Thomas Nagel 's Moral Luck

Hobbes and Kant both give a different account of the foundations of morality. Drawing from Hobbes’ Leviathan and Kant’s Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, I will compare their understanding of the foundations of morality. I will discuss the conflicting accounts of the role played by reason versus the role played by desire and inclination in the determination of what is good, evil, right or wrong. Hobbes claims that ordinary experiences establish human beings as self-interested and are driven by desire or aversion and that is why morality is grounded by subjective self-interests. On the other hand, Kant provides a purely rational principle for ordinary views about unconditional moral value, morality has a universal law that applies to all rational beings at all times. The following paper will identify and explain the key points and sources of difference between Hobbes and Kant. First, I will explain both understandings of morality. Second, I will describe how the account of the foundations of morality differs in human nature, rationality and conceptions of morality. I will, in conclusion, argue that Hobbes’ account of morality best works with our ordinary experiences and moral convictions.

Throughout this paper, I will contrast and compare two moral theories in attempt to uncover what one provides a better argument and can be applied as a universal moral code. The two moral theorists Immanuel Kant and J.S Mill have created two distinctly different theories on morality and how to develop a universal moral code. Both theories focus on intentions and consequences. Kant believes that the intentions and reasons of our actions can be measured and defined as morally correct, where as Mill believes that our intentions really play no role in morality, and that we should focus on the consequences and outcomes of our actions to evoke the most happiness for the most people. Even though both philosophers make incredibly different

P1. Nothing or almost nothing a person does is under his or her control; it is merely a matter of luck.

Let take a simple example from Nagel’s paper to acquire a brief understanding on the idea of moral luck. Driver A and B were both drunk when driving home. Drive A passed the red light and killed a child who was passing the street while driver B got home

When thinking about morality, it is necessary to consider how aspects from both nature and nurture, along with free will, may form ones moral beliefs and dictate ones moral actions. To understand how moral beliefs as well as actions formulate and operate within individuals and societies, it is imperative that a general definition of morality is laid out. Morality, then, can be defined as ones principles regarding what is right and wrong, good or bad. Although an individual may hold moral beliefs, it is not always the case that moral actions follow. Therefore, in this essay I aim to provide an explanation that clarifies the two and in doing so I also hope to further the notion that one’s moral framework is a product of all three factors; nature, nurture, and free will. The first part of this essay will flush out what exactly morality it and how it manifests similarly across individuals and differently across individuals. Contrariwise, I will then explain how morality manifests similarly across societies and differently across societies. Alongside presenting the information in this order, I will trace morality back to primordial times to showcase how morality has evolved and developed since then, not only from a nature-based standpoint, but also from a

Thomas Nagel’s article on death examined why he thinks death is considered a bad thing. He first considered that society would be indifferent to the death of people who are comatose for an extended period, versus those who immediately die. He also points out that few people are sad that they weren’t born prior to their birth. Essentially, anyone born significantly earlier than they were, would have been someone else. As a result, the time preceding to their birth does not prevent that individual from living. There is no expectation of life before we existed, but Nagel thinks death is a bad thing because that person could have potentially done more with their life.

In 1971, Thomas Nagel wrote a paper titled ‘The Absurd.’ He argues that the nous of the absurd arises from two belligerent propensities in us: the first is explained as, ‘we take our lives’, or at slightest the ventures we take on in our lives, and that we cannot circumvent. In addition, the second propensity is that we are capable, upon undermining or reflecting, the explanations for any of our ventures in life. Furthermore, from a radical point of view outside people’s interests nothing can be justified; however we are skilled enough in taking up such a perspective reflection. What more can be said is that this absurdity is an ailment we are predestined to by virtue of our reflective nature. Though in general understanding to the idea,

The leading premise claimed by Singer is a simple thought that provides clear direction or suggestion of one’s moral implication: "if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out" (Taylor, 2009). We can assume that no matter one's ethical views, wading into the water is nothing in comparison to the death of a child. The impact of Singer's argument relies on a carefully worded, yet agreeable set of claims that has a range of reasonable objections. Singer emphasizes the use of common sense in making judgments about moral and ethical choices and does this by daring the reader to question their own views of morality.

21. One of the most hotly debated criticisms of Kohlberg’s moral reasoning theory is that the theory is based on a longitudinal study of only

In “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” Philippa Foot argues that moral judgments are in hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical imperatives. For Kant, categorical imperatives are actions that are good in themselves and do not depend on desires, while, hypothetical imperatives are “actions that are good to some purpose” (306). According to Foot, hypothetical imperatives alone serve as the basis of moral judgments because categorical imperatives give us no reason to obey them. In this paper, I will explain foots argument that moral judgments are hypothetical imperatives. I will then argue that that Foot’s theory of moral judgments fails in two ways. First, placing moral judgments in hypothetical imperatives fails to designate moral from immoral contingent ends, and second, the hypothetical imperative weakens morality by making it too optional. To show this, I will first argue that placing moral judgments in hypothetical imperatives begs the question of what is the moral basis of its own contingent end. I will then propose a decision procedure for determining the moral value of the contingent ends of hypothetical imperatives. Then I will argue that the Leningrad does not solve and that basing moral judgments in hypothetical imperatives still makes morality too optional.

7. Kant’s ethics gives us firm standards that do not depend on results; it injects a humanistic element into moral decision making and stresses the importance of acting on principle and from a sense of duty. Critics, however, worry that (a) Kant’s view of moral worth is too restrictive, (b) the categorical imperative is not a sufficient test of right and wrong, and (c) distinguishing between treating people as means and respecting them as ends in themselves may be difficult in practice.

He persuasively unveils imperatives both universal and hypothetical, the elements of unconventional practical reason, and examples of extreme controversy that force people to consider situations from a previously unconsidered moral perspective; however, Kant’s initial moral work is not without its critique: ranging from

Nagel proposes that ends, or final outcomes, though they might not be under one’s control, should not be our responsibility. He supports his argument by stating that the consequences are not within our control after actions are carried out. For example, he argues that upon the surrounding circumstances changing the final result will change as well. He uses the

I assert that for a moral system to be necessary and applicable, there must exist a moral agent who possesses both the desire and the ability to choose. By denoting certain actions or ways of being as better, a moral system implies that there are also other potential actions and ways of being that are worse. The individual must choose between them. Without this element of choice, an action has no moral qualification. For example, a computer acts, but it does not choose its action. Consequently, while a computer can be judged better or worse in its ability to carry out an action, it cannot be judged responsible for the action. Rather, the person who uses or creates the computer is in fact responsible, for it is that person who chooses for it to act in a particular way. In a moral system, choice, responsibility, and the viability of judgment are linked inextricably.

The second level of moral development is the conventional moral reasoning; “Beginning in middle school, up to middle age – most people end up here” (“Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development.”). At this level,