United States Vs. 2d Cir: Case Study

HOUSTON GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY; Inez Grant; Morehouse Parish School Board; Horace Mann Insurance Company and Lloyd Gray, Defendants-Appellants-Appellees.

Jan Hughes, Plaintiff-Appellant v, Boston Scientific corporation, Defendant-Apellee., 631F .3d 762 (2011), United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit (January 21, 2011)

The case that I have chosen to discuss is Case 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 (1999) 978 P.2d 2 20 Cal.4th 785 Peter Ramirez, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. YOSEMITE WATER COMPANY, INC., Defendant am Respondent, No. S070114, Supreme Court of California, June 17, 1999.

D.A case between a citizen from Maine and a citizen from Rhode Island, where the claim is more than $75,000.

See Electcrostim Med. Servs., Inc. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 962 F. Supp. 2d 887, 898-99 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (granting motion to dismiss); Encompass Office Solutions, Inc. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-02487-L, 2012 WL 3030376, *8-*9 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss); Team Healthcare/Diagnostic Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., No. 3:10-cv-1441-BH, 2012 WL 1617087, *6 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss); Mid-Town Surgical Ctr., LLP v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tex., No. H-11-2086 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2012) (granting motion to dismiss); DAC Surgical Partners, P.A. v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. H-11-1355, 2011 WL 3841946, *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss);

Carvin v. Arkansas Power and Light, No. 90-6055, 1991 WL 540481, slip op. at 4-7 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 2, 1991)

Plaintiff, OSCEOLA SC, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company d/b/a St. Cloud Regional Medical Center, (“Hospital”) by and through its undersigned counsel, sues Defendant, Rafael Fleites, M.D. (“Physician”), and alleges:

Leagle. (2008). Garelli Wong & Associates, Inc, v. Nichols. (551 F.Supp.2d 704). Retrieved from http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?page=7&xmldoc=20081255551FSupp2d704_11203.xml&docbase=CSLWAR3-2007-CURR&SizeDisp=7

For these reasons, we determined that the trial Court had personal jurisdiction over Allstate, and its decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. As we determined that the defense opposed by Allstate was incorrectly granted, it is proper to comment that even if this Court would have considered that Allstate was not present in the State of Georgia, and as result the LAS was applicable, we would arrive to the same conclusion because all the activities performed by Allstate in this forum do meet the standard of “minimum contacts” as required by the constitutional test. It is also necessary to assert that according to the records, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was untimely alleged. In accordance to the Georgia Rules of Civil Procedure such defense should be alleged before answering the merits of the Complaint, or concurrently with it. Because Allstate appeared and first proceed to “deny any and all liability” in the case without previously or concurrently interposing the lack of jurisdiction, it did lose the opportunity to allege this defense, and it waived any

MDM Group Associates, Inc.v. CX Reinsurance Company Ltd. 165 P.3d 882 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) ch 35

Brian Culp and the Frederick Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Movants”), through the undersigned counsel, move this Court pursuant to Md. Rule 2-403, Md. Rule 2-510, and Md. Code (2008, 2017 suppl.) § 9-405 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), for a protective order as to the Subpoena and Notice of Deposition of Brian Culp, Propounded by Defendants, Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc.; Dave Swagger, a/k/a/ David Swagger; and Randolph Scott (“Defendants”), and in support thereof, state as follows:

This has resulted with Cycloplatform’s maintenance contracts unworkable and losing revenue alluding to implications of deterring or preventing Cycloplatform from engaging in competitive conduct in the market under s 46(1)(c) . Greenbike’s use of its substantial market power would breach the CCA on the condition it was for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor under s46(1)(a) . Furthermore, it is not necessary to establish the relevant purpose was the only purpose or the main purpose. The two-step process taken into consideration in the Melway case subsumes whether the disputed conduct was materially facilitated the firm’s possession of a substantial degree of power and any rational business justification of the firm’s conduct. It does appear likely that Greenbike’s action was facilitated by its market power but there are no conclusive proof as even smaller competitors could do the same if their parts are exclusively made. However, there is no rational justification for the difference in

administrative situation. It is a rewritten version of an earlier case entitled, “American Chemical Corporation,” HBS no.

R (on the application of Sue Axon (Claimant) v Secretary of State for Health (Defendant) [2006] EWHC 372 (Admin).

2. Describe briefly the history of the litigation of this case (which courts heard the case, which way did they rule, what court is now deciding the case, which judges are hearing the case in this court)?