Theories of Deterrence in International Crisis

1812 WordsFeb 20, 20187 Pages
The articles for the week looked at theories of deterrence in international crisis in general and the various shades of it in particular. Schelling’s argument, based on classical deterrence theory is that by using manipulative strategies, a nation’s threat will be assumed credible even if the state does not intend to resist. Danilovic on the other hand argued that regional stakes are more important than a refinement of manipulative strategies or state capabilities. According to him, inherent credibility can limit the effectiveness of costly signal. Huth and Russett argue that a defender considers alternatives before using military force when deterrence fails. They agree with Danilovic that relationship between defender and protégé will affect the probability that deterrence will fail/escalate to war. Fearon on the other hand brought a fresh but not entirely different perspective to the arguments. He asserts that classical rational deterrence theory is flawed because it does not account for strategic self-selection in international disputes. Let me talk about the various arguments in detail and how they relate or affect each other. How can a state (defender) persuade another state (challenger) that it is willing to go all out to defend another state (protégé)? Thomas Schelling, one of the earliest deterrence theorists argued that the hardest part about deterrence is communicating intentions. According to him, it is difficult to persuade enemies that one is willing to
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