There Are Instances Of A Priori Knowledge Or Justification?

This author ascribes to the empiricism paradigm. This paradigm is similar to empirical knowing in that it is based on the premise that what is known can be verified through the senses, or

Between the two schools of epistemology, rationalism and empiricism, I am inclined towards the philosophies of rationalism. I am persuaded towards philosophical approaches which are superior at attaining truth. Empiricism relies on observation using the five senses in reasoning to achieve truth. However, in Plato’s Thaetetus, Socrates gives strong arguments for the limitations of human perception. The Canadian legal system, also, recognizes flaws in human observation, which increases my skepticism of empiricism. Conversely, rationalism relies solely on the use of logic and deduction in reasoning. Both, Plato and Socrates stressed the value of rationalism through the ability to know and express combinations of elements through mathematics. Large

In the critique of pure reason, Kant states, “All alternations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect.”1 This statement is interpreted in two different ways: weak readings and strong readings. The weak readings basically suggest that Kant's statement only refer to “All events have a cause”; however, the strong readings suggest that “the Second Analogy is committed not just to causes, but to causal laws as well.”2 To understand the difference between the readings, it is helpful to notice Kant's distinction between empirical laws of nature and universal transcendental principles. Empirical laws have an empirical element that universal transcendental principles cannot imply. On the other hand, empirical experiences require necessity to become a law, accordingly, “the transcendental laws “ground” the empirical laws by supplying them with their necessity.”3In this paper, according to this distinction, I first, argue that the second analogy supports the weak reading, second, show how in Prolegomena he uses the concept of causation in a way that is compatible to the strong reading, and third, investigate whether this incongruity is solvable.

In this paper, I will discuss the truth-belief-justification conceptual analysis of knowledge, which I will refer to as TBJ, Gettier cases, and an example that refutes TBJ. Conceptual analysis is an analysis of a proposition P with given premises to acquire knowledge of that P. The truth-belief-justification analysis of knowledge fails to provide sufficient conditions for someone to possess knowledge. For a condition to be necessary, it has to be satisfied to have knowledge of a proposition. If a condition is sufficient, then the person x will have some information to know something about proposition P. Jointly sufficient conditions are conditions that all need to be satisfied together to have knowledge about some P. They are necessary and supposedly jointly sufficient, but Gettier cases prove that extra conditions on top of TBJ are required to be jointly sufficient.

Therefore, it can be asserted that knowledge gained from causality is not a priori, rather a posteriori, which is knowledge gained from experience and empirical evidence.

Abstract ideas pertaining to epistemology in philosophy are almost as old as the concept of philosophy itself. Dating back to thinkers such as Aristotle, carrying on throughout the medieval period and into modern philosophy, abstracts have always been grappled with. George Berkeley’s epistemology about abstract ideas has historically been one that has drawn the attention of many other scholars and philosophical thinkers. His thoughts on ideas, specifically his expansion of Locke’s general abstract ideas, are still argued to this very day. His critique of Locke’s view of abstract ideas and ideas in general, is successful in refuting his claims, and is validated in the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, and can be expanded upon in another one of Berkeley’s works, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.

In everyday life, people often claim knowledge of various facts and experiences. However, despite the regularity of such claims, it is difficult to articulate what knowledge specifically is and what conditions are necessary to constitute knowledge of a specific fact or event. One set of conditions for knowledge, known as justified true belief, states that a person knows something if that thing is true, if they believe it, and if they are justified in believing it (Gettier 345). This theory, however, was shown to be problematic by the philosopher Edmund Gettier. By proposing two examples, Gettier showed that the conditions of justified true belief are not sufficient to establish knowledge (345-346). Although Gettier found this flaw, he did not propose any alternate conditions of knowledge to add to or replace those of justified true belief (346). This is where Nozick’s idea of knowledge, presented in “”Knowledge” from Philosophical Explanations,” becomes relevant. Nozick’s conditions for knowledge attempt to define knowledge without being swayed by cases such as the Gettier examples. In this paper, I will first summarize Nozick’s conception of knowledge as well as some of the reasoning for including each condition. I will then try to find an example to show that Nozick’s conditions, although more widely applicable to knowledge than justified true

It is normal that the peruser will take the crucial proclamations upon confidence, similarly as he would take explanations concerning a law of electrical activity in the event that they were proclaimed by a Marconi or an Edison; and, taking the announcements upon confidence, that he will demonstrate their reality by following up on them without dread or delay. Each man or lady who does this will absolutely get rich; for the science thus connected is a correct science, and disappointment is outlandish. For the advantage, nonetheless, of the individuals who wish to examine philosophical speculations thus secure a coherent reason for confidence, I will here refer to specific experts.

