Thucydides Grievances

in an attempt to persuade Athens that an alliance would be mutually beneficial. The Corinthian counter-argument offers rebuttals such as, “’[Corcyra] wanted no allies because her actions were wrong, and she was ashamed of calling in others to witness her own misdoings. / Next we should like you to understand that it would not be right or just for you to receive them as allies.’” (Thucydides, 58-9) The dispute over Corcyra was private and completely based on dialogue. Both speakers referred to values that the Athenians should respect, and in the end no blood was shed. The choice of the speakers suggests that their people had great faith in their argumentative skill, and that skill is demonstrated by the fact that Athens initially did not favor an alliance with Corcyra but changed its mind just before coming to a decision.

Action from necessity is a constantly recurring theme in Thucydides’ The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. A sentiment used to explain the growth of the Athenian Empire which some Athenians espoused to an assembly at Sparta best quantifies necessity, “. . . we were necessarily compelled at first to advance the hegemony to where it is—especially by fear, and then by honor, and later by benefit.” (Selected Passages 1.75.3). This claim, referred to as the Athenian Thesis, is used to advance the two following implications: all states act with the motivations of fear, honor and interest and no one can condemn a state for doing so. The Athenian Thesis influences the way many of the Athenian elite structure their patterns of reasoning in both noticeable and subtle ways.

The Peloponnesian war lasted from 431 to 404 B.C. and was profoundly influenced by two Athenian men, Pericles and Alcibiades. Though Pericles and Alcibiades were related by blood they were quite different. Pericles was a diplomat, he approached matters with a level head and tried to find a solution that did not end in bloodshed. Alcibiades was less stable, he either fought, manipulated, or ran when confronted with a problem. Both men spoke eloquently enough to move almost the entire city of Athens, using their words to bend people to their will.  What was different between them was what their will was, one cared about the city and its wellbeing, the other cared about his own wellbeing.

Of course, Thucydides was certainly acquainted with pieces critical of Athenian democracy – the close intellectual relationship between certain of Thucydides’ core concerns, such as empire, and those of the somewhat previous Athenaion Politeia (Athenian Constitution) has long been the custom of such ancient writing. Among teachers of rhetoric were those who claimed openly to have developed a “political science” – what they called politike techne (Parry 1). But the rhetorical formation of politike techne was scarcely involved; it did not rest, as Thucydides supposed any appropriate appreciation of “political science” must, upon a methodical understanding of political structures and their active interaction within larger society. Therefore, Thucydides

There was an increasing concern in the Peloponnesian League that Athens' rapid growth was an opportunistic exploitation of Athenian allies and a direct threat to the League. Well-founded or not, these fears came to a head in 432, when Spartan allies lobbied hard for the League to check Athenian growth by declaring war. At these debates, a Spartan ally from Corinth chastised the perceived aggressive expansion of Athens, stating "(Athenians) are by nature incapable of either living a quiet life themselves or of allowing anyone else to do so."

Amidst an interlude in the fierce struggle for power between the two dominant Greek poleis, Athens and Sparta, the Peloponnesian war, there was unrest. Despite the Peace of Nicias, belligerence between the two states did not cease, but rather took on a new face. While careful to remain within the parameters set several years before in the peace treaty, Athens moved cautiously, but aggressively in establishing alliances, albeit coerced, and strengthening its empire. It was at this juncture that it made its move toward securing the small, weak island-state of Melos, which in its neutral independence suggested danger to the Athenian empire. In a move not of fairness, but of survival, Athens offered the Melians an ultimatum: to be subjugated

The book written by Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, contains two controversial debates between distinguished speakers of Athens. The two corresponding sides produce convincing arguments which can be taken as if produced as an honest opinion or out of self-interest. The two debates must be analyzed separately in order to conclude which one and which side was speaking out of honest opinion or self-interest, as well as which speakers are similar to each other in their approach to the situation.

The Sicilian Expedition is the decisive event in the Peloponnesian war. In fact that is what motivated Thucydide's to record it in his historical records. Thucydides prophesized that it would be `the greatest in all Greek history' and "it was a major turning point for Athens',moreover, it was the `most glorious victory for the winners, and the worst calamity for the loosers.' The outcome was that Athens lost the war which lead to the eventual collapse of her empire and dignity. The Athenians lost the war due to their ill preparedness for the expedition, illogical and hasty decisions, and poor leadership during the expedition.

