In this paper I will argue that it is more reasonable to think the patient discussed in the provided vignette has the full range of mental states. To begin, I will introduce the reader to key terms for understanding the mind-body problem as well as introducing the solutions to it that I will be discussing in this paper. I will also discuss my view and how it relates to solutions for the mind body problem. I will also explain why my view would hold no matter what type of brain the patient had as well as addressing an objection to functionalism. Then I will provide reasons why denying the existence of mental states for non-normal brains through type-identity theory is problematic. Finally I will discuss how functionalism avoids these problems and why it allows the patient to have mental states. In discussing the relationship between the body and the mind, there are a few key terms that are used in the discussion. One very important concept to understand is the mind-body problem, this is the philosophical issue that we do not know how the physical body and the mind interact, it has been a topic of discussion for hundreds of years and many theories have been created to explain the connection between the mind and body. To understand the discussion surrounding the mind-body problem one must also know the difference between mental and physical states. Mental states are a being’s perception of their experiences and ideas, there exist two different type of mental states. Firstly
I would like to begin this paper by addressing what question I hope to answer through the entirety of this paper: is the mind physical? As simple as this question may seem to be, there still, to this day, is not a definite answer. There are, mostly, two approaches to answering this problem, through dualism or physicalism. The dualist, for the purposes of this paper, simply believes that the mind and the body are not equal and therefore, they are not one in the same. The physicalist, however, would come back to say that there are no such things as non-physical objects and therefore, they would conclude that the body and the mind are both physical. After weighing on both sides of this argument, I am going to defend the physicalist ideas and
The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.
A body is just a body without a brain to command it and a brain can only do so much without a body to yield. It’s undeniable that the mind and body are completely dependent on the other to function, but where do they join together to form a unique individual. To what extent do the mind and body bridge together to form a unique individual? Is there even a bridge that connects them or are the mind and body separate entities who solely rely on each other to function, but that’s where all the shared boundaries that create a person end.
One of the most talked about concepts of philosophy is that of the mind-body problem. In short, the mind-body problem is the relationship between the mind and the body. Specifically, it’s the connection between our mental realm of thoughts, including beliefs, ideas, sensations, emotions, and our physical realm, the actual matter of which we are made up of the atoms, neurons. The problem comes when we put the emphasis on mind and body. Are the mind and body one physical thing, or two separate entities. Two arguments have stood amongst the rest, Interactionism and physicalism. Interactionism claims that mind and matter are two separate categories with a casual integration between the two. By contrast, physicalism draws from the idea that all aspects of the human body are under one physical being, there are no nonphysical connections that come into play. While both state a clear and arguable statement regarding mind-body problem, Interactionism gives a more plausible answer to the mind-body problem because although it may seem like we are tied as one, our minds have a subconscious that influence our thoughts, actions, ideas, and beliefs, which is completely independent from the realm of our physical matter.
Armstrong begins his paper with a question for the reader of what it means to have a mind. It is well understood that man has the ability to perceive, to think, to feel, and so on, but what does it mean to perceive, to think, and to feel? The answer, he believes, lies in science. Seeing that science is constantly and rapidly gaining ground, he asserts that “...we can give a complete account of man in purely physico-chemical terms” (295?) Pointing out the fact that this view has been accepted by various scientists throughout time, he explains it is the most reliable way to approach the mind-body problem.
To quote Karl Popper, “Every solution to a problem, raises another unsolved problem” (Williams, 2003, p. 2). It has been a topic debated for centuries, still, a definitive solution is yet to be found that universally satisfies the problem of mind brain identity. The most logical answer comes in the form of monism. Therefore in this paper I will argue that the mind and the brain are identical, as the mind exists only as a property of the brain. David Lewis and D.M Armstrong give support for the causal relationship between mind and brain states in the form of the identity theory, and deal with the multiple realisability argument provided by Hillary Putman. Gottlob Frege provides his support for materialism by showing that mental states are determined by the function of the brain, while discounting Thomas Nagel’s argument which proposes the idea of Qualia. Both the functionalist theory and identity theory reach agreement on the materialistic view that the mind and brain are of the same substance.
