Thomas Nagel Bat

But, in another section of Jackson’s article, he refers back to the famous article What is it Like to Be a Bat?, written by the philosopher Thomas Nagel, to help strengthen his argument against physicalism. Jackson states how there is no amount of physical information that could possibly tell us what it is like to be anything other than a human being (Jackson 416-417). For instance, the dualist would say that I cannot possibly understand what it is like to actually be a dog. Even if I were able to obtain all the possible physical information there is about dogs, according to the dualist, I would still be missing the actual experience of being a dog. However, the physicalist would still argue that, although I am not a dog, I can still know the physical information about what it is like to be a dog and know how they perceive and experience everything in life. Then if, some day, I

Consciousness, Thomas Nagel states, “is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.” Here he refers particularly to phenomenal consciousness, which Block defines as “perceptual experiences,” and Nagel describes as “something that it is to be.’ This experiential element appears to present a challenge to the physicalist assertion that all mental processes are explicable in terms of physical brain states, biochemical reactions and the laws of physics. Frank Jackson presents this argument in his 1982 thesis Epiphenomenal Qualia. Whilst Jackson’s argument occupies a seminal position in philosophy of mind, whether he adds anything new to knowledge of the nature of conscious experience, is debateable. Thomas Nagel’s What is it like to

He explains that reductionism only accounts for reducing the mind to physics. However, it leaves out consciousness. Therefore, according to Nagel, reductionism is inaccurate because it excludes subjective experience. In order to explain his point, Nagel provides the reader with an analogy using bats. He states that the he is able to imagine himself with webbed arms, which permit him to fly around at night catching insects in his mouth. He expands, and says he is able to imagine that he has poor vision and has to use sonar to communicate, and finally he adds that he is able to imagine hanging upside down in an attic. However Nagel clarifies that these things would only explain what it would be like for him to be a bat. The question he wants answered is what it is like for a bat to be a bat? (423). He explains how if one tries to image this, they are restricted by their own mind. By presenting this information Nagel is able to support his claim because one cannot look and behave like another organism without changing their fundamental structure. One’s experiences cannot be anything like the experience from the point of view of another organism

Nagel then proceeds with his argument by demonstrating why we cannot know ?what it is like to be a bat?. A human has an imagination and could therefore imagine what it would be like to have the characteristics of a bat. However, a human cannot imagine what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Nagel supports this by saying, ?if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task.? (p.536). I agree with Nader on this point. In order for me to experience what it would be like to be a bat I would have to make the actual transformation to a bat and there is no way for me to do that. The only other possible way for this to occur would be by a proper explanation about the mind of a bat but this too

Many philosophers have considered the mystery of consciousness to be a “hard problem.” In “The Hornswoggle Problem,” Patricia Churchland rejects the characterization of consciousness as a uniquely hard problem, and asserts her belief that arguing the unknown nature of consciousness, absent any scientific evidence is an argument from ignorance. A proponent of the “hard problem” would instead argue that consciousness possesses a subjective aspect that makes it uniquely different from all other problems. In this paper, it is my contention that Churchland is correct to reject the ‘hard’ problem argument; and without any objective inquiry or research, this “hard problem” argument lacks needed intellectual vigor, and tends to further

Perceived view can be seen as the opposite of received view. In perceived view, also known as interpretive views, phenomenology and constructivism are two major characteristics. Phenomenology can be described as “emphasis of the appearance of things and not things themselves, each individual experience is unique, and can have multiple interpretations of reality” (Bargagliotti, n.d.). Overall, this means that people can have different interpretations of a same experience.

Churchland begins her article by explaining Thomas Nagel belief of having a point of view.

A long time ago the difference between perception and reality was defined as the act of understanding in contrast to the act of being real. Reality could be tricky; most of us including myself depending on scenarios of our lives tend to give in to ideas which are not applicable to reality as a whole. The best example of this is written in the short story “All Over” by Guy de Maupassant. In which his main character Lormerin is very self conscious and narcissistic also Lise de Vance, a former old love plays a big role in hurting Lormerin ego and opening his eyes by showing him, his real self. Many would say that when reality knocks it could be harsh and confusing. In the next couple of

Theodore Roethke’s poem ‘The Bat’ clearly focuses on the animal the bat and effectively conveys through the latter an important message to the reader. One could interpret this poem in various ways; however a prominent theme would be that every

There is a human organism located exactly where you are located. Eric Olson argues that you are identical to that organism. This view is known as animalism. His “thinking animal” argument takes the following form: (1) There is a human animal where you are located; (2) If there’s a human animal where you are located, it is thinking; (3) The only thing thinking where you are located is you; and (4) So, you are a human animal. One argument, which exhibits parallel reasoning and boasts premises motivated in the exact same way, may be employed to resist Olson’s argument. In this paper I will show that this argument, which I will now call the Guanilo-Style argument, is structurally

The material I chose to research was Hard Maple, which is a type of wood. Maple is used for “flooring (from basketball courts and dance-floors to bowling alleys and residential), veneer, paper (pulpwood), musical instruments, cutting boards, butcher blocks, workbenches, and other turned objects and specialty wood items” [5]. Maple has just recently with in the past 10-20 years started becoming popular with baseball bat manufacturers. Ash was the previous popular wood used in the making of baseball bats.

A human being is described as being a creature capable of questioning concepts such as “who am I” and “why am I here” in order to give meaning to their existence. (Creech Ph.D., 2015)

One of the most controversial topics in modern philosophy revolves around the idea of non-human animals being considered human people. Controversy over what makes up an actual person has been long debated. However, society deems it as a set of characteristics. The average person normally does not realize how complicated a question this is, and in fact many scientists, philosophers, and individuals will side differently on this specific topic. I personally do not believe that animals are capable of being human people, but throughout this argumentative paper I will address critical views presented from multiple philosophers on why this seems to be the case.

Self-consciousness implies a state of mind that makes the individual aware of how others perceive him, and thus influences how he sees himself. In a sub-section of the Phenomenology of Spirit entitled ‘Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage’, Hegel describes the development of self-consciousness, and that while he agrees with the notion put forth by earlier philosophers that an individual is aware of himself as a conscious being and a subject, he also advances the argument that other beings (and fellow subjects) are objects from the point of view of the primary subject (self). In addition, within the realm of the social arena the individual is often locked into a struggle for the affirmation of his