What is Karl Popper’s view of science? Do I feel that Thomas Kuhn makes important points against it? The two articles that I make reference to are "Science: Conjectures and Refutations" by Karl Popper and "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" by Thomas Kuhn.

Karl Popper is commonly regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of science in the 20th Century. He is well known for his rejection of the inductivist viewpoint of the scientific method, in which one uses observation to propose a law to generalize an observed pattern, and later confirm that law through more observation. Popper states that “induction cannot be logically justified” (Popper 14). Inductivism relies on the process of inductive reasoning which is a logical process in which multiple premises, all thought to be true and found to be true most of the time, are combined to obtain a conclusion and in many cases formulate a law or theory. Popper rejected the inductivist viewpoint in favor of a theory called empirical falsification which holds that a theory can never be proven, but it can be falsified, and therefore it can and needs to be scrutinized through experimentation.

For as far as we know through writings and drawings people have always been interested in doing some kind of science. The word science comes from the Latin word ”scientia”, which means ”knowledge”. The Egyptians, Greek, Chinese and Romans already had ideas about science. Some of these scientific ideas were nicely documented and preserved. Up until the 20th century people used induction1 as means of proof without questioning the principles of induction. This paper is going to explain why according to Popper induction was not the way to do ”good science”. And how Popper thought science

Popper and Kuhn held differing views on the nature of scientific progress. As seen in Popper’s falsification theory, he held that theories can never be proved only disproved or falsified. Once a theory is proved false we move on to the next. Kuhn, on the other, hand argued a new paradigm may solve puzzles better than the old one but you cannot describe the old science as false. Both seem to share the Kantian idea that the really real, independently existing world is completely unknowable. Kuhn further asserts that the empirical world, which is knowable, is partly constructed by our categories and concepts. The fundamental difference in their views are best stated in Kuhn’s own words, “A very different approach to this whole network of problems has been developed by Karl R. Popper who denies the existence of any verification procedures at all. Instead he emphasizes the importance of falsification, i.e., of the test that, because its outcome is negative, necessitates the rejection of an established theory. Clearly, the role thus attributed to falsification is much like the one this essay assigns to anomalous experiences, i.e., to experiences that, by evoking crisis, prepare the way for a new theory. Nevertheless, anomalous experiences may not be identified with falsifying ones.”(Kuhn, 145) As seen by this passage, the fundamental difference between Popper and Kuhn is that Popper disregards “verification” and Kuhn asserts that “falsification” only takes place once a

In this essay I will argue that science and pseudoscience cannot be clearly demarcated: rather that there’s great difficulty and complication on the fringes when asserting strict criteria that distinguishes the two. I will give a brief overview and draw on the arguments made by philosophers of science throughout history and explain why perhaps their criteria are problematic. I will look in depth into ‘creation science’ and why we strongly consider this as pseudoscientific and analyse the more ambiguous peripheries of science such as Freudian psychoanalysis or even economics.

Karl Popper was critical of inductive methods used in science. He argued that there is a chain of justifying arguments that could never be complete, therefore an original statement that is made can never receives the justification that it needs (Popper 505-506). He was a firm believer in the concept of falsification, emphasizing that we can never be sure that a theory is true but we can be sure that a theory is false. He continues to explain that all inductive evidence is limited: we do not observe the universe at all times and in all places. Popper identifies that no matter how many observations are made which confirm a theory there is always potential for future observations to refute the claim (Popper 426). For example, if millions of white swans were observed, using inductive reasoning, we could come up with a theory that all swans are white. However, no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this information does not provide us with justification for the conclusion that all swans are white (Popper 426). Therefore induction cannot yield certainty. For scientists to continue to rely on inductive reasoning to

Assumptions in the title of this essay imply that results, theories and laws resulting from the current system of peer review multiple perspectives produce completely infallible objective truth, this is a false premise. Whilst the group of knowers known as the scientific community have collectively less bias than one lone knower trying to understand the universe, there is still collective and engrained level of institutional bias. The same problems of confirmation bias and expectation are present in a group of knowers just as they are with one single knower. According to Karl Popper (1902-1994) the best way to eliminate any expectation and confirmation bias was to falsify and disprove rather than confirm one’s hypothesis and predictions. Popper argues: no matter how convincing an argument or theory is, all that is needed to disprove it is one piece of valid counterclaiming evidence. Whilst this theory is valid on an individual level, it really becomes an effective tool in the objectivity of science on a large scale. Despite this attempt at objectifying and ‘protecting against’ error and bias it is inadequate due to inherent flaws in the scientific method. Induction, moving from the specific to the general, is the key element in scientific logic. Any theory or law ‘proved’ through this logic has some key flaws: the main flaw being that inductive logic can never be certain of any event happening or of any prediction. Richard van de Lagemaat

This book, ‘What is this Thing called Science?’ is assigned to write a review on the third edition which was published in the year 1999, 1st February by University of Queensland Press. This book is reflects up to date with day today’s contemporary trend and gives a basic introduction on the philosophy of science. This is a very comprehensive book explaining the nature of science and its historical development. It is very informative and a necessary reference when attempting to understand the how science has evolved throughout time. The book is also well organized, and each chapter is concluded with suggestions for further reading. This book is actually a review on the philosophy of science.