The Plaintiff, Keller, sued the defendant, DeLong. DeLong was driving Kellers car at Tyngsboro, Massachusetts at approximately 11:40p.m. on April 14, 1963, DeLong collided with a utility pole at the side of the highway. The Trial Court ruled that the sole cause of the accident was the fact that the defendant dozed off to sleep and did not awaken in time to avoid collision with the pole. The driver showed no sign he was going to fall asleep. Defendant, Carl DeLong, suddenly and unexpectedly dozed at the time of the occurrence of the accident. Defendant, DeLong, was not found negligent. Vacated; reversed, affirming trial court’s judgment.
Our client, Sage Rent-A-Car Incorporation, leased a vehicle to Jeffery Calkin. The Defendant, Mr. Calkin was involved in a collision by failing to stop at a stop sign, therefore colliding with Jane White, the Plaintiff. Ms. White filed a negligence law suit against Mr. Calkin and Sage Rent-A-Car Inc. In the complaint, the Plaintiff claims that our client is required to carry insurance under the provisions of the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act and therefore, has the duty to assume liability for the Defendant’s negligent collision. This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint.
The defendant Sage Rent-A-Car leased a vehicle to defendant Jeffery Calkin. However, Mr. Calkin failed to stop at a stop sign, and collided with the plaintiff Jane White. The plaintiff then filed a suit against both defendants due to failure to carry insurance under the New Mexico Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act. Nevertheless, when the defendant Sage Rent-A-Car incorporated, it filed for a surety bond with the superintendent of insurance and is self-insured under
Jeffery Calkin, the defendant, leased a vehicle for our client, Sage Rent-A-Car Inc., and was involved in a car accident with the plaintiff, Jane White. A negligence suit was filed by Ms. White against Mr. Calkin and our client, Sage Rent-A-Car Inc. The suit claims that our client is required to carry insurance and therefore has a duty to assume responsibility for this accident under the provisions of the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act (MFRA).
In the district court trial, the jury sided with the plaintiff and ruled that the St. Louis Hockey Club was vicariously liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that as per the doctrine of respondeat superior, the defendant was liable for their employee’s negligent actions that led to the plaintiff’s injuries. As part of their
Paul Imbree, the plaintiff , a supervising licensed driver has suffered a serious injury in a road accident in Northern Territory due to the negligence and breach of duty of care by Jesse McNeilly aged 16 years & 5 months old, the first defendant, and an inexperienced driver not possessing any driver/ learner’s permit.
Brohawn, supra, 276 Md. at 399. Subsequently, the other party to the altercation filed an action against Brohawn seeking damages for intentional torts and negligence. Id. at 399-400. Transamerica, Brohawn’s insurer, refused to defend Brohawn on the grounds that her coverage contained a policy exclusion whereby Transamerica was not responsible for intentional conduct. Id. at 400. Thereafter, Transamerica initiated a declaratory judgment action, in the same court, seeking to have the court declare that Brohawn’s conduct was intentional, and, therefore, fell within the policy exclusion. Id. at 401. The circuit court dismissed the declaratory judgment action because “the question of coverage would be ‘determined by the jury’s verdict in the tort suits]. . . .” Id. at
A dealer sold a new car to Raymond Smith. The sales contract contained language expressly disclaiming liability for personal injuries caused as a result of defects in the car and limiting the remedy for breach of warranty to repair or replacement of the defective part. One month after purchasing the auto, Smith was seriously injured when the car veered off the road and into a ditch as a result of a defect in the steering mechanism of the car.
Jose Carcamo et al., Defendants and Appellants in the Supreme Court of California held that tort liability based on negligent hiring and retention is a cause of action distinct from vicarious liability based on respondeat superior. In the case against Jose Carcamo, it was stated he hit a car while driving his truck for his employer, causing Renae Diaz to lose control of her vehicle. The jury awarded Diaz $22.5 million in damages in which Sugar Transport, Carcamo’s employer, was also help liable based on its negligent hiring of Carcamo. Sugar Transport contended that while it is liable for Carcamo’s driving, it should not be held liable for negligent hiring and retention. The court reviewed negligent hiring and retention as theories of liability independent of vicarious liability. The court stated that the liability comes from hiring and retaining an employee who is unfit to conduct his or her duties. Due to the fact that the employer had sufficient enough reason to believe that undue harm could exist with the employment of Carcamo, they were held liable for negligent hiring. Carcamo’s driving history included previous accidents that were relevant to his job assignment. Sugar Transport thus disregarded his past driving record and the danger that could come with his driving for the company. The jury properly considered that evidence when apportioning fault for the
The Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging negligent entrustment, against the Defendant, Mr. Franklin. Pl.’s Compl. Count II, (Feb. 23, 2016). The Plaintiff alleged that, on the day of the accident Ms. Johnson was using Mr. Franklin’s vehicle with the knowledge and consent of Mr. Franklin. Pl.’s Compl. at 3 ¶ 7 (Feb. 23, 2016). The Plaintiff stated that on the day of the accident she overheard Ms. Johnson state to the police officer that she was driving her boyfriend’s vehicle, and assumed that he gave her permission to use the vehicle. Def.’s Interrog. No. 10 (Mar. 8, 2016).
Unit 2 was driving eastbound in the left lane of 167th St. between Orchard Ridge Ave. and Anthony Ave. in Hazel Crest, IL. Unit 2's approximate speed was 35 miles per hour. A large puddle of water had formed from a very recent rain. It covered the right lane and part of the left lane. The driver of Unit 2 noticed the puddle and proceeded to slow down to a speed of approximately 20 miles per hour. The driver of Unit 2 then noticed Unit 1 coming from behind in the right lane at a high rate of speed. Unit 1 tried to avoid the puddle without slowing down and impacted Unit 2. Unit 1 was pushed back into the right lane. Unit 2 was pushed off of the left side of the road onto the slightly raised median. The front and left side of Unit 1 was severly
The main issue of this case is to determine if Tricontinental may recover from PwC for negligence. In order to show negligence there must be four requirements that the plaintiff must show. The four requirements are: the defendant owed a duty of care, defendant breached that duty, breach of duty to care caused the plaintiff’s injury, and fourth that damages resulted.
We have determined that your clients were traveling on Hallandale Beach approaching Bryant Rd. when Alfonso Reinier attempted to pass the Coca-Cola vehicle before the lane merged. Your clients improper passing is the proximate cause of the accident. According to the police report he was cited for the accident. There is insufficient evidence to prove our driver was legally responsible for injuries sustained as a result of the collision; therefore, we must respectfully deny your claim.
In this case, the accident is the proximate cause of Mrs. Smith’s injuries and the medical providers are the intervening cause, as their breach of duty exacerbated Mrs. Smith’s injury to the point of permanent disability and disfigurement.
It can be concluded that Mr. Prendergast was acting negligently whilst driving his car, above the national speed limit, as confirmed by his insurers. Therefore Contributory Negligence is the basic issue to be consulted with the insurers who are claiming that Steven’s claim ought to be ‘substantially reduced’ due to the negligence on his behalf.