Tonakanian was operating a cab through a contract with United Independent Taxi Drivers Inc. Tonakanian made an illegal left turn and crashed into Emanuele Secci, who was on a motorcycle and was severely injured. Secci alleged that Tonakanian negligently failed to yield to oncoming traffic and that United was vicariously liable for Secci’s negligence. United alleged that Tonakanian was an independent contractor and was was not liable for his negligence.
United’s contract with Tonakanian stated that he was an independent contractor. Tonakanian owned his own cab and paid monthly dues and fees. United maintained the liability insurance for the affiliated taxis. The drivers were required to follow company regulations, rules, and procedures. The
Our client, Sage Rent-A-Car Incorporation, leased a vehicle to Jeffery Calkin. The Defendant, Mr. Calkin was involved in a collision by failing to stop at a stop sign, therefore colliding with Jane White, the Plaintiff. Ms. White filed a negligence law suit against Mr. Calkin and Sage Rent-A-Car Inc. In the complaint, the Plaintiff claims that our client is required to carry insurance under the provisions of the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act and therefore, has the duty to assume liability for the Defendant’s negligent collision. This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint.
In the district court trial, the jury sided with the plaintiff and ruled that the St. Louis Hockey Club was vicariously liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that as per the doctrine of respondeat superior, the defendant was liable for their employee’s negligent actions that led to the plaintiff’s injuries. As part of their
The Plaintiff, Keller, sued the defendant, DeLong. DeLong was driving Kellers car at Tyngsboro, Massachusetts at approximately 11:40p.m. on April 14, 1963, DeLong collided with a utility pole at the side of the highway. The Trial Court ruled that the sole cause of the accident was the fact that the defendant dozed off to sleep and did not awaken in time to avoid collision with the pole. The driver showed no sign he was going to fall asleep. Defendant, Carl DeLong, suddenly and unexpectedly dozed at the time of the occurrence of the accident. Defendant, DeLong, was not found negligent. Vacated; reversed, affirming trial court’s judgment.
The defendant Sage Rent-A-Car leased a vehicle to defendant Jeffery Calkin. However, Mr. Calkin failed to stop at a stop sign, and collided with the plaintiff Jane White. The plaintiff then filed a suit against both defendants due to failure to carry insurance under the New Mexico Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act. Nevertheless, when the defendant Sage Rent-A-Car incorporated, it filed for a surety bond with the superintendent of insurance and is self-insured under
The main issue of this case is to determine if Tricontinental may recover from PwC for negligence. In order to show negligence there must be four requirements that the plaintiff must show. The four requirements are: the defendant owed a duty of care, defendant breached that duty, breach of duty to care caused the plaintiff’s injury, and fourth that damages resulted.
Had he been wearing the safety belt, he would not have been killed. The second defense that Ford Motor Company has is that the purpose of a car is to drive it and not to crash a car so that it spun. Since, the door flew open during a spin, Ford Motor Company was not liable for the death of Chancit. The normal use of a car is not to send it into a spin. The third defense that Ford Motor Company has is that Chancit was suffering from food poisoning and was unwell, that was why he was thrown out of the car. The fourth defense is that the car is meant for normal driving. The safety measures in the car were adequate for normal driving. Since, Chancit was driving in a closed lane and possibly at a speed that was higher than that permitted, Ford Motor Company was no liable. III. The City of Los Angeles is liable of negligence. The sign board it placed said Left lane closed ahead, whereas, it was Right lane closed ahead. The City of Los Angeles had a duty of care to ensure that it placed the correct signs so that motorists were not misguided. There was a breach of duty because the City of Los Angeles placed the wrong sign and this misguided Chancit into an accident. There was direct cause between the placement of the wrong sign and the accident that killed Chancit. There was legal causation. Chancit suffered harm because he was killed. In other words, the City of Los Angeles is guilty of negligence. The court will rule in favor of Chancit and award his widow
The Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging negligent entrustment, against the Defendant, Mr. Franklin. Pl.’s Compl. Count II, (Feb. 23, 2016). The Plaintiff alleged that, on the day of the accident Ms. Johnson was using Mr. Franklin’s vehicle with the knowledge and consent of Mr. Franklin. Pl.’s Compl. at 3 ¶ 7 (Feb. 23, 2016). The Plaintiff stated that on the day of the accident she overheard Ms. Johnson state to the police officer that she was driving her boyfriend’s vehicle, and assumed that he gave her permission to use the vehicle. Def.’s Interrog. No. 10 (Mar. 8, 2016).
