There is a general discord among stakeholders on the definition of irregular warfare and where the

Knowledge is the key to being able to come up with an effective plan. Therefore, the more knowledge held the better the plan will be. When it comes to irregular warfare, Marines will need to have knowledge on many different things, the first being the enemy. Acquiring every detail possible about the enemy will give Marines an understanding of what exactly the enemy is capable of with the numbers, assets, and leadership they have. Second is the enemy’s target population. Having a greater knowledge on the population will allow Marines to understand how the enemy might use the resources available to sway the population. The last piece of knowledge is history. General James Mattis said, “We have been fighting on this planet for 5,000 years and we should take advantage of their experience.” By studying and obtaining the knowledge of conflicts throughout history, Marines will be able to use that information to devise a course of

The Marine Corps ability to execute in such an environment hinges on the MAGTF’s center of gravity, the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and specifically its ‘game-changer’, the MV-22 Osprey. The unique capabilities of this aircraft, especially when coupled with the refueling capability of the C-130, truly provide a unique and efficient method to flow forces over distances inconceivable merely a generation ago. In this instance, the aircraft is the innovation: determining to apply a unique capability in regions of instability is simply logical. However, the semantics of what qualifies innovation is inconsequential. Marines, deployed as a self-contained package, with all of their associated things, can rapidly respond to crisis, bridge gaps between

2. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) counterbalances the Defense Departments tendency to focus on winning conventional conflicts rather than irregular wars by empowering those small nations to improve the security of their countries to prevent conflicts from happening. The NDS focuses on the different irregular warfare tactics that can be used by our enemies in the strategic environment. It gives us guidance on what we need to do to prevent the use of these irregular warfare tactics. It was not until the last decade that the U.S. military started fighting the irregular wars; our Special Forces units were the ones that were fighting the unconventional wars. The U.S. military has had a difficult time changing its focus on fighting conventional wars to fighting irregular wars. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military became very experienced in guerrilla warfare tactics. However, when that war ended the focus shifted back to fighting the conventional wars and that experience was lost. Now, because of the lack of experience, the U.S. military is having a difficult time fighting the unconventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The book’s body is divided into six main sections, not including the introductory and conclusion chapters. These sections are aptly named and reflect Krulak’s views of the Marine Corps and what they are as a whole. The sections are: The Thinkers, The Innovators, The Improvisers, The Penny-Pinchers, The Brothers and The Fighters.

Conventional warfare follows the single battle concept, where two or more well defined forces using weapons that target the opposing force. The contiguous battle-space is well defined with a deep, close and rear area allowing the force commander to array forces that can be visually displayed in a linear graphic. This does not hold true in an unconventional warfare, where the rear area may also be the close and deep fight and forces may target the civilian population either through direct, indirect or propaganda attacks. The will of the people play an important part in unconventional warfare and their support to either force is equally important. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the Marine Corps force in readiness is capable

Irregular warfare brings many unusual situations and circumstances that the majority of the United States Marines would not normally experience in the American way of life. For instances, there is a nine year old Arabic child holding an RPG aimed at your convoy, do you kill him or do you not kill him? This is an immoral decision that has to be made or your fellow Marines may be killed. If you have not been prepared for this situation, you will hesitate and the child will fire the RPG at the convoy. These shock causing situations and circumstances will cause a delay in thinking or decision making which could lead to a life or death situation. Training to overcome gut wrenching situations by training to the mission, the priority of life, and experiences outside of normal life will allow a Marine’s second nature to assist him in the difficult decision to prevent

Purpose. To provide a summary of the Military Review article: States, Societies, Resistance, and Counter Insurgency (COIN).

The forces, national or international, that have been assembled to quell these types of threats are usually more powerful than the organizations they are trying to defeat. Conversely, non-state actors attempt to develop alliances with

The “asymmetry” in asymmetric warfare is an inherently relational concept. It refers to a relative dissimilarity between opponents’ in battle, derived from a difference in relational strength amid warring sides. This asymmetry has tended to be in terms of status and organization; means and resources, goals and objectives; and strategies and tactics. The relationship between the belligerents in today’s conflicts varies in many tactical, strategic and operational levels, which has come to be perceived as changing warfare. This popular perception is that with the rise of asymmetric warfare, conventional warfare had transformed from a customary and symmetric exercise into an irregular, avant-garde, asymmetric experience. In contrast to this perspective, the main argument here is that asymmetric warfare is not a new genus of war that has “risen” in the twentieth century as a distinct revolution in military affairs, but rather, asymmetric warfare is a perennial characteristic of warfare, or set of distinct conflict dynamics in warfare that occasionally surface out of asymmetric strength between opponents in war.

Hybrid threats can be found anywhere in the world, from nation states to failed states, inter mixing with state actors, non-state actors, and rogue actors. While this

Any discussion relating to future conflict and the implications toward the security of the United States must factor in the complexity of numerous multi-dimensional threats, that undermine global stability. The definition of IW as stated in the Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare follows, “A form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility of and/or the legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military operations and other capabilities to seek asymmetric advantages, in order to erode and adversary’s power, influence and will.” This definition for irregular warfare (IW) suggests anything other than conventional warfare in broad terms which perpetuates confusion in the relationship between counter-insurgency (COIN) and IW. Some governmental agencies view COIN as an entirely separate entity and not a sub-component of IW, or they view COIN and IW as the same. This confusion complicates efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy to defeat irregular threats. To facilitate understanding of the similarities and inherent differences between COIN and IW, military professionals must recognize first and foremost that COIN occupies a component within IW and is not a separate type of warfare. The definition of IW requires rewording to change the context relating to how the U.S. views and employs IW in order to

The combined characteristics of both Irregular Warfare (IW) and Regular Warfare (RW) define Hybrid Threat (HT). It is the most comprehensive form of threat. During the Korean War, North Korea (NK) fought with conventional equipment and tactics. Now, NK is threatening to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).This has created a hybrid threat to the United States, and rest of the world. HT is the co-existence of IW and RW and this poses the most complex and multi-dimensional Operational Environment.

The 'Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) case study is regarding the U.S-Philippines partnership in counter-terrorism (CT) operations that took place from 2002-2011. The CT operation was titled as 'Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) and was conducted by the partnership of Philippine security forces and US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). The CT cooperation took place at three levels, tactical, operational, and strategic. The role of JSOTF was that of 'advise and assist' whereby ground operations were conducted by the Philippine forces. The US cooperation for CT in Philippines was guided by the Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and a policy and action framework to act as a binding framework for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational CT operations using full range of military operational capacity. The OEF-P was also conducted by incorporating JP 5-0 principles and guidelines of engagement. The OEF-P took place in Southern Philippines. Following is an assessment how the US forces used termination, military end state, and objectives of operational design (Joint Pub 5-0, page III-18) to develop and refine their operational approach.

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of

Giulio Douhet, in his seminal treatise on air power titled The Command of the Air, argued, “A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.” The United States (US) military establishment has been asking itself this exact question for hundreds of years, in an attempt to be better postured for the future. From the Civil War, through the American Indian Wars, and up until World War II (WWII) the American military’s way of war consisted of fighting traditional, or conventional, wars focused on total annihilation of an enemy. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift from the traditional framework towards one that can properly address non-traditional, or irregular wars. While the US maintains a capability to conduct conventional warfare, the preponderance of operations where the US military has been engaged since WWII have been irregular wars. Therefore, this question articulated by Douhet, as to understanding the character of the next war in order to properly plan, train, and equip, is certainly germane to the current discussion of regular war versus irregular war. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the questions remains, which will dominate the future and therefore, garner further funding and priority. Based on the current threats and the US role as a superpower, the US