United States' Grand Strategy during the Cold War with Emphasis on the Conflict in Vietnam

Hess argues that the threat of the USSR and Communism “left the US no choice but to stand up to the challenge posed by Vietnam”. Direct confrontation was impossible as the USSR was a nuclear power, therefore the only choice available was “a policy of containment”; previous success in Korea gives validity to this view. Hess states Vietnam was the centre of the “Domino Theory”, that a communist Vietnam “would inexorably lead to the collapse of other non-communist states”. All communist states were believed to be puppets of the USSR so an increase in Soviet allies would tip the global power balance against the US.

In her book The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990, author Marilyn Young examines the series of political and military struggles between the United States and Vietnam, a nation that has been distinctively separated as the South and the North. Young chooses to express the daily, weekly, monthly progresses of the affairs collectively called the Vietnam Wars, focusing on the American interventions in the foreign soil. She seeks to provide an answer to a question that has haunted the world for years: What was the reason behind the United States interfering in the internal affairs of a foreign country in which it had no claims at all? Young discloses the overt as well as covert actions undertaken by the U.S. government officials regarding the foreign affairs with Vietnam and the true nature of the multifaceted objectives of each and every person that’s involved had.

During the Lyndon Baines Johnson presidential administration, both those policy makers who supported America’s involvement in Vietnam and those who opposed the war were part of the “containment generation.” They had reached political maturity during World War II and the early years of the Cold War and had experienced the intense anticommunism of the McCarthy era of the early 1950s. These leaders understood and applied the lessons of American nationalism, which had the primary message that the U.S. was the dominating nation that had to embrace its responsibility to aid and improve nations in America’s image. Therefore, when they saw that there was a threat of the spread of communism to areas of Southeast Asia, a majority of the

The political instability in Vietnam from 1950 to 1975 between the communist North Vietnam and anti-communist South Vietnam during the Cold War era has led to the United States’ inevitable intervention in Vietnam. The main motivators for the United States’ incremental decision to intervene and commitment in Vietnam can be viewed as an accumulation of socio-political, political and economic catalysts. In recognition that there were many other factors that may have contributed to the U.S’s involvement in the conflict in Vietnam, this essay will largely focus on these three factors. As the cold war resonates, the American’s crusade was propelled by the fears of the domino theory and perception of Communist threat and expansion affected the

Kenneth Waltz is a renowned international theorist who has a neorealism view. Waltz believes that nuclear weapons can be seen as a positive thing. In the book he is associated with the belief that “more may be better.” He talks about states creating their own sense of security to ward off internal and

In 1960s, the US was faced with another crisis of communist expansion in the war between North and South Vietnam. The Kennedy Administration decided to further pursue their containment strategy out of fear being seen by the international community as weak towards communism. During the Johnson Administration, an attack against American vessels that happened in the Gulf of Tonkin led to President Johnson being granted the ability to conduct broad military operations without congressional approval. The American public began to largely oppose American intervention in Vietnam because the optimistic statements made by the government ran contradictory to the reports of the violent fighting by American news outlets. During the Nixon administration, the US switched to a policy, later known as Vietnamization, where the main goal was to strengthen the South Vietnamese forces and provide them with better armaments so they can better defend themselves. Vietnamization proved to be ineffective as the South Vietnamese forces were unable to hold their own against the North without US air support as proven during Operation Lam Son 719 and the Easter Offensive. The signing of the Paris Peace Accords officially ended US involvement in the Vietnam War. The US followed containment policies during beginning of the war due to the underlying fear of the spread of communism and since the policies were inherited from previous

“I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” This declaration, made by former President Harry S. Truman on March 12, 1947, is part of the Truman Doctrine, and was the basis for U.S. involvement in Western Europe throughout the Cold War. Although the North Atlantic Treaty, and the resulting North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was established during the Cold War “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down,” NATO has persisted since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. This essay will seek to examine the U.S. decision to create and participate in NATO. It will begin by providing a history of NATO and the U.S. decision to participate in NATO before considering how this decision is both an instance of continuity and change in U.S. foreign policy since former President George Washington’s Farewell Address. The essay will conclude by considering the legacy of this decision and its impact on U.S. foreign policy. While this essay will consider the period of time leading up to the formation of NATO and will briefly touch on the present day, greatest consideration will be paid to the time period immediately preceding and following the formation of NATO in 1949.

