United States District Court For The Southern District Of New York

On the date of February 4th, 1965, believing that the Petitioner had been using public pay phones to transmit illegal gambling wagers from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began their surveillance into the life of the Petitioner, Charles Katz. Fifteen days later on February 19th, 1965 FBI agents working the case against the Petitioner had gained access to a phone booth within a set of phone booths that the petitioner frequented on Sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles, and summarily recorded the petitioner’s side of conversations he was having on the phone within a booth nearby. This surveillance lasted until the 25th (excluding February 22, as no evidence was obtained due to technical difficulties) the date of the petitioner’s arrest, which took place immediately after he exited the same set of phone booths. In this case there are two major constitutional questions which need to be addressed: (1) whether evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening and recording device to the top of a public telephone booth used and occupied by the Petitioner is gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) whether the search warrant used by the FBI officers in this case violated the Fourth Amendment to the constitution in that the warrant was (a) not founded on probable cause; (b) an evidentiary search warrant and (c) a general search

Like the plain view law, if the drugs, paraphernalia, or weapons are in plain sight, the court makes an exception. The cops didn’t search for that evidence, so it does not strip any constitutional right so the evidence is not illegal. This rule argues that the internal discipline of the officer takes care of any wrongdoings done to the American people. Americans who think their rights were violated can sue the cops, mainly for the fact they gathered evidence

On the date of February 4th, 1965, believing that the Petitioner had been using public pay phones to transmit illegal gambling wagers from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began their surveillance into the life of the Petitioner, Charles Katz. Fifteen days later on February 19th, 1965 FBI agents working the case against the Petitioner had gained access to a phone booth within a set of phone booths that the petitioner frequented on Sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles, and summarily recorded the petitioner’s side of conversations he was having on the phone within a booth nearby. This surveillance lasted until the 25th (excluding February 22, as no evidence was obtained due to technical difficulties) the date of the petitioner’s arrest, which took place immediately after he exited the same set of phone booths (Brief for Respondent 3). In this case there are two major constitutional questions which need to be addressed: (1) whether evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening and recording device to the top of a public telephone booth used and occupied by the Petitioner is gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) whether the search warrant used by the FBI officers in this case violated the Fourth Amendment to the constitution in that the warrant was (a) not founded on probable cause; (b) an evidentiary search warrant and (c) a general search warrant. While the Petitioner would like the answer to be yes in both cases,

The Supreme Court consolidated two cases where the police gained entry into the defendants’ home without a search warrant and seized evidence found in the house. The rule of law as read out under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment posits that the United States Constitution has prohibited warrantless entry and search of a premise, absent the exigent circumstances, regardless the existence of a probable cause. The courts in Payton held that the Fourth Amendment made it a violation to enter a premise during an arrest absent an arrest warrant and exigent circumstances; a person’s house is a critical point to which the constitutional safeguards should be respected.

officers entered her home without a warrant. The court cited that the search was without probable

Her attorney argued that she should never have been brought to trial because the material evidence resulted from an illegal, warrant less search. Because the search was unlawful, he maintained that the evidence was illegally obtained and must also be excluded. In its ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that ?a reasonable argument? could be made that the conviction should be reversed ?because the ?methods? employed to obtain the evidence?were such as to offend a sense of justice.? But the court also stated that the materials were admissible evidence. The Court explained its ruling by differentiating between evidence that was peacefully seized from an inanimate object, such as a trunk, rather than forcibly seized from an individual. Based on this decision, Mapp's appeal was denied and her conviction was upheld.

7. Court’s Order: As a result of this holding the court has established sufficient law entitles P to have her case heard before trial court.

Hudson was charged under Michigan law with unlawful drug and firearm possession. Hudson’s counsel moved to subdue the evidence from the record because of the violation of Hudson’s Fourth Amendment right when the officers prematurely entered his home. The issue was whether or not a violation of the “knock-and-announce” rule would call for the courts to throw out of all evidence found in a warranted search if police do not exercise the rule announcing their presence and giving proper time for the citizen to respond before entering the citizen’s home. Upon

In the District of Columbia v. Wesby case The Supreme Court is hearing oral arguments on whether a number of partygoers were in the right or if the police officers were in the right. The police were called to respond to a noise complaint at a residence and later questioned if the partygoers had a right to be there at all. The partygoers say they are innocent because they were told they could be in the home. While the police officers say they broke the law by trespassing. To defend the partygoers case they are using the 4th amendment.

The information provided by the anonymous informant is not credible. The court established in Aguiler v. Texas (1964), created a test to determine whether an informant tips could be used as probable cause to search warrants and Spinelli v. United States which developed the Aguiler-Spinelli test fully. Bradley’s 4th amendment right to unreasonable search and seizures was violated with the search of his locker and cellphone. Stafford Unified School District #1 v. Redding (2009), provided that school searches violates the 4th amendment if they lack reasonable suspicion or do not present a danger.

While searching the house the police officers found a .22 caliber rifle gun that was introduced into evidence. During the trial the defendants grandmother claims that she didn’t know why the officers wanted to search her home, because they didn’t tell her what was

Even in public places, an individual is rightfully given a reasonable amount of privacy. By the individual entering the phone booth, he sought out privacy from the public; although the public was able to view him, the public was unable to hear him. The individual expected the protection of the Fourth Amendment as he assumed that his conversation would not be broadcasted to other listeners. Once this fact has been certified, it’s reasonable to believe that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals, and not areas, from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Government actively listened to the petitioner’s telephone call by recording what was said, constituting a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment that did not require a search warrant based on sufficient probable cause (p. 32-38).

Mr. Jones filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the invalid search conducted by law enforcement.

Petitioner disingenuously attempts to circumvent this Hearing Officer’s previous orders dismissing Beaumont II and Beaumont III by re-phrasing the same issues; that the District did not comply with Orders 3-7 of the Decision and Order in Beaumont I. It has already been established that the implementation of a prior Hearing Officer’s order in a prior case is not subject to a new due process complaint. The allegations regarding appropriate goals and objectives in Paragraph 31-A are nothing more than a recitation of Order 3-7 loosely veiled as new issues but nevertheless inextricably entwined with the Decision and Order in Beaumont I.

Despite the overwhelming significance of the rights protected and guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, many questions and concerns existed regarding police and court procedures and practices. The most important of those questions was whether or not illegally obtained evidence could be used in courts. Before 1914, any evidence obtained by the police could be used in both Federal and State courts, regardless of any constitutional violations that might have taken place during the search and seizure of that evidence. Such practice has spawned multiple occurrences of police misconduct. Before that date, many police officers did not follow constitutional requirements. They could freely search individuals and households and seize evidence without appropriate warrants. Needless to say, that such poor performance resulted in illegal arrests and unjust prosecutions of innocent people. One of such cases had become a landmark and initiated the long process of reforms in regard to the Fourth Amendment and police conduct. The Supreme Court articulation of the exclusionary rule has come in Weeks v. United States case in 1914. That case has changed the Fourth Amendment and related laws forever. The defendant, Mr. Freemont Weeks was convicted based on the evidence illegally seized from him during the warrantless search. The appeal was initiated by the defense attorney, thus bringing the case to the attention of the highest Court. The United