The INARA law gives the Administration a number of choices to cease or change U.S. Implementation of the JCPOA. These provisions raise the possibility of several courses of action as follows:
1- Recertification and Continuation of U.S. Sanctions Waivers
Trump May decide to continue implement the Iran Deal as it has been doing in the past by certifying that INARA conditions are met and to continue renewing the waivers of sanctions within US commitment in JCPOA. Such waiver renewals must be separately reported to Congress to be consistent with the requirements of the sanctions laws that were waived to implement the JCPOA.
2- Decertification and reimposition of some or all U.S. Sanctions
On 13 October 2017, The Administration in his
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4- Decertification but not Reimposition of Sanctions
Nothing material has been changed since Trump certified Iran’s compliance in July and no change in sanctions relief being provided by US. Despite of verified evidences of Iran’s continued compliance with the JCPOA by IAEA, the lack of any material breach or new evidence since Trump’s last certification and the view of some of his Cabinet members and its European allies, recent Trump decertification had no justification.
Under INARA, there is no requirement for the administration to reimpose US. Sanctions if here is no certification of compliance, and then the Administration might renew the waivers of U.S. sanctions laws and otherwise decline to reimpose any sanctions. That means the administration continue to its commitments to implement the JCPOA. It would signal Administration dissatisfaction with the JCPOA and perhaps suggest the Administration wants it renegotiated, but without necessarily causing the JCPOA to collapse.
B) By Using of JCPOA Provisions:
JCPOA stipulated each party commitments and rights. It also defined how to settle differences among parties, if appeared and each part might what to do in case of unilateral violations done by another party. Under JCPOA and Security Council resolution 2231, If Iran does not comply its commitments and these noncompliance verified by IAEA, then snap back sanctions being activated. If US does not comply its
Now is the time to use the power of American diplomacy to pressure Iran to stop their illicit nuclear program, support for terrorism, and threats toward Israel. Obama and Biden will offer the Iranian regime a choice. If Iran abandons its nuclear program and support for terrorism, we will offer incentives like membership in the World Trade Organization, economic investments, and a move toward normal diplomatic relations. If Iran continues its troubling behavior, we will step up our economic pressure and political isolation. In carrying out this diplomacy, we will coordinate closely with our allies and proceed with careful preparation. Seeking this kind of comprehensive settlement with Iran is our best way to make
There are seven key points in this nuclear deal: Iran has to reduce their centrifuges, reduce their uranium enrichments, they can’t over produce anything nuclear for at least two months, their Fordow Facility has to stop producing uranium for fifteen years, they can keep doing research and development but can only do it with a break of three months, they will have inspection by the U.N., and we have to lift our sanctions that we have on Iran. President Barrack Obama said this deal, “is not built on trust, it is built on verification.” (Cato Institute 1/3) This applies to the quote by Barrack Obama wanting to make history. He wants to ensure the safety on America by declining the top producing nuclear war-heads country in the world, their production of nukes. President Obama will go into the books by already stopping a future nuclear
Currently, numerous sanctions target the Iranian economy. These sanctions are implemented and enforced by the United States of America, The European Union, and several other United Nation members to include; Japan, the Republic of Korea, Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzer. Fathollah-nejad, A. (2013). These measures are necessary to enforce international laws through means other than war.
Since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), or Iran Deal, was signed in Vienna on July 14, 2015, there widespread debate as to whether the agreement would benefit both sides of the pact. Due to the numerous amount of steps taken to ensure Iran’s compliance, the accord between Iran China, France, Russia, the U.K, the U.S, Germany and the EU (P5+1+ Eu countries) provides both sides with comfortable allowances that allow each state to thrive. Though highly contested, as demonstrated from the varying opinions in the supplied articles, the JCPOA solidified the deconstruction of Iran’s uranium enrichment program, which is one of the hardest objectives to achieve in the field of international relations. As shown by the world’s quandary
regarding the tense relationship between the U.S. And Iran in order to illicit a more
This paper will seek to identify three key aspects of US sanctions imposed on Iran. First the paper will briefly introduce the reasons as to why US and Iran relations have worsened since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Secondly, this paper shall outline some of the key sanctions imposed on Iran which have influenced Irans’s behaviour. After sanctions are reviewed, the paper will then summarise the impact of sanctions on Iran. Last but not the least and most importantly, the paper will elaborate how Iran is resisting stringent US sanctions. This paper will argue that despite punitive measures adopted by the US, Iran has found alternative mechanisms to fight them and has reoriented its
After the determination of the U.S court, the old decree was stopped working and Donald Trump declared to