The Cold War era proxy war known as the Vietnam War wrecked global havoc during 1955-1975. Although the destruction on the ground occurred in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the bloodshed of the war was just one part of a much larger worldwide communism versus capitalism battle headed by the United States and the Soviet Union. For the U.S., diplomatic and military policies had never before been so tightly intertwined with domestic policies. The war in Vietnam had such an impact on the home front in America that the term, “The Vietnam Syndrome” is still repeated to this day. The war, which is sometimes seen as a part of the larger anti-communist policy of ‘containment’, is largely to blame for the near destruction of three presidencies, as well as causing numerous political and social divides, a detrimental effect on the U.S. economy, and a credibility gap that caused distrust between government and the people. The focus on the war meant that many domestic issues such as the civil rights movement, the war on poverty, and Johnson’s ideology of the ‘Great Society’, were neglected by the government and therefore limited in their progress. The overall domestic impact of the war in Vietnam was largely negative and extremely divisive.

For the United States government, the failure of U.S intervention in Vietnam provided lessons about where and under what circumstances the United States should intervene in foreign conflicts. Throughout the mid-twentieth century, U.S. foreign policy was characterized by the idea of “containment”. Coined by George Kennan in 1946,

The Vietnam War had discredited the United States’ stereotype of being the strongest world power for being “undefeatable” in war by trapping the most powerful foreign nations into a merely undefeatable war, and by destroying any hope that the United States had for institutional change in Vietnam. The United States’ involvement in domestic affairs had again proved that the nation felt confident enough to present itself as the “problem solver” in issues regarding foreign policy. The main intention of Americans was to bring forth an established democracy to Vietnam that would overpower

In fact, remarkable similarities exist between the Korean War and the Vietnam War; from the US support of a dictatorial and corrupt anti-communist regime to its conception of communism as a monolithic entity, under which all communist nations were necessarily allies, rather than individuals to be dealt with separately. However, though those parallels, Vietnam era policy-makers did not apply the lessons of the Korean War to the Vietnam War. Rather, they did not seem to recognize those lessons as lessons at all, and repeated in

The investigation assesses the level of success President Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization policy attained during the Vietnam War to end U.S. involvement in the war. In the strive to evaluate the level of success this policy demonstrated, the investigation evaluates the ability of the policy to equip, expand, and train Southern Vietnamese forces and allocate them to a substantial combat position, all while simultaneously reducing the quantity of U.S. combat troops in a steady manner. The Vietnamization policy is investigated and analyzed by both its causes and effects. The motivation that led to Nixon’s creation of this

Realism is a theory which believes that sovereign states are the primary actors in the international system. It also believes that the international system has always been anarchic due to the nature of states not trusting each other and each state seeking to gain or maximize its own power capability. The Realist approach to the Cold War was also that of an “anarchical constitutive” and had seen the Cold War as something that was not out of the ordinary. The realists believed that states are always competing to maximize their own power, “the basic premise of its understanding is that the Cold War was not historically unique. the Cold War rather reflected in general terms the ongoing logic of inter-state conflict derived from the anarchical constitutive nature of the international system, and the ‘power maximization’ policies of states” R.Saull (2001:7).

Furthermore, according to realist, it is not possible for “rival powers [to] cooperate on…security issues of common interest” (Kegley, 28). In fact, cooperation among states is rare because the distribution of relative gains deriving

In “Structural Realism...” Waltz defends his theory of Structural Realism against criticism that its tenets are no longer valid in a post-Cold War world. The international system, he writes, is still anarchic, even though that system is unipolar instead of bipolar as it was during the Cold War, and that states still seek hegemony and power. A nation 's ideals and internal factors may count for something (he posits that the US intervention after the collapse of Yugoslavia was the result of such pressures),3 but they certainly shouldn 't. States should make decisions based on the idea of maintaining their own security and maintaining a balance of power in the international system.