U.s. Intelligence Community ( Ic )

While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is one, centralized agency, securing the homeland involves the cooperation and collaboration of many, different agencies and organizations ranging from local law enforcement to national agencies such as the NSA, CIA, and FBI. Each of these agencies contributes to the development of homeland security intelligence. By carefully analyzing and commenting on the objectives, tasks, strengths, weaknesses, and roles of each agency, a larger picture emerges regarding the capabilities and limitation of intelligence in supporting homeland security efforts.

“Prior to September 11th intelligence agencies and law enforcement failed to communicate with each other about terrorist hijackers… This lack of communications had its roots deep in the culture of government… Fortunately, in the Patriot Act, congress began to tear down the walls that cut off communication between intelligence and law enforcement officials” (Gerdes 36)

2). Domestic terrorism is usually committed by citizens of the United States, and documentation of terrorist activities on American soil have dated back to the 1950s. The 1970s heighten domestic terrorism by a “rash of skyjacking”, that is, taking a commercial airline hostage (Sauter & Carafano, 2012). Skyjacking incidents compelled the FBI and CIA to develop undercover strategies to enforce terrorist groups; however, these tactics lead to civil right violations. The federal agencies covert tactics and aggressive intelligence collection, “prompted congressional hearings and led to dramatic restrictions on domestic intelligence operations, including the creation of a bureaucratic wall between intelligence gathering and law enforcement” (Sauter & Carafano, 2012, p. 25). The “wall” that was previously stated halted information sharing between the intelligence community and local law enforcement. Communication and information sharing prevents redundancy in high priority investigations, and it could also provide first responders advance notice in life threatening

Since 9/11, the intelligence community has improved greatly. It is not that they have been reconstructed from the ground up, or that their mission has completely changed, it is, in the community’s eye anyway, that they now all share information, no matter how important or how small. This information sharing now even includes all the way down to local and tribal authorities. The reasoning is that, even if it might be small or seem insignificant to you at your level, it may be the piece someone somewhere else in the country needs.

Upon analyzing 9/11 it was clear to focus on the limitations that the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency had faced. Security breaches and poor intelligence sharing were just some of the critical failures that were encountered. Moreover, the main focus is pointed towards the miscommunication between these two agencies. Evidently, the execution and tactical strategies went unnoticed despite the apparent red flags that presented themselves, in addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency failure to pursue threats and establish a baseline of security resulted in the disaster of 9/11. In conjunction to these mistakes, the restriction of shared information

Subsequent to 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon which compelled the U.S. to imagine the unconceivable. That day things went really wrong, because that was the day that terrorist decided to make their presences know by attacking us. They evolved from using bombs to using airplanes to deliver as there attack weapon because it would cause lethal fatalities on U.S. soil. This was never done before and we were not prepared to handle such a massive attack. This paper will investigate what went wrong before and after 9/11, the effects of post 9/11, surveillance surge on state and local policing, what was the problem why the C.I.A. and the F.B. I. did not communicate with each other, analyze our current and past laws in regards to the dissemination of information between state, local authorities, and federal authorities, and to recommend changes or reforms to policies that are obsolete. We understand that local law enforcement and state agencies will bring specific advantages (there strength) from there organizations, and they will also bring their inherited weaknesses. Thereby, they will bring one important thing to the table which is how they collect local intelligence; as well as them being able to address some of their weaknesses. For example, lack of analytical capacity in order to fully use the data they collect. This paper builds and contributes to how things were before and after 9/11, and the types of changes that were made within law

An apparent fear in the public is that power delegated by the citizen to their government may be abused and used against them. Intelligence-gathering, when efficiently performed in ways consistent with Americans’ rights and expectations, is similarly essential.

