Uncompetitive Nature Of Party Polarization

Politics in the United States is a complex structure that is comprised of many systems. While most of these systems appear to work well, there are a few that are broken. A perfect example of a broken system is the district boundaries and the likelihood of gerrymandering. Multiple states across the country are subjected to gerrymandering, which is the act of dividing a county into election districts that provide one political party with an unfair advantage over the other. Gerrymandering is used to help or prevent a particular demographic from gaining adequate representation. In Florida, for example, there is controversy over Congressional District 5, which extends from Jacksonville down to Orlando in a way that creates a “minority-majority” district.

Polarization in the United States today exists on two levels: polarization in the electorate and polarization in the elite. While separate, these two groups are perpetually intertwined. Polarization in the electorate refers to the movement of voters toward ideological extremes, and the ideological gap between voters on either side has been increasing in recent decades (Kuo). A study conducted by Pew Research Center in 2014 confirms the proliferation of polarization in the electorate: it found that since 1994, voters agree more intensely with their party’s policies and view the policies of the opposing party as a “threat to the nation’s well being” (“Political Polarization”). One factor that has led to this increase is the utilization of new technologies by the media, which allow voters to access more information than ever before. This broad scope of available information allows the public to be selective in what they consume (Kuo). As a result, many people participate in confirmation bias, meaning they seek out sources that share their beliefs; this strengthens their preexisting opinions and their level of partisanship. Another factor that increases political polarization in the electorate is geography. Republican voters tend to live in suburbs or rural areas, while Democrat voters are more likely to live in urban areas (Kuo). These geographic boundaries impact polarization because

In 2013, Rep. Peter DeFazio’s (D, OR-4) party unity score was 94% (Weyl, 183). Party unity as defined in the textbook, Congress and Its Members, are votes in which the majority of voting Republicans oppose a majority of voting Democrats. In other words, average votes Peter DeFazio casted with the Democratic majority against the Republican majority. Furthermore, party affiliation as well as ideological positions, and the constituency pressure are strongly correlated with congressmen’s voting decisions (Davidson, Oleskek, & Lee 2014, 255).

According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, Polarization is defined as the “division into two opposites”. (Merriam-Webster) Political Polarization refers to the perceived division of ideologies espoused between the two major political parties in the United States. The topic of political polarization is one frequently referenced in the media and in political discussions. Does political polarization actually exist or is it a myth? In this paper, this question will be analyzed and examined and a conclusion will be reached.

A congressional district is an electoral division of a state, electing and entitled to send one member to the United State House of Representatives. Districting is the initial set district, whereas redistricting is the process of drawing district boundaries after the decennial census and new population changes. Redistricting is a political process that affects the fortunes of incumbent House members, state legislators,

In his essay “Polarized Parties Are Good for America”, Matthew Yglesias asserts that the two-party system is ideal for America. He begins by stating that polarization is bad for elites, as it leaves little to no room for “self-styled players”. He then suggests that the two-party system is beneficial for voters, insisting that having clearly labeled candidates creates a “menu” that allows the masses to know what they’re voting for from the start. He concludes by stating that the problem isn’t in partisanship, but with the small number of parties. In this essay I will prove that the two-party system is bad for America.

Over the past three decades, the distance between parties has continued to grow steadily. As their distances increase it has become harder for presidents to receive votes from both parties.

While the district size and its geographic make up varies from region to region and state to state, it is oftentimes plausible to categorize a district as either homogenous or heterogeneous based upon its racial and ethnic pluralities, as well as the constituents relative economic status. A homogenous district typically is comprised of individuals who are like-minded with similar opinions and district goals. However, in a heterogeneous district, there is a “difference between the dominant district group and the average voter” (Bishin, 2009, 126). Furthermore, the prominent industries within the district often also influence representatives because a large number of their constituents are employed by or affected by the actions of that industry

Studies conclude that citizens who tend to classify themselves as either conservative or liberal tend to have opposing political and policy views (p. 571). This means that social opinions alone does not have a significant or resilient influence in elite or mass polarization. This leads us to our next variable, partisan elections.

the Civil Rights Act of 1964.82 The passage of that Act ended an era that had

In Chapter 8 of his book Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State, Gelman discusses the polarization of America’s political parties. It is often stated that America is becoming more polarized, but the only evidence thus far is that politicians are the ones who are actually further apart. People complain that polarization is breaking the country apart and impeding government action. On the other hand, polarization does have certain benefits in that it makes it easier for uniformed voters to easily select candidates. The author develops ways to measure political divisions and arguments to determine if division in America is a real phenomenon. Gelman does this because he wants to determine if it is the voters, the politicians, or both who are polarized in contemporary society and if it is actually increasing.

At times, rising polarization gives the impression that the American nation has disintegrated, but many political scientists argue that although our nation has its flaws, polarization is not the problem. Political scientist, Alan I. Abramowitz, is especially adamant about the manners in which polarization profits American democracy. He admits that polarization can lead to immature mudslinging, but presents this as a small downside to the important and essential benefits it provides. In his opinion, polarization can be a solution to legislative gridlock in congress. Polarization between different parties leads to “party discipline” within a party because it moves the moderates in a party further left or further right. Abramowitz claims that this can overcome procedures, such as the filibuster, that actually inhibit the law-making processes. Additionally he believes that polarization manifests party lines, making it less complicated for American citizens to associate with a specific side, which as a consequence, encourages them to vote and discuss their political views with others. Shaun Theriault adopts a similar view. He decries the name-calling and

Tufte (1978) and Hibbs (1987) both argue that there are two principle political influences on macroeconomic policy: partisanship and electoral incentives. However, they differ with regard to the emphasis they place on each influence. While Tufte emphasizes the influence of electoral incentives, Hibbs argues in favor of the influence of partisanship. Franzese’s (2002) review of electoral and partisan influences on macroeconomic outcomes suggests that there is more empirical evidence supporting Hibbs’ assertion. However, he also suggests that there is considerable room for an analysis of “context-conditional electoral and partisan cycles” (Franzese, 2002, p. 369). Bearing this in mind, I argue that incumbent politicians can switch between

According to the Gulati “prominent theories of American political parties imply that higher levels of competition cause lawmakers to be more responsive to the center of public opinion. However, there are multiple problems of the moderation theory. First, the data from the article suggests that the opposite occurs. Moreover, the studies conducted in the article suggest that highly competitive districts influence candidates to appeal more to their partisan base rather than the center, and this is even more apparent in marginal states that lack political clout. Gulati states that “parties and candidates pursue a mobilization rather than the moderation strategy”. Competitive districts foster diverse constituencies and the politician takes a more

Because theory suggests that congressional ideology would come before a partisan change, we expect that the ideology of southern members of Congress may predict movement of partisan strength. We particularly focus on southern Democratic members of Congress because they were a majority of the southern members of Congress for much of the period under study. Also, we could expect that through replacement, electoral defeat, and policy shifts made the voting record of southern democratic representatives seem more liberal. We could see that areas realign their party strength based upon the ideology of local policymakers.