Thomas Nagel What Is It Like To Be A Bat Summary

Consciousness, Thomas Nagel states, “is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.” Here he refers particularly to phenomenal consciousness, which Block defines as “perceptual experiences,” and Nagel describes as “something that it is to be.’ This experiential element appears to present a challenge to the physicalist assertion that all mental processes are explicable in terms of physical brain states, biochemical reactions and the laws of physics. Frank Jackson presents this argument in his 1982 thesis Epiphenomenal Qualia. Whilst Jackson’s argument occupies a seminal position in philosophy of mind, whether he adds anything new to knowledge of the nature of conscious experience, is debateable. Thomas Nagel’s What is it like to

“What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” is American philosopher, Thomas Nagel’s, opinion on the widely debated mind-body problem. Nagel introduces the paper by explaining what it means for something to be conscious. He defines consciousness as an organism’s ability for there to be something it is like to be that organism. Using his definition of consciousness Nagel suggests that physicalism cannot be successfully defended using the popular reductionism theory. This is because in order to be defended a physical account must be given to phenomenological features themselves. This leads Nagel to his argument, “Every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will

Thomas Nagel states that human beings have a “natural expression” for the sense that life is absurd (Nagel 29). In his essay, simply titled “The Absurd”, Nagel argues that this natural presumption is true, but not for the reasons commonly given: the smallness and brevity of our lives. Instead, our lives are absurd because they feature an inevitable conflict between our feeling that life lacks justification and our inability to disengage with life despite this feeling. I argue that Nagel mistakenly includes awareness in his philosophical definition of absurdity. Nonetheless, his essay is an insightful read about the nature of human life.

Nagel then proceeds with his argument by demonstrating why we cannot know ?what it is like to be a bat?. A human has an imagination and could therefore imagine what it would be like to have the characteristics of a bat. However, a human cannot imagine what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Nagel supports this by saying, ?if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task.? (p.536). I agree with Nader on this point. In order for me to experience what it would be like to be a bat I would have to make the actual transformation to a bat and there is no way for me to do that. The only other possible way for this to occur would be by a proper explanation about the mind of a bat but this too

Many philosophers have considered the mystery of consciousness to be a “hard problem.” In “The Hornswoggle Problem,” Patricia Churchland rejects the characterization of consciousness as a uniquely hard problem, and asserts her belief that arguing the unknown nature of consciousness, absent any scientific evidence is an argument from ignorance. A proponent of the “hard problem” would instead argue that consciousness possesses a subjective aspect that makes it uniquely different from all other problems. In this paper, it is my contention that Churchland is correct to reject the ‘hard’ problem argument; and without any objective inquiry or research, this “hard problem” argument lacks needed intellectual vigor, and tends to further

Thomas Nagel’s “Moral Luck” challenges the Kantian idea that morality is immune from luck by defining and supporting the concept of ‘moral luck.’ Nagel claims that moral luck occurs when “a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment.” His argument is as follows:

This essay examines Thomas Nagel’s paper, Moral Luck, and aims to dissect the assumptions and arguments presented. Moral Luck challenges the Kantian idea that morality is immune from luck by defining and supporting the concept of ‘moral luck.’ Nagel claims that moral luck occurs when “a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment.” This essay begins by presenting Nagel’s argument and supporting claims and is followed by my analytical critique. Though Nagel highlights some provocative questions and scenarios, I will argue that one of his premises makes an assumption that is rather unsubstantiated. I then speculate how Nagel might defend his argument in response. The essay is concluded with my own interpretation of Nagel’s argument and moral luck as a fully realized phenomenon.

The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)

Theodore Roethke’s poem ‘The Bat’ clearly focuses on the animal the bat and effectively conveys through the latter an important message to the reader. One could interpret this poem in various ways; however a prominent theme would be that every

In 1971, Thomas Nagel wrote a paper titled ‘The Absurd.’ He argues that the nous of the absurd arises from two belligerent propensities in us: the first is explained as, ‘we take our lives’, or at slightest the ventures we take on in our lives, and that we cannot circumvent. In addition, the second propensity is that we are capable, upon undermining or reflecting, the explanations for any of our ventures in life. Furthermore, from a radical point of view outside people’s interests nothing can be justified; however we are skilled enough in taking up such a perspective reflection. What more can be said is that this absurdity is an ailment we are predestined to by virtue of our reflective nature. Though in general understanding to the idea,

There is a human organism located exactly where you are located. Eric Olson argues that you are identical to that organism. This view is known as animalism. His “thinking animal” argument takes the following form: (1) There is a human animal where you are located; (2) If there’s a human animal where you are located, it is thinking; (3) The only thing thinking where you are located is you; and (4) So, you are a human animal. One argument, which exhibits parallel reasoning and boasts premises motivated in the exact same way, may be employed to resist Olson’s argument. In this paper I will show that this argument, which I will now call the Guanilo-Style argument, is structurally

Thomas Nagel covers the issues of the purpose of humanity in his piece, “Free Will”. There are several topics that Nagel covers as he starts out hopeful of the idea of free will itself. Free will defined by Merriam Webster as freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention. All our lives we are taught that we do things on our own accord and that we have the right to choose the things that happen to us. He gives the example of choosing between a peach and some cake. This, actually, is not a real example of free will, but rather personal preference that has been predetermined from our upbringing, the environment we are placed in and even and even genetics. I could choose the peach because I know that my predetermined genes will eventually make me into a diabetic so I want to stay as healthy as I can. That in itself does not give me a very wide scope of choices, but more or less narrows it. As he goes on, he explains that we all want to think that we have “free will”. We want to think that we have our own choices and the ability to drive our own lives at our own expense. Yet, when it comes down to it, that is not the case at all. According to his take on it, nothing would be able to be predicted about the future if there was such a thing as free will. A simpler way to look at it is the discussion we had towards the very beginning of the course. We discussed how everything seems to come from something, so how can something come

In “Death”, Thomas Nagel debates and argues that the nature of death is bad, but not intrinsically bad. He explains one of his hypothesis with death and how it is a bad thing. It is a loss of life that deprives the person that was once alive of future fortunes. “Death is an evil at all, it cannot be because of its positives features, but because of what it deprives us of.” (pg.74)

In his text “What is it like to be a bat?” of 1974 Thomas Nagel claims that consciousness is the

Many philosophers agree that consciousness provides a very difficult problem in understanding the mind-body concept; this is why from a materialist’s point of view, the problem is not sufficient enough for giving one’s attention. Thomas Negal on the other hand, finds the problem rather interesting. Negal’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” proposes a number of arguments, one of them which states that the subjective approach to the mind-body problem should be abandoned for a more objective approach (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). The purpose of this essay is to show that Negal’s arguments are sufficient in describing whether it is indeed possible to know what it is like to be a bat, portraying his arguments in an orderly fashion, and ultimately