This question concerns the most important issue in epistemology – perhaps the only important question, as far as practical living is concerned, which has the ability provide certainty to our existence and meaning. One famous view I shall explore and defend in this paper is Gettier’s. He suggests that the tripartite analysis, which states that knowledge is a justified true belief, taken together, is not sufficient to constitute knowledge. However, I am aware that this view has not gone unopposed either and I will confront these issues to show that no conditions will ever be certain or universal enough to clarify a new conceptual justification for knowledge.

In the selection, ‘Skeptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding’, David Hume poses a problem for knowledge about the world. This question is related to the problem of induction. David Hume was one of the first who decided to analyze this problem. He starts the selection by providing his form of dividing the human knowledge, and later discusses reasoning and its dependence on experience. Hume states that people believe that the future will resemble the past, but we have no evidence to support this belief. In this paper, I will clarify the forms of knowledge and reasoning and examine Hume’s problem of induction, which is a challenge to Justified True Belief account because we lack a justification for our

Prerequisite is best described as something that is required as a prior condition. In this case, it is whether explanation, described as a reason or justification given for an action, belief, dynamic or phenomena is considered a prerequisite for prediction; which is an assertion of a future state, sequence of events, or emerging dynamic. This paper will seek to answer this question through two areas of knowledge; Human and Natural Sciences arguing that depending on specific cases, it is apparent that for certain predictions an explanation is necessary, while for others it is not.

Empiricism, in contrast, argue that the rationalists' idea that all knowledge is present at birth, from such an innate source, is invalid . Instead, they argue that knowledge is attained through sensory experience. Empiricists also find problems with the rationalists' mathematical and logical model of knowledge. They argue that these claims, as well as their stand-point on absolute truths, do not provide us with any new, viable, information alone. The problem with this is that rationalism can only provide us with information that is already known. Unlike rationalists, empiricists rely on synthetic statements. A synthetic statement

Empiricism is based from sensory experience and observed facts. This view emphasizes that “scientific knowledge can be derived only from sensory experience” (Alligood, 2014, p. 15). Examples of sensory experience are seeing, feeling and hearing facts. This approach is labeled the research-then-theory strategy. An example that Alligood provides is that “formulating a differential diagnosis requires collecting the facts and then devising a list of possible theories to explain the facts” (2014, p. 16). Empiricists believe that reason alone does not give knowledge (Markie, 2017).

Evidence implies that an entity presents itself to the knowing cognition of man in such a way that it can be looked at in a direct and immediate manner and be regarded as meaningful. Evidence originates when a given, in its disclosure, is experienced as sense by the human soul, by means of an immediate intuition or observation. The correlation between intuition and the given in its disclosure, constitutes the experience called evidence, and is therefore a composite factor of evidence (Theron, 1995).

The production of knowledge is a process that occurs through a sequence of related actions, these series of actions allows for the Ways of Knowing to interact in a way that works to develop the knowledge that is being produced. From the prescribed title we can claim that while the Ways of Knowing may appear to be acting in isolation when forming knowledge, they are actually working in a variety of different ways in the construction and formation. In some cases, the Ways of Knowing are interacting so closely together that it is often hard to differentiate between them, for example emotion and reason, or imagination and memory. Given the right circumstances faith can be isolated to a point where it can be acting by itself to produce knowledge. However, this knowledge is often deemed as unreliable, due to faith being seen as one of the more “subjective” ways of knowing. This inability to differentiate the ways of knowing from each other during the production of knowledge, raises the questions “Can any knowledge in any Area of Knowledge be produced by a single Way of Knowing?” and “Is it possible to distinguish between Ways of Knowing if they are working together?”. While reason is used in almost all production of knowledge, it is the other Ways of Knowing used that can determine whether the knowledge is reliable or not, as some Ways of Knowing are more subjective than others. This essay will attempt to