The Synopsis: Star Trek Episode “The Measure of a Man” deals with the thought that android could have physical and mental properties. In order to fully understand or evaluate this we have to have a clear understanding of the Mind/Body Problems and solutions. Humans are material objects consisting of physical and mental properties. Physical properties examples are height, weight, color, shape or size and mental properties are awareness, consciousness, feeling, thinking, emotions and senses. The problem arises because these properties interact where intentional or unintentional continuously. Hasker discusses several mind/body solutions such as idealism, materialism, behaviorism, dualism, and
Thesis: The mind-body problem arises because of the lack of evidence when looking for a specific explanation of the interaction of mental and physical states, and the origin and even existence of them.
The mind and body problem can be divided into many different questions. We can consider or ask by ourselves that what is the mind? What is the body? And do both of them are co-existing, or does the mind only exist in the body? Or does the body only exist
It can be very difficult to find a universal proposal that offers a solution to the mind body problem. While solutions to this problem differ greatly, all attempt to answer questions such as: What makes a mental state mental? What is the fundamental nature of the mental? Or more specifically speaking, what makes a thought a thought? Or what makes a pain a pain? In an attempt to answer these questions, many philosophers over the centuries have rejected, proposed, or altered preexisting theories in order to keep up with the thinking and science of their times. Entering the 21st century their still exit a plethora of theories, some stronger than others, which include Cartesian dualism, physicalism,
The mind-body problem is an age-old topic in philosophy that questions the relationship between the mental aspect of life, such as the field of beliefs, pains, and emotions, and the physical side of life which deals with matter, atoms, and neurons. There are four concepts that each argue their respective sides. For example, Physicalism is the belief that humans only have a physical brain along with other physical structures, whereas Idealism argues that everything is mind-based. Furthermore, Materialism argues that the whole universe is purely physical. However, the strongest case that answers the commonly asked questions such as “Does the mind exist?” and “Is the mind your brain?” is Dualism.
In the philosophy of mind, there are many theories that try to resolve the mind-body problem. That is, how does the mental or consciousness interact with our physical body? Do they interact at all? Are they two separate entities or one in the same? Many theories try to answer these types of questions, but the one I will be focusing on is role functionalism. When mentioning functionalism throughout, I will be referring to role functionalism. Functionalism is a theory that says mental states can be defined by their function. So, we can identify mental states with their functional states. We can come to know the function of a mental state through examining its inputs, outputs, and relation to other mental states. I will show how this theory is correct by comparing it to the identity theory. I will begin by clarifying a few important terms in relation to functionalism, lay out the theory, and then present an objection. Lastly, I will present a possible functionalist reply to the objection and conclude.
The mind and body problem is a conundrum that argues the explanation of how mental
Many philosophers agree that consciousness provides a very difficult problem in understanding the mind-body concept; this is why from a materialist’s point of view, the problem is not sufficient enough for giving one’s attention. Thomas Negal on the other hand, finds the problem rather interesting. Negal’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” proposes a number of arguments, one of them which states that the subjective approach to the mind-body problem should be abandoned for a more objective approach (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). The purpose of this essay is to show that Negal’s arguments are sufficient in describing whether it is indeed possible to know what it is like to be a bat, portraying his arguments in an orderly fashion, and ultimately
The Mind-Body problem arises to Philosophy when we wonder what is the relationship between the mental states, like beliefs and thoughts, and the physical states, like water, human bodies and tables. For the purpose of this paper I will consider physical states as human bodies because we are thinking beings, while the other material things have no mental processes. The question whether mind and body are the same thing, somehow related, or two distinct things not related, has been asked throughout the history of Philosophy, so some philosophers tried to elaborate arrangements and arguments about it, in order to solve the problem and give a satisfactory answer to the question. This paper will argue that the Mind-Body Dualism, a view in