The defendant, Kingston High School, is negligent under the Ontario Occupants Liability Act against the plaintiff, Mary. The defendant failed to uphold a duty of care against the plaintiff, which resulted in general and special damages. The plaintiff is owed compensation for medical care and treatment expenses, the economic loss from failing to attend the remainder of the semester of business school, and a loss in prospective wages from future employment.
This claim arises out of a lawsuit filed in Kane County, Illinois involving an incident at Johnny A’s Third Rail Pub, a local pub owned by the Insured, Beslidheje, Inc. Mr. Tefik Ashiku owns and operates the Insured corporate entity. The pub operates out of a building owned by the co-defendant, Junaid Zubairi. Plaintiff’s lawsuit alleges negligence against both Beslidheje, Inc. and Zubairi, claiming that the stairway had insufficient or inoperative lighting at the time she fell.
If Jimmy did give Billy permission, then Jimmy is the bailor and Billy is the bailee, and the benefit is of the bailee (Billy). The standard of care is high (great care) and the standard of proof is low. This could be mutual too, because if Jimmy exchanged the truck to use Billy’s house for a few hours, then they both benefited (same standard of care and of proof as in situation two). But if Billy was supposed to have watched the truck for Jimmy’s benefit, then the benefit would have been for just Jimmy (the bailor); the standard of care would be low (slight care) and the standard of proof is high being liable for gross negligence. This means that Jimmy would have to prove that Billy acted with extreme carelessness. But, if this is the case, then Billy did not have permission, so he had no right to use the truck. If I understand the textbook correctly, then the use without permission is technically a “tort of conversion” on Billy, which makes him liable for the damages. Even If he used great care and parked properly in a parking zone, and wasn’t guilty of negligence, Billy is liable/responsible for the major damages done by the drunk driver slamming into the truck. The truck would have to have been parked properly in a “parking zone;” otherwise, there could be issues about that. In conclusion, it looks like Timmy is liable for the alignment, the valet (hotel Hyatt) for the scratches, and Billy for the other major damages. Yikes! What a messy
In this case, the accident is the proximate cause of Mrs. Smith’s injuries and the medical providers are the intervening cause, as their breach of duty exacerbated Mrs. Smith’s injury to the point of permanent disability and disfigurement.
The negligence claims against the Radio Station disc jockey. The disc Jockey was liable for misfeasance owed a duty of care toward the young listener in the contest, breached that duty of care by disregarding youthfulness carelessness by the driving unsafe on the Highway to meet in one location just to win a prize which cause the younger driver that performing a legal act, and the resulted in harm cause automobile accident that cause the young listeners
Ragnarr, must prove to the court that due to the states negligent actions he will consequently experience economic loss. Causation refers to whether the defendants conduct (or omission), in this case The State Of Victoria, caused the resulting harm or damage. The common law of negligence obliges instigation of causation for the purposefulness of attaching legal accountability. Another element that must be proven is that it is applicable for the scope of the negligent persons liability to extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability ). As it is a case of negligence the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, is weighed upon our client, the plaintiff Mr. Ragnarr. Even if the ‘but for’ test is applied to the current situation in the case, the outcome would be that the loss suffered by the plaintiff would have only occurred if the defendant acted negligently, which they did, and therefore if they hadn’t have acted in that way, then our client would not have been publicly humiliated by the State Of Victoria as a result. The court must deliberate whether it is suitable to extend the scope of the defendant negligence to the harm caused to the plaintiff and our client, Mr. Ragnarr. The harm that occurred, or similar harm, must have been foreseeable in order for it to reach within the scope of liability upon the
There are two defences to an action in negligence: contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk. (FoBL, 2005, p83) This case only involves contributory negligence.
The importance of mutuality of obligation was demonstrated in O’Kelly where it was held that even though the relationship had many of the characteristics of a contract of employment, the workers were self-employed because mutuality of obligation was missing. The test was applied in a strict sense in this case; this is ‘highly disadvantageous’ for workers with irregular patterns; as demonstrated in Dacas and Bunce. However, in Dacas it was suggested that an implied contract could exist between the end user and complainant because mutuality could be created if the individual had