Using Material From Smart And Armstrong

In a series of relatively simple though complexly-worded (out of necessity) thought experiments regarding body-swapping and changes to memory and the mind, Bernard Williams attempts to demonstrate that identity should be identified with the body rather than with the mind when identity is extended into the future (and by extension during the present). That is, though it is typical for identity to be associated with the mind at any given moment, Williams argues that the logic that supports this intuitive association does not hold up over longer periods of time, and that anticipation of the future leads to an association of identity with the body rather than with the mind. Whether or not Williams is successful in this attempt is a matter of much debate, with this author finding some fundamental flaws in the very premise of the comparisons and thus the conclusions, however the argument is fairly elegant and persuasive and certainly worth of closer inspection. A careful reading of the argument might lead one to a conclusion opposite to that which was intended, but is no less rewarding for this unusual quirk.

The mind-brain identity theory is an ontological perspective which centers around the idea that the mind can be closely associated with the brain to be considered the same. In other words, a person’s mind processes are coherent with their brain processes. It is a significant topic included in the philosophy of mind. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the identity theory of mind is “to the effect that these experiences just are brain processes, not merely correlated with brain processes”. In this

In this essay, I am going to write a response to the objection raised by the functionalists towards identity theory. Identity theory is a form of physicalism; it states that a particular mental state is identical to a particular physical state of body and brain, for instance mental sensation such as pain is simply just the firing of C-fibres (Smart, 1959). This is a reductionist view as it reduces our psychological state to a materialistic and physical form. A prominent objection against identity theory is Functionalism, in which the main advocate Hilary Putnam stated that identity theory is too narrow as it ignores multiple realisability. In the next paragraph, I will write a little more about functionalism, and in the end, I will ultimately conclude that functionalism is a better theory than identity theory.

In David Armstrong’s thought-provoking work titled, The Nature of Mind, he explains that the most convincing way to make sense of the mind-body problem is to approach it in a materialistic way. Specifically, Armstrong shows that the science of physico-chemical processes of the brain is the best way to explain the nature of our mind. He goes on to explain traditional and dispositional behaviorism, and states his own materialistic take on behaviorism. His arguments throughout his paper are very logical, and though there have been arguments against his explanations, he effectively justifies the materialistic view of the mind.

As the tool of scientific investigation increase, the relationship between the mind and the brain has never been more intimate. Chemical changes in our brain could lead to heightened euphoria or it can lead to the most profound depression. Damages to the brain can lead to changes that can eliminate the some abilities of the brain, such as smell, vision, or even the ability to recognized faces. Therefore, this is at that vary lease a powerful correlation between the state of the mind and state of the brain. But this is not enough for the Identity theories, so they go above and beyond this to explain this profound view.

The Identity theory maintains a monistic belief by considering states of mind as being indistinguishable to brain states. Mental experiences including feeling pain, and possessing mental images are not correlated with, but in fact are brain processes (Smart, 2007). When dealing with the question of whether the mind and brain are identical, identity theorists differentiate between two forms, Type Identity and Token Identity (Schneider). Token Identity theory considers that mental

The brain has been determined to be the control centre for all nervous messages in humans. The complexity of the brain allows us to interpret these nervous messages into thoughts which in turn allow us to respond to them. To be able to have a sense of consciousness the brain must receive some form of stimulus. Type physicalism/identity theory which was first developed by Place (1956), which describes how different mental states are triggered due to the firing of the corresponding fibres. Philosophers like Place (1956), Smart (1959), Feigl (1972), and Armstrong

Showing only the physical side of this transformation, Bliss presents the assumption that the physical side of human identity is

The idea that mental states are non-reducible properties of brain states is the central tenant of a theory of mind called property dualism. However, before we can assess the theory we must be aware that the question assumes the existence of mental states and as such we cannot answer this question from some perspectives (e.g. eliminative materialism)

Materialists believe that the mind and brain interact with each other as compared to the dualist’s argument that they are two different entities. According to Kelly, the brain and mind interact because the things going on in the mind can result in significant changes in the brain and vice versa4. If dualism is correct then the mind and the brain should be located within the same space to allow for their interaction. This argument goes against the dualists’ view that the mind and the brain do not exist within the same

In the 1960’s, Hilary Putnam introduced the world of philosophy to the multiple realizability argument against identity theory. Her main point in her argument was that, if identity theory holds to be true, than all living creatures who experience pain, such as humans, mammals, reptiles, etc., must have a commonly shared physical-chemical brain state which directly relates to a certain mental

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

John B. Watson (1878-1958), not to be confused with John H. Watson from Sherlock Holmes’ fame, left an indelible mark on the field of psychology. Prior to Watson, psychologists and philosophers theorized about internal, or mental, processes and consciousness. Myers (2013) states, “Watson urged his colleagues to discard reference to inner thoughts, feelings, and motives” (p. 268), and instead, “limit ourselves to things that can be observed…[i.e.] behavior—what the organism does or says” (Watson, as cited in Berger, 2014, p. 42). Watson’s views, along with Pavlov’s and Bechterev’s, would launch the behavioral school of psychology. The radical behaviorism Watson believed would not allow him to study or theorize about internal experiences such as emotions and their influence on thinking and behavior.

Are minds physical things, or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will? Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality, selfish? (Sober 203). These are questions relevant to philosophy of the mind and discussed through a variety of arguments. Two of the most important arguments with this discussion are Cartesian dualism and logical behaviorism, both of which argue the philosophy of the mind in two completely different ways. Robert Lane, a professor at the University of West Georgia, define the two as follows: Cartesian dualism is the theory that the mind and body are two

The identity theory is not concerned to find neural correlations for mental states for brain states are everything that is meant by mental states. When I complain of a pain, then, whether or not I