Thucydides recounts the events that took place during the civil war in Corcyra. In the year 427 tensions between the Democrats and Oligarchs exploded into civil war, both sides hailing allies from all over the world for aid. At first the Oligarchs received aid from large a Peloponnesian naval fleet, which gave the democrats a scare. However, the Democrats receive back up from an ever-larger Athenian fleet, sending the Democrats into a killing frenzy of all who supported the Oligarchy. Thucydides describes the situation during the civil war

The Peloponnesian War pitted the Athenians against the Spartans. The Peloponnesians’ were an alliance of city-states controlled by Sparta. These two powerful city-states became locked in a struggle for dominance of the eastern Mediterranean area. The roots of the conflict and in particular this expedition is highly complex. As Thucydides says in his history of the war, the underlying cause was Spartan fear of Athens' expansive power. But, the triggering event was Athens' aggressive behavior towards Corinth, an ally of Sparta.

The Melian Dialogue is a debate between Melian and Athenian representatives concerning the sovereignty of Melos. The debate did not really occur-the arguments given by each side were of Thucydides own creation. Thus it is reasonable to assume that we can tease out Thucydides' own beliefs. In this paper, I will first extract Thucydides views from the Melian Dialogue and then analyze whether or not these views are well founded.

?Corinth being at the center of all this trading activity, it is no surprise that the city was consistently a great commercial and cultural center.? A description of Corinth by the ancient author Strabo states, ?Corinth is called wealthy because of its commerce, since it is situated on the Isthmus and is master of two harbors, of which the one leads straight to Asia, and the other to Italy; and it makes it easy the exchange of merchandise from both countries that are so far distant from each other? (Strabo).? In his book Roman Corinth, Donald Engels describes Corinth in similar terms, ?From a small beginning, Corinth grew to become the largest city in Greece by the Second century A.D.? It was both an intellectual and cultural center, as well as a vital link in the commercial network of the eastern Mediterranean? (Engels 8).? It was the Vanity Fair of Greece, having objects of exoticism and luxury finding open markets which were visited by every nation in the civilized world;

The city-state built blockades to resist occupation by the Athenian army and sparked revolt elsewhere in the area, in Chalcidice and Bottiaea. Since negotiations failed, the Athenians sent troops into the region by ship. However the Athenians also had their hands full with the Macedonians in the same region and had difficulty suppressing the revolt. When Athens finally made a treaty with Perdiccas, the Macedonian leader, she found herself betrayed as the Macedonians joined alongside the Corinthians, who had come to the defense of the Potidaeans. In spite of all of this, the Athenians were able to recapture control of most of the region with the arrival of reinforcements. Seeing that their own citizens were now trapped, Corinth called a meeting of the Peloponnesian assembly at Sparta. During this meeting the complaints against the Athenian Empire reached their peak. After another meeting a month later the Peloponnesian assembly decided that war was in order. However, it was winter and war did not begin immediately. In fact the Spartans sent three different ambassadors to Athens over the course of the winter in an attempt to secure peace. The Spartans demanded that the Athenians withdraw from Potidaea and that all the city-states in northern Greece be given their freedom. Pericles’ response to this demand was…

Written by the Greek historian Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War is one that tells the story of the war (431-404 BC) which divided the Greek world between Athens and its allies and Lacedaemon. The Melian Dialogue presents two sides and two perspectives that of the Melians neutrality and that of the Athenians’ might. By Thucydides juxtaposing the Athenian’s position to that of the Melians, there is a clear conclusion of which side actions are tactically and morally acceptable. One would argue that the Athenians are immoral for violently plundering the Melian territory because they had the power to do so. However, given the circumstance of trying to defend their empire due to the imbalance of forces, the Athenian actions are not

The establishments of cleruchies had cause much resentment from other Greek states towards Athens. According to Plutarch, this system had relieve “the city of a large number of idlers and agitators and raise the standards of the poorest classes”, but at the same time it implanted amongst the allies “a healthy fear of rebellion”. It also allowed Athens to gain more numbers of hoplites, as only Athenian men with money can become a hoplite soldier. This had increased the military force in Athens and had strengthened Athensʼ hold on her empire, as they were located at strategic points in the Aegean. The worsening relationship between Athensʼ and her allies in the League is due to Athensʼ selfish self interest in developing her imperial power, and this had allow Athens to gradually grow into an empire. This selfish self interest can be seen after the Peace of Callias. At first the aim of the League was, according to Thucydides, ʻto compensate themselves for their losses by ravaging the territory of the King of Persiaʼ, but in 449 BC Persian lost the battle against Cimon in Cyprus and signed a peace treaty called ʻPeace of Calliasʼ. Although this meant that the Leagueʼs aim had been fulfilled, the Athenians argued that the Persians would strike again if the Greeks appeared weak. This argument from Athens had an underlying aim, that was so the Greeks states would not leave