They commended the parties for finding value and diplomacy and for seeking peaceful political solutions. However strenuous it may seem, that was evident in July, when the parties agreed to extend the period of the negotiations for another four months to give themselves more time to close the underlying gaps. They have continued the talks on P5+1 Iran’s nuclear program. The representatives of those countries are negotiating a comprehensive plan of action that, once implemented, would ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon and that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. They seek to finalize such arrangements by 24 November of this year. Hopefully the negotiation goes well. In the meantime, the Council and its Iran Sanctions Committee must ensure the continued implementation of United Nations sanctions. We have been troubled to hear reports of confusion as to whether the sanctions remain in effect during the period of negotiations. Although the P5+1 offered Iran some limited and reversible sanctions relief as part of the joint plan of action, the plan included no changes to United Nations sanctions. The role of the 1737 Committee in support of the P5+1 process is vital to its success. We agree with the Chair that only the Security Council itself can alter the sanctions measures applied by the
At this point, the US had few options in which to prevent the continued advancement of the Iranian nuclear program. However, the deal reached by the Obama administration, whose support extends to the world’s leading powers, significantly extends the time Iran would need to develop a nuclear weapon and ensures that we have ample time to counteract any attempt at restarting the Nuclear program. In addition, the US has made it clear that if Iran does violate the terms of the deal, sanctions will be reimposed and more aggressive options could be taken. This deal is far from perfect and there are legitimate concerns raised by its many critics. That being said, without this deal, Iran could quickly double its capacity to enrich uranium and move towards producing a bomb. One of the greatest criticism raised, is that the deal and provisions will expire. While some are only in place for 10-25 years, the fundamental principle of the deal—to preserve the peaceful nature of its nuclear program—are permanent. Unfortunately, neither military action, sanctions or this deal for that matter can guarantee that Iran will never have in their possession a weapon of mass destruction. However, this deal is
On the White House website, a 112 pages’ document called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) gives some detailed about the deal with Iran. It says that the deal:
When the deal was signed on July 14, 2015, it successfully achieved the limitation the aforementioned threats, as Iran will have no nuclear weapons and be subject to intense U.N oversight for at least ten years. This oversight, sanctioned by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), consists of stringent daily facility and centrifuge inspections, with a clause that states “the IAEA will have access where necessary, when necessary” (Chin and Lincy, Iran Watch). To quote President Barack Obama, the Iranian Deal “is not built on trust; it is built on verification” (Chin and Lincy, Iran Watch). Lifting sanctions placed on Iran in exchange for these allowances is not a difficult decision. A deal that restricts and checks enrichment, and also renders Iran a non nuclear- weapon possessing country is a good deal that allows states around the world to sigh a breath of relief.
Former President Ahmadinejad set Iran back years by putting Iran into extreme isolation from the international community. His continued badgering with the international community, eventually lead to a nuclear stand-off with world powers. With what seems to be the Ayatollah’s blessing, President Rouhani has so far shown promise to ease the country’s relations and assume a solution on the nuclear issue. “For Washington, meanwhile, the election offered stark confirmation that its strategy is working, at least to a point. The outcome confirmed that political will for a nuclear deal exists within the Islamic Republic. In other words, the path out of isolation and economic crisis is perilous, but Iran’s new president, who has sometimes been dubbed “the sheikh of diplomacy,” may just be the right man at the right moment to walk it.” (Maloney, 2013)
have nuclear and hydrogen weapons, but for Iran, which is not a member of NATO and its security is not guaranteed by any country in the world, the simple principle of self-defense becomes so problematic?” (Vaez, 2017). The JCPOA satisfies Iran’s demand for increased influence while maintaining the priority of international nuclear stability. With worldwide peace and proliferation safeguards an international interest, the United States should utilize a selective engagement mindset, specifically in regards to a great powers focus, to maintain leverage and unity within the multilateral agreement, “Selective engagement endeavors to ensure peace among powers that have substantial industrial and military potential – the great powers” (Posen, & Ross, 2000). By prioritizing vital interests, the great powers can develop a collaborative and effective strategy to force Iranian nuclear cessation and maintain unity to avoid Iranian partnerships with nations seeking to increase their sphere of influence. Additionally, the international response to Iran establishes a
Sanctions intended to change the behavior or government of a target country are very difficult to design. They have to be imposed as quickly and easily as possible.(Library of Economics) By moving too slowly, it gives the target country time to adjust by finding alternative markets, finding new allies, and by gaining domestic support of its own policies.
Still, Iran continuously denies that its nuclear objectives are to construct atomic weapons, but a large majority of the international community remains skeptical to the legitimacy of this claim due to the secrecy of Iran’s productions and their refusal to cooperate with the IAEA on several notable occasions. However, in defense over the concerns pertaining to the secrecy of Iran’s program, Iran’s former ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammed Javad Zarif, claims Western tension and dwindling support for Iran’s early nuclear energy programs forced Tehran with no choice but to continue their nuclear activities in a discreet matter. Zarif wrote in Colombia University’s Journal of International Affairs, “To avoid the