Tug Valoar Failure

Hillenbrand and the author of the text about Mine’ Okubo explain how perseverance and resilience are essential for surviving difficult times. Throughout both texts, the authors use several methods to develop this central idea. Unbroken by Laura Hillenbrand provides a detailed description of how Louie Zamperini survives being a prisoner

Many men, women and children died on this brutal two-month trip. Starvation, illness, floggings and men jumping overboard into the seas took the lives of some around me. It was hard to fathom the horrible treatment the crew inflicted upon all of the men, women, and children; how they treated us

Findings Following the investigation of the American Airlines 1420 accident, the NTSB released a detailed and comprehensive list of the overall findings. Using data from the accident craft’s CVR and FDR, along with a thorough investigation of the crash site, the NTSB findings painted a clear understanding of the string events leading up to the crash. In addition, the events gave insight to the causes that prevented flight 1420 from landing safely in Little Rock.

Broward Community College Colgan air/Continental Connection Flight 3407 Air Crash Hugo M. Minaya ASC 2320 Aviation Law Professor Mike Nonnemacher 5 August 2013 Hugo M. Minaya ASC 2320 Aviation Law Professor Mike Nonnemacher November 25, 2016 Colgan air/Continental Connection Flight 3407 Air Crash One of the most controversial and important air crash linked to human error of the modern world happened on the night of February 12, 2009. Colgan air flight 3407, operated by Continental Connection, was on final approach to runway 23 at Buffalo-Niagara International Airport as it disappeared from radar. The aircraft was a Bombardier Dash 8, a popular twin engine medium range turboprop Airliner used by many regional carriers. The aircraft entered an uncontrollable stall crashing into to a neighborhood 5 miles northeast of the airport killing all everyone on souls on board. The Captain, Marvin Resnlow and first officer Rebecca Lynne were behind the controls the night of the accident. The NTSB report determined error by both pilots cause the aircraft to crash. Thus, pilot fatigues, improper recovery form a stall were contributing factors. The victim’s family members pushed for congress to overhaul airline regulations. The NTBS investigation delivery multiple findings that eventually led to a modernization of airline operations and pilot training.

During the Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster, many professional responsibilities were neglected. First, engineers did not “hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public” (Ethics Code II. 1. a.). For example, although the ice inspection team found the launch situation to be of great concern, the launch director authorized it anyway (Texas A&M University 5). At this point, professional bodies or public authorities should have been notified.

After the collision last month, the heavily-damaged Fitzgerald went back to Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan. The Navy and Coast Guard are investigating the incident. Because of what those seven sailors suffered and what their families are now paying, decency demands that we be cautious in drawing conclusions about the causes of the collision. This collision will reminds us that there is no such thing as a safe

In 1986 when the space shuttle Challenger launched from Kennedy Space Center people watched in awe for a little more than a minute before the shuttle exploded in flight. This was the first of only two major accidents that occurred during over two decades of NASA’s shuttle program. Many would consider the Challenger disaster to be a fluke that could not have been prevented or predicted but, In truth, it was an accident waiting to happen and was a symptom of systemic problems that were occurring at NASA during that era. The 1986 space shuttle Challenger disaster was cause by a number of factors including structural failure of the shuttle, a change in NASA’s work environment from the days of the successful Apollo missions, and additional

Conduct of the people within both NASA and Morton Thiokol with respect to the risk management was unplanned. NASA management had to make a choice at the last minute even when everyone agreed that a disastrous possibility existed. It was understood that the duties of the engineers and managers were clearly defined. Much of the evidence relating to the tragedy was dismissed. Conduct of the entire project team could be interpreted as group

In the determination of the decision making model utilized at the Deepwater Horizon disaster, it appears the etiology of the explosion was based upon a series of irregularities that cascaded into the final explosion (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013). The importance of this description documents the scenario is not based upon a single decision by one individual but a series of decisions by multiple groups. For obvious reasons, it can be asserted that a rational model of decision making was not used. There was incomplete information available and shared, there was no lack of emotion involved in the process, alternatives weren’t actively evaluated, and finally time and resources were at a premium (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013).

Operators were also responsible for the failure of the auxiliary feedwater pumps, as a test of the “twelves” valves two days before the incident led to them remaining closed until the incident itself, a clear violation of regulations set in place by the NRC. When asked about it post-incident, an operator claimed it was very easy to forget to reopen the valves after a test, whether you just plain forgot or you were relieved at the end of your shift before you could do it.4 Again, this ties to the unbelievable lack of education and micromanagement that was present in a typical operator. Yet another time, the issues tie back to the carelessness of the NRC in preparing its operators for the job.

The Junior Officer Chief Bond Is Failing A Coast Guard Cutter departed home port on July 2nd 2015 for a routine summer Alaska Patrol, with scheduled port calls in Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, Adak, and a transit into the arctic circle. Weeks passed and the crew settled into their routine of underway life. There soon began to appear issues of poor communications, simple daily tasks were not complete. Watch issues, teams not properly prepared for a mission. There is a break down between the junior officers and the chiefs. Junior officers and chiefs unwillingness to follow a mentorship programs, is causing poor mission execution.

Introduction The Columbia space shuttle disintegrated on re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere in February of 2003. The astronauts on board had completed a two week mission and were returning home. The program was halted for the next couple of years while the disaster was investigated. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board reported

A key cause of this disaster was the lack of adequate communication between BP and Transocean. BP did not share critical information with its contractors, and contractors did not share critical information with BP. As a result, employees often made critical decisions without a full approval for the context in which they were being made. Decision making processes did not sufficiently ensure that personnel fully considered the risks created by time and money saving decisions. There is nothing wrong with choosing a less costly or less time consuming alternative as long as it is proven to be equally safe. The problem is that, at least in regard to BP’s team, there appears to have been no formal system for ensuring that alternative procedures were

The BP oil spill has been known as one of the world's worst events to happen. An estimated 4.2 million barrels of oil spilled out the uncapped oil well (Griffin, Black, & Devine 2015). The environmental issues that resulted from the BP oil spill have been outrageous. We are still seeing the effects of the BP oil spill and will continue to see the effects for years to come. Safety was a key issue, the crisis management team had not prepared for an event like this well enough. It seems only one route to the third lifeboat was available and the result of the tragic event eliminated the path to the lifeboat. The crew stated during the crisis, there was no one in charge, no chain of command was in order during such an event (Hoffman, 2010). Without

BP leadership along with partners did not have proper governance and process to evaluate the risk that they are willing to take. The employee at every level does not know how much risk to take nor did any corporate policy exist to guide them. Having zero risk tolerance and zero safety defects in these complex operations ensure there are no human losses. The analysis of the Deepwater Horizon Study Group (2011) (p.11) shows that the leadership was concerned about how much money was spent in excess and did not address previous violations or preventive steps. Instead of downplaying, BP could have accessed the situation, analyzed, and communicated just before and after the explosions from an organizational behavior perspective. Communication is an important tool and basic needs of any organization to effectively discuss or write to their employees, clients, external vendors, and the government to govern internal process and enhance its customer experiences.