U.s. Troop Surge Policy

Though many were opposed to military force, it was for many diferent reasons. Some thought that military force was not needed because the threats imposed by President Bush was in fact acknowledged by the Iraquian troops because they no longer were advancing in territory and no other territory was currently in danger of being invaded, and it would only be a matter of time before they withdrew thier troops. David Chandler in a letter to the la times wrote "The official reasons given by the bush adminastration for going to war in the Persian Gulf are not adequate to explain our agressive

President George W. bush made the decision to go to war with Iraq just months after the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States. There is evidence that shows Bush was after Saddam Hussain from day one of his presidency. Paul O’Neill claims that Bush started constructing arrangements for the invasion of Iraq within days of Bush’s inauguration. Bush denied these claims and discredited O’Neill by declaring he was a dissatisfied employee who was dismissed by the White House and that O’Neill had no reliable comprehension of U.S. foreign policy. The Iraqi National Congress argues that soon after Bush’s inauguration, Bush contacted them to discuss how to remove Hussein from power, which confirms O’Neill’s allegations

Since the war on Iraq began on March 20, 2003, at least 1,402 coalition troops have died and 9,326 U.S. troops have been wounded in action. This is no small number and the count grows daily. One would hope, then, that these men and women were sent to war with just cause and as a last resort. However, as the cloud of apprehension and rhetoric surrounding the war has begun to settle, it has become clear that the Bush administration relied on deeply flawed analyses to make its case for war to the United Nations and to the American people, rushing this country, and its soldiers, into war. This is not to say that this war was waged against a blameless regime or that our soldiers have died

Even when faced with reasonable arguments against their courses of action they still went ahead and acted in the same way. Creon took advice from the elders and President Bush took advice from the people looking for WMDs. Colin Powell, in May 2001 informed his President and the nation that “even though we have no doubt in our mind that the Iraqi regime is pursuing programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, I think the best intelligence estimates suggest that they have not been terribly successful." The war on terror is now justified by the White House administration as having been in response to Saddam Hussein’s human rights record and not down to a reasonable threat of attack and the use of WMDs. The difference between Creon and Bush is that Creon stood alone in his bad decision making, George W Bush took the UK, Australia and Poland along with him. This desire to show power was never more obvious than when, in January 2003 a meeting took place at the White House at which George W Bush and Tony Blair allegedly discussed how they could look for alternative ways to provoke a war after full disclosure about any weapons Iraq held was not forthcoming.

Beginning with the creation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, up to the current Obama doctrine, presidential doctrines have dominated United States foreign policy. A presidential doctrine highlights the goals and positions for United States foreign affairs outlined by the sitting president. Many of the country’s major foreign policy successes or disasters can be explained by tracing the doctrines of sitting or previous presidents and analyzing their evolution and eventual impact on world events. After established, a presidential doctrine often takes on a life of its own. This can be explained by the military resources and human capital involved in carrying out these doctrines. Future presidents often feel compelled to abide by previous doctrines, or find the reality of change can only be done with incremental changes over a period of years. For this reason, presidential doctrines often outlive their creators and consequently effect American foreign policy for years to come.

In Obama’s Wars, Woodward asserts President Obama used the Second Order (Institutional) Friction: Military Planning Systems Meet Presidential Decision Making cause of friction to make the Afghanistan surge decision.

My first example is of Bush’s “War on Terror”. In 2001, the President stated that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and Saddam was going to use them against the U.S. and other nations even though he did not have concrete proof . He also said Iraq had ties to Al Quaida and this was a threat to our security and the security

Yet another instance whereby the government’s hypocrisy has been displayed is when the Bush Administration declared war on Iraq, about five years ago. Matt Matusek, in an article entitled Purpose of Iraq war murky to Americans, wrote: “The plan was to invade Iraq and capture Saddam Hussein so he couldn't use his weapons of mass destruction on any other nation. The United States also wanted to sever Hussein's ties to Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Then, we were to get our troops back home as soon as possible.” However, five years into the war, it can clearly be seen that the government’s initial goal was to get oil from Iraq, but used Saddam as an excuse to engage in war (Matusek). Today, more and more people, just like Montag, are starting to analyze the government’s actions and take a strong stand against them.