The Testimony of Cofer Black, the Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center from 1999-2002, greatly affected my thinking about the domestic intelligence ‘failures’ which led to the inability to foresee or prevent the 9/11 attacks. His testimony, paired with both concurring and clashing views from the 9/11 Commission Report, gave a persuasive ‘defense’ of the intelligence community’s actions and capabilities before September 11, 2001. Three of Black 's ‘agreements’ were particularly influential towards my understanding. First, Black presented a strong argument that the inefficiency of counterterrorism had much to do with pre-9/11 domestic priorities, which left those involved with fighting terrorism, including those acts

The Intelligence Community is a cooperative federation of sixteen separate United States government agencies that worked separately and together on matters of foreign relations and national security. One of these agencies is the Central Intelligence Agency which is to collect, analyze, evaluate, disseminate foreign intelligence to assist the President and senior US government policymakers in making decisions relating to national security. Therefore this paper will discuss Central Intelligence Agency history and the role it plays in combating acts of terrorism.

The attack on the World Trade Center was not the first attack and was not the first time the US Intelligence Community had heard of Al-Qaeda or Osama Bin Laden. The role of counterintelligence from both sides the US and Al-Qaeda, lent to the information flow not only form the attackers but also to the ones who would ultimately respond. The FBI, the CIA, the DIA, have integral parts in these series of events from the information collection to the information flow. In a time where it was realized that Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism have a similar need, as well as information sharing across agencies, have led to the CI and IC we see today.

Additionally, would streamlining the sharing of this information both vertically and horizontally at the federal, state and local levels improve efficiencies, effectiveness, and operability? There are almost 50 agencies from the President down to the local level that have “fingers in the pie” so to speak in the domestic intelligence gathering community. This paper will examine the complexity and inherent barriers within the domestic intelligence community from the federal to the state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) levels, then analyze the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and what appears to be a lack of unity amongst the disparate organizations at both the federal and SLTT levels, and finally assess the levels of training and operational effectiveness to evaluate the overall performance efficiency of the intelligence community at the enterprise level. A way forward is also presented at the end of each section to provide suggested

The terrorist attacks on 9/11 played one of the most significant roles on intelligence and its process of procurement and disciplines. Prior to the attack on 9/11 the U.S intelligence community had been downsized and was under further constraint by budget restrictions. The U.S. had been in a long intelligence battle during the Cold War and the intelligence community found them without a viable large threat to focus its priorities on. It is also speculated that without a major threat some functions of the intelligence process could have become redundant and complacent. There was also a breakdown in communication between intelligence community members that could have overlooked some key components to a pending terrorist attack.

Throughout the years, the intelligence community in the United States have worked diligently to provide a sense of security for the millions of Americans living in our great nation today. From the FBI to the CIA, these government agencies work around the clock to find and eliminate threats that maybe detrimental to our country. However, one event that took place 14 years ago reshaped not only the way Americans think of the intelligence community, it also reshaped the policies and procedures of institutions such as the CIA, FBI, DOD, etc. The event that caused the remodeling of our government agencies was the event that took place on September 11, 2001 or known throughout the U.S. as “9/11.” A total of 2,977 Americans lost their lives to a

After the 9/11 attacks, the reports of Al-Qaeda attacking the United States directly have been minimized. Development of the intelligence sharing has led to open sharing of information where terrorists can be easily tracked. The wiretapping of phone calls, for example, has led to the tracking of terrorist activities. The greatest achievement of the intelligence post the 9/11 attacks was the follow-up of Al-Qaeda`s leader Osama bin Laden. By killing the group's leader, the US achieved partial deactivation of the group although it wasn`t dismantled as its effects are still evident in the Islamic world (Lawrence 2006) .

Intelligence collection and apprehension of criminals have occurred for many years; however, with the exception of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, these actions were performed by different organizations. Nonetheless, roles and responsibilities have changed since the attacks on September 11, 2001. Intelligence-led policing and the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing program were incorporated, and fusion centers were established to help gather intelligence from different levels of the government. Although law enforcement at the local, state, and tribal levels aid in intelligence collection, it is important to ensure that intelligence gathered to protect national security and law enforcement