During his presidency, President George W. Bush made plans for Middle Eastern democracy. Although his plans were somewhat, unrealistic, he was very adamant about his position as well as his views and seemed to be very persistent as to exactly what he wanted. In a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) described as a major policy address by the White House, Bush avoided important issues such as attack, weapons of mass destruction and "gathering" dangers to the United States. Rather, he put the war in a time stretch context of the "2,500-year old story of democracy,"

In a speech given by President Bush, he called the surge “A new way forward”, which indirectly confirmed to many that the White House was aware of the military shortcomings in Iraq. Although the Bush administration most likely had the best of intentions, there are a few key reasons the Iraqi surge did not have sustained positive results. The surge strategy was to increase the number of troops in Iraq by 20,000; these troops would be used in urban civilian areas where military forces have had a difficult time clearing out neighborhoods. The surge was initially a success, however, after several months it became clear the success was short-lived, and the overall strategy was short sighted. Members of Al Qaeda simply left the region while it was heavily occupied, only to return when the U.S. threat had vacated the area. There was a survey conducted by Iraq, and the overwhelming majority of Iraqi citizens felt that daily living conditions had not changed they were in favor of American troops leaving their country. Although the primary goal of improving the lives of citizens was not fully realized, there is a bigger flaw with the surge, it had aimed to reduce American and Iraqi casualties, as well as lower the number of Al Quad attacks. As already stated, these surges did have some fleeting success, which were able to produce statistics that briefly pacified many critics of the war,

According to Mel Gurtov, most would say that foreign policy has an erratic temperament. In his insightful book, "Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in U.S. Foreign Policy", Gurtov shows that Bush's foreign policy follows his predecessors' policies of regime change, unilateralism, and an expanded military. The big things he believes to be Bush's gift to future presidents are two new highly controversial concepts. These key concepts are preemption and unprecedented secrecy. These two changes are something that Gurtov views as unwise and misleading to the population. Thomas Donnelly, in his book "The Underpinnings of The Bush Doctrine," gives the reader three underlying principles of the Bush

In 2003, President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell launched an invasion of the nation of Iraq. United States Secretary of State Colin Powell outlined the reasons Iraq posed a threat to international security in a speech he gave at the United Nations. Iraq’s nuclear weapons program concerned the Bush administration. Fearing Iraq might use this program to act aggressively in the region, and wanting to secure oil supplies and a friendly regime, the administration pursued a plan of action to remove Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power (FLS 2016, 43). A constant secure supply of oil stood as a cornerstone of the military-industrial complex thriving in the United States and a friendly regime in such an oil rich country remained an important objective of President Bush. This directly conflicted with the desire of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq to remain in power.

George W. Bush prided himself on his decisiveness. Bush’s management style was structured around a desire to preserve the time of the president and produce swift action. Bush’s management style was a product of his past experiences as a former governor of Texas and business executive and his business school education. His life experiences had taught him to delegate and trust the abilities of his immediate subordinates. (Allen & Broder, 2004) Joe Allbaugh, a top aide and 2000 campaign director, described Bush as the “best one-minute manager” and a “fantastic delegator.” (Public Broadcasting Service, 2004) President Bush once described his own decision making style by stating “I’m not a textbook player. I am a gut player.” (Pfiffner 2011, 249) This preference was reflected in the way his White House organized his access to information.

In August of 2002, the Bush administration’s position about Iraq had changed significantly. Prior to this point, the United States and other western countries had been arming Iraq with weapons of every type. The fact the United States and other countries had been arming Iraq with weapons, shows how little they considered Iraq to be a threat. This quickly changed. A debate on invading Iraq, held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, created

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution